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CHAPTER ONE 
EXPERIENCE: THE CRUCIBLE FOR 
RELIGION IN JOHNSON'S SERMONS 
I 
Even the most cursory reading of Samuel Johnson's 
writing makes it clear that he was intensely interested in 
religious and moral issues. Walter Jackson Bate has con-
structed an extremely lucid analysis of the complex 
interrelationship between the religious and secular 
aspects of Samuel Johnson's definition of--and exhorta-
tions to--right conduct in the Rambler essays.1 Bate's 
analysis is an essential point of departure for this 
dissertation which focuses on the complexity of that same 
relationship within Johnson's Sermons. This dissertation 
will explore the sophisticated interrelationship in the 
Sermons between the religious and the secular aspects of 
Johnson's exhortation to right thinking and living as 
basic for an appreciation of the solace he offers us for 
the vacuity of life. 
1 Walter Jackson Bate, The Achievement of Samuel 
Johnson (New York: Oxford University Press,-r955). See, 
especially, Chapters II, III, and IV. 
1 
Yet, the question remains to be asked: Why a study 
of Johnson's Sermons? While the study of the religious 
views and moral philosophy of Johnson has been a subject 
of great interest for more than two hundred years, few 
scholars have turned their attention to the Sermons. 
2 
since nearly all of Johnson's writing reflects his 
interest in religion, it would seem logical and worthwhile 
to consider in some detail the single context, apart from 
his Prayers and Meditations, which contains his religious 
views in their most concentrated form. 
Johnson believed that the question of what one must 
do to be saved--"the important question which it becomes 
every human being to study from the first hour of reason 
to the last" (Sermon 28, 302)--could be seriously 
considered only if men could recognize without self-
delusion some essential characteristics of their nature: 
the dangerous sallies of the imagination, the insatiable 
desires of the will, and man's limited use of reason. I 
have no doubt that these principles expressed by Johnson 
in his Sermons can be found in his other works. I make no 
claim for the uniqueness of the Sermons. Yet, after 
having said this, I must state that I do find the Sermons 
different from Johnson's other works because throughout 
the Sermons he portrays the utter pervasiveness of the 
vacuity of life. Indeed, the idea that human life is in a 
special sense "vacuous" may be seen as the starting point 
3 
of Samuel Johnson's thought on the diverse aspects of 
human nature which he treats in the Sermons. His basic 
metaphor for human experience is the empty receptacle 
which cannot tolerate its own emptiness; it is used in the 
sermons to describe that very problem which most vexed 
him--the problem of reconciling the misery and wickedness 
of the temporal state with the Christian hope of redemp-
tion and eternal happiness. 
In the Sermons, we find no dethroned monarchs, no 
Abyssinian princes searching the world for the perfect way 
of life, no famous poets disappointed of a pension. The 
world of the Sermons is largely the world of shopkeepers 
and merchants; it is a world of middle-class persons with 
modest ambitions and humble hopes. Johnson shows us that 
sorrow is sorrow regardless of the social or intellectual 
sphere it operates in; every man needs sympathy from time 
to time, needs his hopes encouraged. Most importantly, 
the Sermons demonstrate that religion is efficacious in 
this world, and that even these ordinary shopkeepers can 
aspire to salvation and can attain it with as much toil as 
their superiors. 
Johnson's Sermons demand an absorbed and reflective 
reading in which the reader at every point compares his or 
her own way of living with the life described in the 
sermon text. Thus, a sermon like Sermon 1£, on the folly 
of vanity, will have failed in its effect for someone who 
4 
regards it as the sort of thing that happens only to other 
people. The sermon begins to work only when the reader 
enters and engages it, associating its analysis with some 
half-forgotten private experiences and realizing, perhaps 
with surprise, his or her own susceptibility. Walter 
Jackson Bate says that ''it does not minimize Johnson's 
criticism or indeed his writing on human experience itself 
to say that his ultimate greatness lies in the example 
they provide" (Achievement, 233). Johnson pursues his 
readers beyond the page, back into the pragmatism of daily 
life: 
If we cast our eyes over the earth, and extend 
our observations through the system of human 
beings, what shall we find but scenes of misery 
and innumerable varieties of calamity and 
distress, the pains of sickness, the wounds of 
casualty, the gripings of hunger, and the cold 
of nakedness; wretches wandering without an 
habitation, exposed to the contempt of the 
proud, and the insults of the cruel, goaded 
forward, by the stings of poverty, to dishonest 
acts, which perhaps relieve their present 
misery, only to draw some more dreadful distress 
upon them. And what are we taught, by all these 
different states of unhappiness? what, but the 
necessity of that virtue by which they are 
relieved; by which the orphan may be supplied 
with a father, and the widow with a defender; by 
which nakedness may be clothed, and sickness set 
free from adventitious pains; the stranger 
solaced in his wanderings, and the· hungry 
restored to vigour and to ease? (Sermon 19, 
207). ~ 
The Sermons are not merely relevant for Sundays; rather, 
Johnson follows the reader into the street, the 
marketplace, and the coffeehouse as he puts religion to 
5 
the test of addressing the practical realities of Monday 
and Tuesday. 
Indeed, Johnson's Sermons fulfill his own description 
of the didactic function of an author: 
The task of an author is, either to teach what 
is not known, or to recommend known truths, by 
his manner of adorning them; either to let new 
light in upon the mind, and open new scenes to 
the prospect, or to vary the dress and situation 
of common objects, so as to give them fresh 
grace and more powerful attractions, to spread 
such flowers over the regions through which the 
intellect has already made its progress, as may 
tempt it to return, and take a second view of 
things hastily passed over, or negligently 
regarded. 
Either of these labours is very difficult, 
because, that they may not be fruitless, men 
must not only be persuaded of their errors, but 
reconciled to their guide; they must not only 
confess their ignorance, but, what is still less 
pleasing, must allow that he from whom they are 
to learn is more knowing than themselves 
(Rambler l, 14-15). 
Johnson helps us locate each of the vices he treats in the 
Sermons somewhere in ourselves. Just how he does this is 
not immediately clear; the present dissertation will 
explore some of the strategies Johnson employs for 
achieving this response from the auditors of his Sermons. 
For example, he does not confess his own failings in any 
overt way, nor does he lure us in with many anecdotes or 
vivid pictures of evil; rather, the Sermons show us with 
terrible clarity the logic of our personal involvement in 
sin, tracing its origin in man's nature to its pragmatic 
consequences in daily life and never allowing us to feel 
superior. 
Since Johnson's psychological insights into human 
nature play such an important role in understanding his 
pragmatic approach to religion in the Sermons, some 
clarification of the term psychology is in order. In the 
seventeenth century, the word referred to a study of the 
doctrine of the soul or the science of spirits. However, 
by the 1730's, it had taken on its modern sense, being 
applied to mental processes rather than to a study of 
spirits.2 Kathleen Grange says that 
from about 1690 to 1800, psychology was con-
sidered to be an account of the intellectual 
operations of the mind, as in Locke's study of 
"ideas" in the Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing (1690) or in Charles Bonnet's study of 
the soul and its faculties in his Essai de 
psychologie (1754).3 
Even more importantly, however, Grange adds that for some 
thinkers the word psychology included only intellectual 
operations--"memory, imagination, judgment, reason, and 
6 
attention"--and was not a study of the emotions which fell 
under the term moral philosophy (444). While Johnson does 
not use the word psychology, preferring instead the 
2 See the term psychology as defined in the Oxford 
English Dictionary. 
3 Kathleen M. Grange, "Pinel and Eighteenth-Century 
Psychiatry," Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 35 
(1961), 444. 
phrase, "anatomy of the mind" (Adventurer 95, 427),4 his 
understanding of man's nature clearly includes both 
emotion and intellect. Indeed, in his Preface to 
Shakespeare, Johnson unites the concepts which Grange 
artificially distinguishes as psychology and moral 
philosophy when he describes a science which attempts 
to analyze the mind, to trace the passions to 
their sources, to unfold the seminal principles 
of vice and virtue, or sound the depths of the 
heart for the motives of action (88).5 
The complexity and extensiveness of this description 
is real and not rhetorical; pursuing an almost Lockean 
methodology, Johnson included the whole scope of man's 
attributes in his writings. "The anatomy of the mind, as 
that of the body," Johnson wrote, "must perpetually 
7 
exhibit the same appearances" (Adventurer _22, 427) because 
in spite of the temporary effects of unique events or the 
arbitrary behavior resulting from accidental customs, 
"human nature is always the same" (Adventurer 99, 431). 
Such uniformity permits Johnson to describe human nature--
4 Samuel Johnson, The Idler and The Adventurer, ed. 
W. J. Bate, John M. Bullitt, and r::--F-:--Powell, Vol. II of 
The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson (New 
Have~Yale University Press,l963). Subsequent 
references are to this edition and are designated by essay 
and page number. 
5 Samuel Johnson, Preface to Shakespeare, ed. Arthur 
Sherbo, Vols. VII and VIII of The Yale Edition of the 
Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven:---Yale University 
Press,1968). 
8 
a profile of man's basic mental constitution together with 
the underlying motivations for his actions--and when 
explained appropriately, it also allows ordinary man to 
understand his temperament, his desires, and his potential 
for choice and action. Indeed, Johnson says the precept, 
~ thyself, is 
a dictate, which, in the whole extent of its 
meaning, may be said to comprise all the 
speculation requisite to a moral agent. For 
what more can be necessary to the regulation of 
life, than the knowledge of our original, our 
end, our duties, and our relation to other 
beings? (Rambler 24, 131). 
Since, then, "every error in human conduct must arise from 
ignorance of ourselves," one obligation of Johnson as a 
sermon writer was to remind his audience about the 
limitations of human nature. He saw that the actual 
battleground where the fight against evil and unhappiness 
takes place was largely a psychological one--in the sense 
of the term discussed earlier, encompassing both emotion 
and intellect--a battle over self-inflicted pains and 
self-created frustrations.6 As we shall see from an 
examination of his Sermons, the whole realm of Johnson's 
understanding of human nature included not only man's 
intellectual and emotional faculties but, as an adjunct, 
man's spiritual aspirations as well. Indeed, no attentive 
6 Johnson frequently points to the psychological 
basis for unhappiness. See, for example, Sermons l and 
11_; Ramblers 66, 68, 72, and 98. 
9 
reader of Johnson has ever doubted the truth of Boswell's 
assertion that "the history of his mind as to religion is 
an important article" (Life, I, 67). However, Johnson's 
modern, almost "existential," understanding of the nature 
of man in the Sermons, in contrast to the positions 
reflected by the English homiletic tradition, has not been 
much considered by contemporary scholars. Moreover, an 
examination of the pragmatic orientation of the Sermons 
has been hindered by two marked phenomena in Johnsonian 
criticism: (1) an inability to separate biographical 
interest in Johnson from an investigation into his work; 
(2) a narrow or specialized focus which tends to distort 
Johnson's assertions regarding the integration he found in 
human nature. Each of these hindrances bears looking at 
because, by doing so, we can better discover what 
specifically remains to be done. 
Samuel Johnson has been viewed chiefly as a 
biographical subject by many critics. Seen by some as 
unquestionably representative of eighteenth-century 
England, Johnson has been labeled as the perpetrator or 
the victim of the shortsightedness and the defects of his 
age. The contrast between the public and the private 
Johnson has been generally noted and frequently disparaged 
as evidence of simplicity rather than complexity. The 
fact that Boswell defends Johnson against the charge of 
writing on behalf of a faction and in return for a pension 
10 
indicates the fondness with which opponents deliver and 
even acquaintances adopt ad hominem arguments. 
The first difficulty, then, in Johnsonian criticism 
has resulted from an incomplete distinction between 
"psychologizing ~Johnson" and "psychologizing of him."7 
Leopold Damrosch, Jr. has remarked that "the world has 
never been willing to take Johnson's works apart from 
their writer,"8 and this has been especially true when the 
investigation has touched upon psychological matters. 
Johnson's character and his life--his melancholy, his 
fears, and his habits--are so interesting in light of 
modern psychoanalysis that almost any discussion of his 
writings about human nature quickly focuses upon the 
author rather than upon the ideas he is presenting. 
The phenomenon of shifting the emphasis away from the 
writings to the author and thus subordinating his 
philosophy to his biography has taken several different 
forms. The oldest and most extreme version is that of 
some writers, many of whom were psychiatrists, who drew 
upon Johnsonian materials with the goal of diagnosing 
Johnson's "condition" or "problem" according to the 
theories of modern psychiatry. Johnson's works were 
7 Donald J. Greene, ed., Samuel Johnson: A 
Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, 1965), 5. 
8 Leopold Damrosch, Jr., Samuel Johnson and the 
Tragic Sense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1972), 61. 
consulted not in an effort to understand them critically 
or aesthetically, but for clues by which Johnson himself 
might be used "as a case history. 11 9 
11 
In his discussion of the apathetic fallacy, historian 
David Hackett Fischer points out the logical absurdity of 
insisting upon a psychogenetic basis for other people's 
ideologies because such a position regards "rational men 
as if they were not rational," involves "metahistorical 
doctrines which transcend empiricism" (and are therefore 
neither provable nor disprovable), and consists of little 
9 A brief survey of Johnson's "doctors" yields a wide 
range of diagnoses for his personality. Johnson is 
labelled as a person who suffered from anxiety hysteria, 
sexual impotence, oral and anal aggression, an inferiority 
complex, an Oedipus complex, etc. For example, see: 
William Kenney, "Dr. Johnson and the Psychiatrists," 
American Imago, 17 (Spring 1960), 76; R. MacDonald Ladell, 
"The Neurosis of Dr. Samuel Johnson," British Journal of 
Medical Psychology, 9 (1929), 314-323; Charles MacLaurin, 
"Dr. Johnson," in Mere Mortals: Medico-Historical Essays 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1925), 13-35; Edward Hitschman, 
"Samuel Johnson's Character: A Psychoanalytic Interpreta-
tion," Psychoanalytic Review, 32 (April 1945), 207-218; w. 
Russell Brain, "Authors and Psychopaths," British Medical 
Journal, 2 (24 December 1949), 1433-1439, and "A Post-
Mortem on Dr. Johnson," London Hospital Gazette, 37 (May, 
June 1934), 225-230, 288-289; Katharine c. Balderston, 
"Johnson's Vile Melancholy," in The Age of Johnson: 
Essays Presented to Chauncey Brewster Tinker, ed. F. w. 
Hilles (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), 10-11; 
George Irwin, "Dr. Johnson's Troubled Mind," in Greene, 
ed., Critical Essays, 28-29, and Samuel Johnson: A 
Personality in Conflict (London: Oxford University Press, 
1971), 76-79; Herman Liebert, "Reflections on Samuel 
Johnson," in Greene, ed. Critical Essays, 17; Walter B. c. 
Watkins, Perilous Balance (1939; rpt., Cambridge, MA: 
Walker De Berry, 1960), 91; Bertrand H. Bronson, Johnson 
Agonistes and Other Essays (1944; rpt., Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1965), 8. 
12 
more than "motivational special pleading. 11 10 Furthermore, 
the ever-present implication that Johnson's ideas are the 
product of his "problem" verges upon the psychogenetic 
fallacy; it seeks to subvert an idea by criticizing its 
origin.11 For example, Walter B. C. Watkins traces 
Johnson's understanding of human nature to "a projection 
of his own personality" (49) and says that Johnson has 
spun "his own bitter mental experience into the web of 
wisdom" (59). Rasselas has been seen as autobiographical, 
with Rasselas, Imlac, and the mad astronomer representing 
three different aspects of Johnson.12 The ending of the 
Vision of Theodore has been called "an eloquent evocation 
of his [Johnson's] own condition" (Damrosch, 63). Arieh 
Sachs has argued that "the central assumptions of 
Johnson's thought gain added depth and force when viewed 
in terms of Johnson's particular being, in terms, that is, 
of his biography. 11 13 Such a shift of attention as this is 
certainly not unreasonable, but Sachs goes much further, 
10 David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: 
Toward ~ Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1970), 193-195. 
11 William s. Sahakian and Mabel Lewis Sahakian, 
Ideas of the Great Philosophers (New York: Barnes and 
Noble,~966), 22. 
12 Richard B. Hovey, "Dr. Samuel Johnson, Psychia-
trist," Modern Language Quarterly, 15 (December 1954), 
321-325. 
13 Arieh Sachs, Passionate Intelligence (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 10. 
13 
saying that "the experience of a desperately neurotic man 
was turned into a generalized scheme of morals and 
religion which could claim universal validity" (14). Such 
an assertion, coming early in the book, tends to reduce 
the integrity of Johnson's ideas, no matter how seriously 
and judiciously those ideas are examined. 
some of these evaluations do help us to understand 
Johnson better, and insofar as they touch upon recog-
nizable aspects of his character--such as his melancholy 
and fear of death--they have value. Yet, to be told that 
Johnson had an Oedipus complex, for example, leaves us 
nearly as ignorant as we were before, and a good deal more 
uncomfortable, because we know the diagnosis was made not 
from a clinical analysis of the person, but from a 
selection of anecdotes about him examined two hundred 
years after he died. 
The psychoanalytically-oriented scholars' assertion 
that Johnson's mental condition gave rise to his thoughts 
suggests the less speculative critical methodology 
employed in this dissertation; namely, that Johnson's 
writings help us to gain at least a general insight into 
his character. Tracing the results of this hypothesis has 
yielded productive Johnsonian scholarship over the past 
twenty-five years.14 The orientation of these critics has 
14 For example, see: John Wain, Samuel Johnson: A 
Biography (New York: Viking Press, 1974); Peter Quennell, 
Samuel Johnson: His Friends and Enemies (New York: 
14 
been extremely useful because it has contributed some 
credible information about Johnson, and when Johnson drew 
upon or generalized from his own life, as he often did, 
this has been helpfully pointed out. Nevertheless, the 
tendency often has been to lose track of the philosophy 
through intense scrutiny of its psychological origins. It 
is essentially unfair to an author to ascribe his views to 
personal problems or to his need to believe because we 
then tend to cease taking those ideas seriously. Johnson 
wrote expressly about this problem: 
Those whom the appearance of virtue, or the 
evidence of genius, have tempted to a nearer 
knowledge of the writer in whose performances 
they may be found, have indeed had frequent 
reason to repent their curiosity; the bubble 
that sparkled before them has become common 
water at the touch; the phantom of perfection 
has vanished when they wished to press it to 
their bosom (Rambler 14, 74). 
Even more significant than this reason is that which 
Johnson cites in response to the charge of hypocrisy on 
the part of writers who cannot live as well as they write: 
it may be prudent for a writer, who apprehends 
that he shall not enforce his own maxims by his 
domestic character, to conceal his name that he 
may not injure them (Rambler 14, 78). 
American Heritage Press, 1972); Walter Jackson Bate, 
Samuel Johnson (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 
1975). 
15 
The coup de grace to all efforts which insisted upon 
a psychogenetic basis for an individual's ideology was 
delivered by William James in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience. James termed any attempt to judge an idea on 
the basis of the author's life "the genetic fallacy." He 
argued that such a practice was altogether illegitimate 
and observed that some very sound discoveries in human 
history were made by individuals whose sanity was 
sometimes in question. Moreover, James asserted that if 
an individual attempted to discredit another's religious 
beliefs on the grounds that they were simply projections 
of insecurities and fears, he would respond that a lack of 
belief could be likewise related to hostility toward 
authority figures.15 
As we shall see, Johnson dramatically anticipated 
William James' position on "the genetic fallacy." Indeed, 
Johnson took great pains to keep his own life apart and 
away from his published works. For example, Walter 
Jackson Bate, the critical editor of the Yale edition of 
Johnson's Rambler essays, notes that 
as he prepared to begin the Rambler, he deeply 
wished the purity and soundness of the work to 
be free from the prejudices the reader might 
bring to it if he knew the author (Vol. III, 
xxv). 
15 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experi-
~ (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963), 454-464. 
Many of his works, like the Rambler, Idler, Adventurer, 
and Rasselas, were published anonymously; he wrote the 
sermons for others to preach and publish under their own 
names. 
Indeed, it is important to remember that Samuel 
16 
Johnson never delivered a sermon. He wrote approximately 
forty sermons of which twenty-eight are extant. Of these 
twenty-eight, only two were published in Johnson's 
lifetime, twenty-five appeared posthumously,16 and "The 
convict's Address to His Unhappy Brethren" appeared in 
16 The chief collection of Samuel Johnson's Sermons 
is known as the Taylor collection. The Reverend John 
Taylor, a lifelong friend of Johnson's, died in 1788; he 
left a number of sermons among his personal effects. 
Johnson wrote one of these sermons for the funeral of his 
own wife; it was published in 1788 as an octavo pamphlet 
of eighteen pages, by the Reverend Samuel Hayes [See, A 
Sermon Written .Qy the Late Samuel Johnson, LL.D. for the 
Funeral of his Wife. Published by the Reverend Samuel 
Hayes, A:M.--Usher of Westminster School. London: 
printed for T. Cadell, in the Strand, 1788]. 
In May, 1788, thirteen sermons from the Taylor 
collection were published in an octavo volume of 285 
pages. [See, Sermons on Different Subjects, Left for 
Publication .Qy John Taylor, LL.D., Late Prebendary of 
Westminster, Rector of Bosworth, Leicestershire, and 
Minister of St. Margaret's, Westminster. Published by the 
Reverend Samuel Hayes, A.M. Usher of Westminster School. 
London: Printed for T. Cadell, in the Strand, 1788]. In 
July, 1789, a second octavo volume of 239 pages and 
containing twelve additional sermons, including the one 
written by Johnson for the funeral of his wife, was also 
published by Samuel Hayes. [See, Sermons on Different 
Subjects, Left for Publication .Qy John TaylOr, LL.D., Late 
Prebendary of Westminster, Rector of Bosworth, Leicester-
shire, and Minister of St. Margaret's, Westminster. 
Volume the Second. Published by the Reverend Samuel 
Hayes, A.M. Late Senior Usher of Westminster School. To 
which is added, "A Sermon Written by Samuel Johnson, LL.D. 
for the Funeral of his Wife." London: Printed for T. 
Cadell, in the Strand, 1789]. 
17 
print for the first time in the Yale edition of Johnson's 
.§_ermons. 
The first sermon published in Johnson's lifetime was 
written in 1745 for the Reverend Henry Hervey Aston, a 
close friend, who delivered it before the Sons of the 
clergy;17 the other published sermon was written in 1777 
for the Reverend William Dodd, a clergyman awaiting the 
death sentence to be carried out against him for forgery, 
who preached it before his fellow prisoners at Newgate.18 
The Aston sermon was attributed to Johnson by L. F. 
Powell,19 and we have Johnson's own acknowledgement of the 
authorship of the Dodd sermon (Life, III, 141-142.). 
There can be no denying that a knowledge of the life 
of an author, as well as some acquaintance with his age 
and his contemporaries, can be useful in understanding his 
work. However, a problem with the psychogenetic approach 
17 The Aston sermon was published as an octavo 
pamphlet of twenty-eight pages. see, Aston, Henry Hervey. 
A Sermon Preached at the Cathedral Church of St. Paul, 
Before the Sons of the Clergy, On Thursday the secona of 
May, 1745, Being the Day of their Annual Feast. By the 
Honourable and Reverend Henry Hervey Aston, A.M. Rector 
of Shotteley in the County of Suffolk. London: Printed 
for J. Brindley, Bookseller to His Royal Highness the 
Prince of Wales, at the Feathers in New-Bond-Street; and 
sold by M. Cooper, in Paternoster-Row, 1745. 
18 The Dodd sermon was published as an octavo 
pamphlet of twenty-four pages. see, Dodd, William. The 
Convict's Address to His Unhappy Brethren. Delivered in 
the Chapel of Newgate, on Friday, June 6, 1777. London: 
printed for G. Kearsly, at No. 46, in Fleet-Street, 1777. 
19 Powell, L. F. "Dr. Johnson and a Friend," London 
Times, 25 Nov. 1938, 15-16. 
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to ideology is that it often tends to ignore the empirical 
evidence suggested by the work itself. The contention of 
this dissertation is that Johnson's ideas, as found in his 
sermons, must be taken on their own merits and judged 
accordingly. They are neither to be accepted reverently 
because of the greatness of their author nor are they to 
be dismissed because of the suggested pathology of his 
personality. As we will demonstrate, Johnson's major 
contribution in his Sermons lies in his layman's approach 
to matters of ultimate concern and that pragmatic approach 
must be judged on its own merits. 
A second difficulty in Johnsonian criticism has 
resulted from the particular focus of many investigators--
a focus which often omits or minimizes one of the key 
elements in Johnsonian thought. Johnson's understanding 
of human nature, as reflected in his Sermons, embraces a 
psychological, ethical, and spiritual body of knowledge; 
none of these elements can be justly separated from the 
others if the goal is to describe accurately and 
coherently his view of man. For example, Richard B. 
Schwartz maintains that "scientific investigation [for 
Johnson] was conducted within a religious context;"20 
Damrosch argues that religion for Johnson is linked firmly 
to the rational (76); and Jean Hagstrum demonstrates that 
20 Richard B. Schwartz, Samuel Johnson and the New 
Science (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press;-1971), 
164. 
faith for Johnson was "not mysticism or inward light but 
acceptance of testimony and even sense evidence upon the 
highest possible authority. 11 21 
Johnson's observations on the nature of man reflect 
his conviction that human beings are in the process of 
integrating powerful forces within their personalities. 
BY not recognizing this dynamic or process aspect within 
Johnsonian thought, scholars have sometimes fallen into 
errors of emphasis or interpretation, even in otherwise 
19 
excellent and extremely useful studies. For example, one 
early tendency of such critics was to deny either the 
existence or the sincerity of Johnson's religious 
concerns. Leslie Stephen stresses the "worldliness" of 
many eighteenth-century writers, including Johnson, saying 
that they "seemed to close their eyes as resolutely as 
possible to all thoughts of eternity, infinity, heaven, 
and hell. 11 22 Stephen argues that this orientation caused 
them to become "practical moralists" (367) who "turn their 
backs upon the infinite and abandon the effort at a 
solution" to the "inscrutable enigma of life" (370). It 
is not surprising, then, that Stephen sees Johnson as a 
21 Jean H. Hagstrum, Samuel Johnson's Literary 
Criticism (1952; rpt., Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1967), 69. 
22 Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the 
§ighteenth Century (New York: Peter Smith, 1949), II, 
370. 
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moralist preaching only social doctrines such as "work and 
don't whine" (376). 
In his study of Samuel Johnson, Joseph Wood Krutch 
also refuses to take Johnson's faith seriously, either in 
terms of Johnson's own profession of it, or as part of the 
solution to the vacuity of life. For example, Krutch says 
that in Rasselas Johnson uses a fairly mechanical formula 
without much genuine substance to it: 
Again and again when he is faced with the 
necessity either of consoling others or of 
facing some sorrow of his own, the steps are the 
same. First, the consolations of religion. 
Then, to others or to himself, the advice: Seek 
the palliatives for those ills which are 
susceptible of no radical remedy. That the man 
as well as the child can be pleased with a 
rattle and tickled with a straw is indeed one of 
nature's most kindly laws.23 
Bertrand Bronson views Johnson's religion as a last resort 
to which he was driven "by the desperate character of the 
quest for happiness" (41) and as a self-imposed "straight-
jacket" which Johnson needed to control himself (170). 
In more recent years, scholars have become 
increasingly aware of the importance that a variety of 
religious concerns have in Johnson's writing.24 Yet, 
23 Joseph Wood Krutch, Samuel Johnson (New York: 
Henry Holt, 1944), 184. 
24 For example, Johnson's stylistic indebtedness to 
churchmen has been examined in completely different ways 
by two critics. Katherine c. Balderston, "Dr. Johnson's 
Use of William Law in the Dictionary," Philological 
Quarterly, XXIX (1960), 379-388, explores the implications 
21 
these studies of Johnson's religious concerns have turned 
their attention almost exclusively to the doctrinal arena 
and have omitted analyzing Johnson's understanding of 
man's struggle to integrate the psychological, ethical and 
spiritual dimensions of his nature. Robert Voitle 
corrects many of the mistakes of the earlier scholars 
whose views we have sketched. Voitle denies Krutch's 
views that Johnson uses religion only as a club to enforce 
social conformity25 and he vigorously disagrees with the 
assertion that Johnson did not believe in the possibility 
that man could reform (32). 
In Samuel Johnson: A Layman's Religion, Maurice 
Quinlan examines the broad aspects of Johnson's doctrinal 
affiliation with the church establishment and the leading 
theologians of the day. The book analyzes in detail 
certain key religious doctrines such as the Atonement and 
Repentance.26 Quinlan firmly establishes the fact that 
Johnson was a devout Christian, and that such themes as 
of the type and quantity of excerpts from Law in succes-
sive editions of the Dictionary. W. K. Wimsatt, The Prose 
Style of Samuel Johnson (New Haven, 1941), suggests that 
the theologians mentioned by Boswell [Life, I, 219] and 
Sir John Hawkins [Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D., ed. 
Bertram H. Davis (New York, 1961), 116], as well as Robert 
South and Samuel Clarke, be studied as influences on 
Johnson's style. 
25 Robert Voitle, Samuel Johnson the Moralist 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 157. 
26 Maurice J. Quinlan, Samuel Johnson: ~Layman's 
Religion (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), 
46-84. 
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meditating upon death and the need for charitable acts 
resulted from a considered belief of his Christian duty 
(52-53; 136). Other critics have focused on one major 
aspect of Johnson's religion, such as Johnson's well-
documented fear of death.27 Moreover, isolated facets of 
Johnson's religion have come under critical scrutiny. For 
example, Bate analyzes Johnson's religious scruples in 
terms of neurotic compulsion (Achievement, 158-159) and 
Watkins attributes Johnson's sporadic church attendance to 
his emotional ebullience (Perilous Balance, 57). 
In The Religious Thought of Samuel Johnson, Chester 
Chapin laments that Bate and Voitle discuss Johnson's 
ethical theory apart from his religious views.28 
Specifically, Chapin deserves much credit for pointing out 
the extraordinary implications of Johnson's assertion that 
''all theory is against freedom of the will; all experience 
for it" for understanding the religious basis for his 
exhortations to right conduct (115-117). However, some 
discussion of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
in this connection would have been appropriate since on 
27 For the theory of fear as obsession, see Krutch, 
548; also see Ernest c. Messner, The Forgotten Hume (New 
York, 1943), 193. For the theory of fear as part of 
orthodox Christian belief, see Jean Hagstrum, "On Dr. 
J~hnson's Fear of Death,'' ~Journal of English Literary 
History, 14 (1947), 308-319. 
28 Chester F. Chapin, The Religious Thought of Samuel 
Johnson (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), 
92. 
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manY other critical issues Johnson's opinions very closely 
correspond to those of Locke. The present dissertation 
draws the parallel between Locke's discussion of free will 
and Johnson's treatment of it in his Sermons and argues 
that the Essay provides a significant alternative to 
either acceptance of Hobbesian determinism or simple 
rejection of "all theory." An examination of Locke's 
position on the liberty of man's will provides a more 
complete picture of the intellectual background for 
Johnson's thought on the subject. Furthermore, an 
analysis of Johnson's treatment of the liberty of the will 
in his Sermons offers a corrective to the charge of 
Chapin, Bate, and Voitle that Johnson's writings 
demonstrate as pessimistic a view of human nature as 
anyone ever presented. 
Richard Schwartz takes an even darker view of 
Johnson's thought when he implies that personal 
reformation or the amelioration of evil in this life is 
nearly futile; he says that "Johnson sees the problem [of 
pain) as insoluble and, finally a mystery"29 and that 
Johnson becomes merely "a cataloguer or illustrator of 
evil" (60). Schwartz does acknowledge Johnson's 
recognition that "the prevalence of evil in human society 
is often the product of human imagination" (49) and that 
29 Richard B. Schwartz, Samuel Johnson and the 
Problem of Evil (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1975), 36." --
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"our task is to gain what ground we can with Reason and 
Religion as our guides" (59). These latter assertions of 
Schwartz are examined in this dissertation in light of the 
additional evidence provided by Johnson's Sermons. The 
present study demonstrates Johnson's pragmatic awareness 
that the greater part, though not all, of su.tfering here 
on earth is caused by man's self-delusive nature. Johnson 
argues in his Sermons that this suffering can be ameli-
orated by moral action which produces a life that can be 
better enjoyed. 
In one of the best books treating Johnson's under-
standing of human nature, Walter Jackson Bate has written 
extensively on human desire, imagination, and reason as 
these concepts function in Johnson's understanding of the 
nature of man. In The Achievement of Samuel Johnson, Bate 
very perceptively distinguishes between the mechanism of 
desire and the eventual objects fixed upon (69); this is a 
central idea in Johnson which few other critics have 
noted. Bate astutely observes the unity of vigor and 
order in Johnson's style and demonstrates that in 
Johnson's personal religion there exists the needed 
personal freedom and emotional satisfaction compatible 
with the equally needed centrality and control of 
religious orthodoxy. Moreover, Bate has delineated a 
large portion of Johnson's understanding of the processes 
by which man's desire and imagination struggle to be 
integrated with man's reason: 
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the "hunger of imagination" ... and the 
"stability of truth" ... form the twin poles 
between which Johnson's practical insights into 
human life and destiny move back and forth 
(Achievement, 134). 
Bate's position, however, omits much of Johnson's 
awareness that religion can effectively address the 
tension between the chimeras created by man's imagination, 
the insatiable desires of his will, and man's limited use 
of reason. Moreover, Bate almost completely neglects the 
evidence provided by Johnson's Sermons which suggests that 
Johnson's observations on the nature of man have a clear 
foundation in religious tradition. The present 
dissertation will explore these gaps left by Bate's 
investigation. This study of the Sermons reveals 
Johnson's astute awareness that religion provides 
pragmatically satisfying answers for those precise 
problems caused by man's self-delusive nature. 
The only book-length study of Johnson's Sermons 
available to date is James Gray's Johnson's Sermons: A 
Study.30 Gray discusses the composition and the printing 
of Johnson's Sermons, placing special emphasis on 
Johnson's long-standing friendship with the Reverend John 
30 James Gray, Johnson's Sermons: A Study (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1972). 
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Taylor of Ashbourne for whom twenty-five of the twenty-
eight extant Sermons were written. The central part of 
Gray's study is an examination of the influence of the 
theology of William Law, the first important influence on 
Johnson's adult religious life, and of Samuel Clarke, 
whose sermons Johnson considered the best in the language 
"bating a little heresy," on Johnson's Sermons. Gray 
traces Johnson's attitudes and beliefs on death, 
suffering, happiness, repentance, the Atonement and the 
Incarnation, rewards and punishments, and the hope for an 
afterlife to their possible sources in influential English 
divines. He argues that Johnson's treatment of these 
subjects in his Sermons suggests that he sought a 
systematic creed that could be contained within the bounds 
of human reason and credulity. Gray's conclusion is that 
it is nearly impossible to separate the religious and 
secular aspects of Johnson's admonitions to moral conduct 
without seriously distorting his achievement in the 
Sermons. 
The present dissertation may accurately be 
classified, with Gray's study, as an argument for the 
integrated nature of Johnson's exhortations to right 
thinking and living. However, there is an important 
difference between Gray's study and mine. Gray deals 
Primarily with the establishment of the argument; this 
dissertation implicitly accepts that argument and uses it 
as a point of departure for its analysis of Johnson's 
§._ermons. 
Gray's analysis of William Law emphasizes the 
27 
contemptus mundi theme and stresses the value of a 
spiritual regimen and a concern with "the somber realities 
of death and the last judgment" (122). However, the 
present dissertation argues that Gray's discussion of Law 
carries the contemptus mundi theme further than Johnson 
himself did in his Sermons. Indeed, the Sermons support 
the view that for Johnson religion provided the solace man 
needs for the vacuity he experiences in this life. 
Religion provides consolations in this world as well as 
promising the reward of eternal salvation. Whatever the 
tension between man's self-delusive nature and the demands 
of moral behavior, Johnson's Sermons suggest that man not 
eschew this life but rather engage it as the responsible 
way of struggling for salvation. 
Gray does not explore the implications of the 
important tension in Johnson's Sermons between reason and 
revelation, a tension which has significant bearing on the 
relevance and credibility of revelation for man's salva-
tion. The present dissertation demonstrates that the 
Sermons accentuate Johnson's belief that not even Scrip-
tural revelation is exempt from the critical scrutiny of 
Pragmatic experience. Because he viewed reason as man's 
most celestial faculty, Johnson devoted a major portion of 
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his effort as a sermonist to the delineation of those 
conditions under which reason could play its proper role 
in guiding man's ethical conduct in this life and 
preparing him for the next. Johnson did not, however, 
believe that human affairs could be conducted wholly by 
the light of reason. Unless reason is supplemented by 
religion, the dangers of man's self-delusive nature could 
not be avoided. The Sermons recognize that in many 
circumstances man's reason is powerless or insufficient; 
nevertheless, they demonstrate that human conduct can be 
far more rational than it usually is and the Sermons 
explain how man can make the fullest use of his capacities 
for rational behavior. 
Gray's study provides useful parallels in content 
between Johnson's Sermons and the English homiletic 
tradition. This dissertation extends Gray's discussion of 
homiletic sources and models for Johnson's Sermons to an 
examination of Johnson's stylistic modifications of that 
tradition. His Sermons contain significant deviations in 
form from those characteristics which he found so 
praiseworthy in the works of many English divines. All 
Johnson's modifications suggest his belief that man's 
faith is forged more from the realities of secular life 
and less from conventional ascetic ideals. 
29 
II 
Johnson is usually viewed as a moralist of a deeply 
conservative--even reactionary--bias because he is usually 
classified as a Christian moralist. Such an assessment is 
an oversimplification because Johnson is clearly a 
moralist who is also Christian. It is too easy to pigeon-
hole him by automatically placing him within a certain 
tradition and then viewing him as a participant within 
that static philosophical system. Johnson wrote in a 
period when man's conception of himself and his world was 
on the threshold of major change. There was a palpable 
shift from viewing the human mind as a static entity to a 
stance which saw it as a complex of processes.31 Within 
that framework, the Christian moralist tradition, which 
encompasses religious, sociological, and psychological 
thought, was primarily a static conceptualization. 
However, even in Johnson's time it was beginning to 
weaken, and the transformation itself is most tellingly 
reflected in the fact that rather than seeking identity 
and purpose through the established institutions--
political, social, ecclesial--man began to seek his 
identity and purpose within himself. 
Until that vantage point had been solidly attained, 
rationalist philosophers, in their ~earch for order in the 
31 Lancelot Law Whyte, The Unconscious Before Freud 
(New York: Basic Books, Inc-.-,-1960), 49. 
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universe, postulated general conceptions of human nature 
which tended to be static, closed systems of thought, 
"abstractions achieved by emphasizing permanent entities 
and neglecting their changing relationships" (Whyte, 48). 
The essential difference between the static concept of the 
unchanging nature of the human mind and Johnson's concept 
is that the former perceives human nature as a grouping of 
singular, unconnected attributes, motives, and responses, 
which are fixed in a hierarchical arrangement; Johnson 
perceives human nature to be an integrated process of 
instinctual forces, emotions, and responses that are in 
flux within the individual. 
In his Sermons, Johnson depicts the mind not as a 
hierarchy of separate faculties of reason, imagination, 
desires, and instincts, but as a more complex development 
of the instincts to "elemental" feelings of "hope and 
fear, love and hatred, desire and aversion" (Sermons 10, 
12, 14, 15, 1Jl; Rambler 49). The various faculties of the 
mind, in Johnsonian psychology, are thus intimately 
connected. Moreover, whereas Johnson says that the 
passions, the desires, and the imagination are not to be 
extirpated but to be integrated into the whole personality 
(Sermon 18, 193-4; Rambler 66), the static conceptualiza-
tion of man's nature sees the imagination, desires and 
passions often in conflict with reason. 
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In the Christian moralist tradition, the static 
philosophy of man's mental faculties and of the nature of 
self-knowledge reflects a feeling of self-distrust. Man's 
paradoxical position is that, while he is a higher being 
than the animals because he possesses reason, he is also 
weak and limited because of the eruption of his passions. 
With his reason constantly in conflict with his passions, 
desires, and imagination, man cannot trust the impulses of 
his instincts, nor can he even trust his physical 
senses.32 The major character ideal of Christianity is 
that of the ascetic,33 whose emphasis on the eradication 
of sinful impulses is a synecdoche for the extirpation of 
all man's desires, fantasies, and passions. 
In this tradition, the individual Christian looks 
outward for help in attaining the ideal, for control of 
his passions, to the norms and commandments of established 
religion. His orientation and identification is to 
reflect the greater glory of God by living as closely as 
possible to Christ-like perfection, according to "right 
reason" rather than the treacherous instincts and passions 
that originally took man out of his happy state. Thus, 
William Law, whose Serious Call is a representative 
32 Paul Fussell, The Rhetorical World of Augustan 
Humanism: Ethics and Imagery from Swift to Burke 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 76. 
33 Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: 
Uses of Faith After Freud (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 17:-
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expression of Christian orientation and identification, 
both because of its clarity in presenting the issues and 
because of its influence in the eighteenth century, says: 
If it is our glory and happiness to have a 
rational nature, that is endued with wisdom and 
reason, that is capable of imitating the Divine 
nature, then it must be our glory and happiness 
to improve our reason and wisdom, to act up to 
the excellency of our rational nature, and to 
imitate God in all our actions to the utmost of 
our power (47). 
The attitude expressed in this passage informs Law's whole 
treatise on the Christian way of life. 
The central ethic of the Christian is, therefore, "to 
love our neighbor as ourselves, to love all mankind as God 
has loved them" (Law, 53). This particular doctrine is a 
major mode of inculcating selflessness in the individual 
and so orienting him outward for the greater purpose of 
reflecting the glory of God. This ethic together with the 
admonition know thyself directs the individual to 
knowledge of his primary relationship to God, and through 
God, to love of his fellow man. Through the rejection of 
self--the ascetic ideal--the individual is led to love his 
fellow man. 
Where does Johnson stand with respect to these 
concepts? When we consider how Johnson's psychology 
informs his morality, we find that he adheres to the 
conventional tenets of the Christian moral tradition. 
However, we also discover that Johnson transforms the 
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motivation for right conduct from the Christian ascetic 
ideal of self-denial to a motivation based on pragmatic 
and secular self-interest. Throughout his Sermons, 
Johnson does not rule out love of virtue for its own sake 
as a desirable goal, but he makes clear that his precepts 
are not intended chiefly for those who already love virtue 
for its own sake. The Sermons are designed instead for 
those who are struggling to practice virtue and need to 
have their self-interest enlisted on its side. Moreover, 
Johnson considers enlightened self-interest a very 
different matter from selfishness and a perfectly valid 
foundation for moral conduct. This is a view he shared 
with others, including Locke. Locke, for example, not 
only regarded the rational pursuit of happiness as 
praiseworthy but as obligatory--a pursuit that men have no 
right to neglect. 
Johnson asks the conventional moral questions in his 
Sermons: how are we to be saved? what solace or hope is 
there for man as he experiences the emptiness of life? 
However, his answers are always framed by his unconven-
tional and experiential understanding of the nature of 
man. Through the efforts of human beings to integrate 
their reason with their imagination and desire, through 
realistic perceptions about the self and about relation-
ships with others, through not postulating Christ as a 
character ideal to be realistically attempted, Johnson 
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suggests that man can hope, not only for the conventional 
reward of eternal life, but also for solace from the 
vacuity of this life. 
Indeed, the Sermons are nothing if they are not a 
study of the ways in which religion addresses the problem 
of human vacuity. The centrality of the perception that 
life is vacuous to Johnsonian thought went unnoticed by 
Boswell; it was left to Mrs. Thrale to note that 
the vacuity of Life had at some early period of 
his life perhaps so struck upon the Mind of Mr. 
Johnson, that it became by repeated impressions 
his favourite hypothesis, & the general Tenor of 
his reasonings commonly ended in that: The 
Things therefore which other philosophers 
attribute to various and contradictory Causes 
appeared to him uniform enough; all was done to 
fill up the time upon his Principle. One Man 
for example was profligate, followed the Girls 
or the Gaming Table,--why Life must be filled up 
Madam, & the man was capable of nothing less 
Sensua1.34 
To understand Johnson's meaning of vacuity is to 
understand the way in which his observations on the nature 
of man within the Sermons are guided by the implicit 
polarities of eternity and temporality, reason and 
imagination, desire and fulfillment:35 
34 Hester Lynch Piozzi, Thraliana: The Diary of 
~·Hester Lynch Thrale (Later Mrs. Piozzi), 1776-1809. 
Ed. Katherine c. Balderston (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1951), I, 179. 
35 In the Dictionary, Johnson defines vacuity as "(1) 
emptiness; state of being unfilled; (2) space unfilled; 
space unoccupied; (3) inanity; want of reality." 
Significantly, all six examples Johnson uses for these 
35 
The whole mind becomes a gloomy vacuity, without 
any image or form of pleasure, a chaos of 
confused wishes, directed to no particular end, 
or to that which, while we wish, we cannot hope 
to obtain (Sermon 25, 267). 
Johnson sees human activity as a futile attempt to fill an 
inner void, as an incessant and hopeless search for 
"novelty" and "diversity" with which to feed the hunger of 
human nature: 
If the most active and industrious of mankind 
was able, at the close of life, to recollect 
distinctly his past moments, and distribute 
them, in a regular account, according to the 
manner in which they have been spent, it is 
scarcely to be imagined how few would be marked 
out to the mind, by any permanent or visible 
effects, how small a proportion his real action 
would bear to his seeming possibilities of 
action, how may chasms he would find of wide and 
continued vacuity, and how many interstitial 
spaces unfilled, even in the most tumultuous 
hurries of business, and the most eager 
vehemence of pursuit (Rambler~, 41). 
The contradiction between the infinite desires of human 
nature for fulfillment and the insufficiency of the 
temporal ends with which human nature becomes obsessed 
suggest that the answers provided by religion could 
resolve this contradiction and help man cope with the 
vacuity of life. 
three definitions refer to either the physical, emotional 
or spiritual emptiness of human nature. Indeed, his 
quotation from Rogers is illustrative of Johnson's use of 
vacuity in his Sermons: "God, who alone can answer all 
our longings, and fill every vacuity of our soul, should 
entirely possess our heart." 
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In every Sermon, Johnson notes that it is the 
preponderance of vacuity in our lives which moves us to 
seek the consolation and encouragement provided by 
religion. However, even in his call for a life of 
spiritual perspective--man's ability to contrast this 
transitory life with the sure prospect of eternal 
happiness--Johnson does not expect man to respond in any 
transcendental way. He tells us in his Sermons that such 
a spiritual perspective on life provides the pragmatic 
motivation we need to integrate the chimeras of the 
imagination and the insatiable desires of the will with 
the stability of our reason. 
CHAPTER TWO 
JOHNSON'S SERMONS AND THE NATURE OF MAN 
I 
Long before the philosophical inquiries of William 
James, Alfred North Whitehead, or John Dewey, Samuel 
Johnson asked similar probing questions of religion--"Does 
it work? Is it practical?" Indeed, whether he was reading 
poetry or drama, philosophy or theology, Johnson was 
impatient with anything that lacked common sense or that 
did not conform to human experience. Furthermore, he did 
not regard his own approach to religion as unique or as 
somehow set apart by either mental acuity or careful 
cultivation. 
The object of the pages which follow is to demon-
strate that Johnson was above all a pragmatist in writing 
his Sermons; he tested all ideas, even orthodox 
theological doctrines, against the reality of human 
experience. He had little interest in the abstract or the 
metaphysical. When Johnson asked, "Is it true?" what he 
really meant was, "Will it work?" It is a commonplace 
that every homilist is speaking essentially to himself and 
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this appears to be true of Johnson throughout his Sermons. 
The sermons are so meaningful precisely because they are 
50 practical, so helpful to those looking for suggestions 
and hints as to how to wrestle with the pains of life. 
Johnson sought and succeeded in putting that kind of 
common sense content into his homilies. Most Johnsonian 
critics are concerned with showing the affinities between 
his Sermons and the ideas of Hobbes, Mandeville, Locke or 
Hume, and Johnson was, of course, a child of his age. 
However, few critics have sufficiently appreciated the 
pragmatic nature of his Sermons in which Johnson uses 
human experience as a test and judge for religion's 
consolations for the vacuity of life. 
Modern critics of Samuel Johnson's moral thought 
often label his view of man as "pessimistic" and seek 
parallels for it in the writings of Thomas Hobbes and 
Bernard Mandeville. Walter Jackson Bate finds Johnson's 
views among the most pessimistic to be encountered in 
Western thought (Samuel Johnson, 298; 492). Robert Voitle 
discovers in Johnson's gloomy view of human nature 
possible justification for some readers' regarding him as 
a Calvinist. Voitle also points to the strong parallels 
between Johnson and Mandeville, especially in the latter's 
notorious Fable of the Bees, where the evil that men do is 
seen as springing from an innate depravity (Samuel Johnson 
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the Moralist, 131, 154). Paul Alkon stresses Johnson's 
-
dependence upon and agreement with Hobbes in seeing human 
life in the state of nature as "solitary, poor, nasty, and 
brutish" and in believing unselfish action to be alien to 
human beings (Samuel Johnson and Moral Discipline, 41). 
It cannot be denied that Johnson's conception of 
human nature is a somber one, especially when compared to 
the more optimistic view of man so conspicuous in the 
works of such popular writers as Fielding and Sterne.1 
Moreover, since in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century it had become increasingly fashionable in some 
circles to refer to man as naturally benevolent, it is not 
surprising that even some of Johnson's contemporaries 
thought his pronouncements severe. Boswell relates that 
Lady Macleod, upon hearing Johnson deny natural goodness 
1 Johnson's observations on the weakness, corruption, 
and limitations of human nature were widely recorded. 
According to Frances Reynolds, the sister of Sir Joshua 
Reynolds, Dr. Johnson's "general and common" assertion was 
"that Man was by Nature much more inclined to evil than to 
good'' (II, 256), in Samuel Johnson, Johnsonian Miscel-
lanies, ed. George Birkbeck Hill (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1897). In her Anecdotes, Mrs. Thrale mentions the 
"fixity" of Johnson's opinions on "the natural depravity 
of mankind and the remains of original sin" (115-116). 
Readers of Boswell's Tour to the Hebrides will recollect 
Johnson's sharp response t~Lady Macleod, who asked 
whether man was naturally good--"No, Madam, no more than a 
wolf" (V, 211), in James Boswell, The Life of Samuel 
Johnson, LL.D., ed. George Birkbeck Hi~rev. and enl. by 
L. F. Powell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934-1950). 
Hereafter, cited in the text as Life. 
to man, "started, • . . saying in a low voice, 'This is 
worse than Swift"' (Life, V, 211). 
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As Bate, Voitle, and Alken suggest, several of Samuel 
Johnson's statements do bring to mind the opinions of 
Hobbes and Mandeville. Nearly a century before Johnson 
made his observations on the nature of man, Thomas Hobbes 
drew an image of human nature that was far from idyllic. 
Hobbes invited the readers of his Leviathan to discover, 
based on their own observations of man, whether the 
unflattering things he said of human nature were not 
inescapably true. The elements within man that make for 
hostility, spite, and malice are no secret: 
All the world knows that such is the nature of 
man, that dissenting in questions which concern 
their power, or profit, or pre-eminence of wit, 
they slander and curse each other .... For 
such is the nature of men that howsoever they 
may acknowledge many others to be more witty or 
more eloquent or more learned, yet they will 
hardly believe there be many so wise as 
themselves; for they see their own wit at hand 
and other men's at a distance.2 
Hobbes believed that the testimony of actions is much more 
reliable than that of words in assessing the extent of 
human depravity: 
2 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in British Moralists: 
Being Selections from Writers Principally of the 
Eighteenth Century, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1897), Vol. II, 318. All quotations from 
Leviathan are from this edition. 
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For every man looks that his companion should 
value him at the same rate he sets upon himself; 
and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing 
[he] naturally endeavors ... to extort a 
greater value from his contemners by damage and 
from others by example. So that in the nature 
of man we find three principal causes of 
quarrel: first, competition; secondly, diffi-
dence; thirdly, glory .... We see even in 
well-governed states, where there are laws and 
punishments appointed for offenders, yet 
particular men travel not without their sword by 
their side for their defenses; neither sleep 
they without shutting not only their doors 
against their fellow subjects, but also their 
trunks and coffers for fear of domestics. Can 
men give a clearer testimony of the distrust 
they have of each other, and all of all? 
(Leviathan, II, 15; 319-21). 
Whether Hobbes portrays man in a state of nature or 
"advanced" to a state of civil society, his observations 
on the human condition are as insightful as Johnson's own 
perceptions of human life. For example, Johnson describes 
man as being first 
... wild and unsocial, living each man to 
himself, taking from the weak, and losing to the 
strong. In their first coalitions of society, 
much of this original savageness is retained. 
Of general happiness, the product of general 
confidence, there is yet no thought. Men 
continue to prosecute their own advantages by 
the nearest way; and the utmost severity of the 
civil law is necessary to restrain individuals 
from plundering each other. The restraints then 
necessary, are restraints from plunder, from 
acts of publick violence, and undisguised 
oppression. The ferocity of our ancestors, as 
of all other nations, produced not fraud, but 
rapine. They had not yet learned to cheat, and 
attempted only to rob. As manners grow more 
polished, with the knowledge of good, men attain 
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likewise dexterity in evil. Open rapine becomes 
less frequent, and violence gives way to cun-
ning. Those who before invaded pastures and 
stormed houses, now begin to enrich themselves 
by unequal contracts and fraudulent intromis-
sions .... I am afraid the increase of 
commerce and the incessant struggle for riches 
which commerce excites, gives us no prospect of 
an end speedily to be expected of artifice and 
fraud (Life, II, 198-9). 
The laws and customs of civilization only force the 
relentless human current for power and domination into 
other channels; human beings remain essentially the same--
frail, limited, corrupt and prone to evil. 
Following Hobbes' imperative for a clear-sighted view 
of man, Mandeville's avowed purpose in The Fable of the 
Bees is to show man what he is: 
Most Writers are always teaching Men what they 
should be, and hardly ever trouble their Heads 
with telling them what they really are (Fable, 
I, 39).3 
To Mandeville, man is simply "the most perfect of animals" 
(Fable, I, 44). In The Fable of the Bees, society is 
shown as a bee-hive. This hive is prosperous and great as 
long as pride, selfishness, corruption, luxury, hypocrisy, 
fraud, injustice, and every conceivable vice are freely 
practiced. One day, however, Jove "rid the bawling Hive 
3 Bernard Mandeville, The Fable 
Private Vices, Publick Benef'Its, ed. 
II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924). 
~ Fable are from this edition. 
of the Bees: £!:_, 
F:- ~Kaye, vols. !-
All quotations from 
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d " of gree . The result of Jove's purge was that trade and 
the professions languished, unemployment and depopulation 
set in, and the few surviving bees deserted their hive for 
a hollow tree. The moral regarding civilization, as 
Mandeville draws it, is: 
Then leave complaints: fools only strive 
To make great an honest hive. 
To enjoy the world's conveniencies, 
Be famed in war, yet live in ease, 
Without great vices is a vain 
Utopia seated in the Brain. 
Fraud, luxury, and pride must live, 
While we the benefits receive: 
Hunger's a dreadful plague, no doubt, 
Yet who digests or thrives without? 
Bare Virtue can't make nations live 
In Splendor (Fable, I, 37). 
Mandeville maintains that people generally profess to 
value real virtue, but they never practice it, and if they 
did, everything they really value, judging by their 
behavior, would vanish. Consequently, they are faced with 
an impossible choice, either real virtue and poverty or 
vices and prosperity: 
... they, that would revive 
A Golden Age, must be as free, 
For Acorns, as for Honesty (Fable, I, 37). 
The foundation for Mandeville's scheme of values is his 
view of human nature: 
I believe man (besides Skin, Flesh, Bones, etc., 
that are obvious to the Eye) to be a compound of 
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various Passions, that all of them, as they are 
provoked and come uppermost, govern him by 
turns, whether he will or not (Fable, I, 39). 
Based on this view of human nature, Mandeville contends 
that virtue ought to be defined as self-denial: 
It being the Interest then of the very worst of 
them, more than any, to preach up Publick-
spiritedness that they might reap the Fruits of 
the Labour and Self-denial of others, and at the 
same time indulge their own Appetites with less 
disturbance, they agreed with the rest, to call 
everything, which, without regard to the 
Publick, Man should commit to gratify any of his 
Appetites, VICE; if in that Action there cou'd 
be observed the least prospect, that it might 
either be Injurious to any of the Society, or 
ever render himself less serviceable to others: 
And to give the Name of VIRTUE to every Perfor-
mance, by which Man, contrary to the impulse of 
Nature, should endeavour the benefit of others, 
or the Conquest of his own Passions out of a 
Rational Ambition of being good (Fable, I, 48-
9) • 
Virtue however is a very fashionable word, and 
some of the most luxurious are extremely fond of 
the amiable sound; tho' they mean nothing by it, 
but a great veneration for whatever is courtly 
or sublime, and an equal aversion to everything, 
that is vulgar or unbecoming. They seem to 
imagine that it chiefly consists in strict 
compliance to all the Laws of Honour that have 
any regard to the Respect that is due to 
themselves ..•. It is counted ridiculous for 
Men to commit Violence upon themselves, or to 
maintain, that Virtue requires Self-denial; all 
Court Philosophers are agreed, that nothing can 
be lovely or desireable, that is mortifying or 
uneasy (Fable, II, 12). 
Mandeville's whole speculation in The Fable of the Bees 
turns on this definition of virtue which implies a 
contradiction within human nature. Given the nature of 
man--a compound of passions which are forever struggling 
to control him, with the strongest always winning out--
E.,elfless behavior, the practice of virtue, is not only 
impractical but impossible: 
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If it be urg'd •.. there might be such People 
[the truly virtuous]; I answer that it is as 
possible that Cats, instead of killing Rats and 
Mice, should feed them, and go about the House 
to suckle and nurse their young ones; or that a 
Kite should call the Hens to their Meat, as the 
Cock does, and sit brooding over their Chickens 
instead of devouring 'em; but if they should all 
do so, they would cease to be Cats and Kites; it 
is inconsistent with their Natures, and the 
Species of Creatures which now we mean, when we 
name Cats and Kites, would be extinct as soon as 
that could come to pass (Fable, I, 134). 
The worldliness, the hypocrisy, the backsliding are not, 
then, accidental--they are the necessary consequences of 
human nature. 
Like Mandeville, whom he had read with some apprecia-
tion, Johnson rejects any possibility of disinterested 
human goodness.4 To say otherwise is to suggest, 
4 According to Mrs. Thrale, Johnson was "indeed a 
most acute observer" of the consequences of man's limited, 
corrupt, and frail nature; he "used to say sometimes, half 
in jest, half in earnest, that they were the remains of 
his old tutor Mandeville's instructions. As a book, 
however, he took care always loudly to condemn the Fable 
21 ~Bees, but not without adding, 'that it was the work 
of a thinking man"' (Anecdotes, 115-116). 
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absurdly, that Samuel Johnson held, in effect, a Pelagian 
understanding of man. Rather, he told Mrs. Thrale: 
I hope I have not lost my Sensibility of Wrong, 
but I hope likewise that I have seen sufficient 
of the World to prevent my expecting to find an5 
Action whose Motives, & all its Parts are good. 
Moreover, throughout his Sermons, Johnson consistently 
describes the nature of man as weak, limited, corrupt, and 
subject to temptation. For example, when he explores the 
destructive effects of hardness of heart on the practice 
of religion in Sermon l, he observes that 
The continual occurrence of temptation, and that 
imbecility of nature, which every man sees in 
others, and has experienced in himself, seems to 
have made many doubtful of the possibility of 
salvation (32).6 
5 Hester Lynch Piozzi, Thraliana: The Diary of Mrs. 
Hester Lynch Thrale (Later Mrs. Piozzi) 1776-1809, ed. 
Katherine c. Balderston (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 
183-184. 
6 Samuel Johnson, Sermons, ed. Jean H. Hagstrum and 
James Gray, vol. XIV of The Yale Edition of the Works of 
Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). 
Hereafter, cited in the text by both Sermon and page 
number. Johnson frequently associates the word imbecility 
with human nature. In the Dictionary, for example, he 
defines imbecility as a "weakness; feebleness of mind or 
body." Johnson also uses this term in a similar context 
in his moral essays. For instance, in Idler 88, he 
observes that "[man] ..• sooner confesses the depravity 
of his will than the imbecillity of his nature" (274), in 
The Idler and The Adventurer, ed. w. J. Bate, et al., Vol. 
~of The Yale""""Edition of The Works of Samuel Johnson 
(New Haven:---Yale University Press, 1963). Hereafter, 
cited in the text by Adventurer or Idler number and page 
number. 
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Johnson portrays human nature in similar terms when he 
examines the vexatious problem of conceit in Sermon 8 and 
the consequences of human ignorance in ~ermon 16: 
What can any man see either within or without 
himself, that does not afford him some reason to 
remark his own ignorance, imbecillity, and 
meanness? (Sermon~, 94). 
Such is the weakness of human nature, that every 
particular state, or condition, lies open to 
particular temptations (Sermon 16, 171). 
However, when he deals with the more odious sins of human 
pride in Sermon & and spiritual indolence in Sermon z, 
Johnson's assessment of human nature becomes more severe; 
he uses the concept of depravity to describe man and, when 
he warns against the dangers of pride, he suggests the 
possibility of original corruption. 
Pride is a corruption that seems almost origin-
ally ingrafted in our nature; it exerts itself 
in our first years, and, without continual 
endeavours to suppress it, influences our last 
(Sermon£, 66). 
Such is the present weakness and corruption of 
human nature, that sincerity, real sincerity, is 
rarely to be found (Sermon z, 80). 
But as startlingly severe as it may have appeared to 
Mrs. Thrale and Lady Macleod, and as extraordinarily 
pessimistic as it appears to Bate, Voitle, and Alkon, 
Samuel Johnson's view of human nature was neither 
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identical with that of Mandeville or Hobbes nor something 
invented by him de novo. Johnson was solidly within the 
long tradition of Christian orthodoxy, at one with the 
Apostle Paul, with Tertullian and Augustine, with Luther 
and Calvin, a fact that many Johnsonian critics are 
inclined to overlook. That Mrs. Thrale and Lady MacLeod 
should have been surprised is simply a commentary on the 
Anglicanism of the day, which was inclined toward a mild 
form of the Pelagian heresy. The anthropology, or 
doctrine of man, behind this Enlightenment version of 
Anglican doctrine popular in the eighteenth century and 
with which Johnson took sharp issue was mildly optimistic; 
it eschewed the severe pessimism of Augustine and the 
Reformers. Johnson owed his dissent, finally, neither to 
Mandeville and Hobbes on the one hand, nor to his famili-
arity with the gloomier Christian doctrine of early ages, 
but to his own experience of human nature. Johnson simply 
did not find man to be the sweetly reasonable creature 
seen by some of his contemporaries. He did not view man 
pessimistically but realistically. 
The Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion appended to The 
Book of Common Prayer include a strong Calvinist [one 
could equally say Augustinian] view of human corruption: 
Original sin ••. is the fruit and corruption 
of every man that naturally is engendered of the 
off spring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone 
from original righteousness, and is of his own 
nature inclined to evil (Article IX of The 
Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion). 
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That statement, together with many similar ones throughout 
the Articles, was produced by the Church of England at a 
time when the Calvinist influence was at its peak and it 
has embarrassed the more "Catholic" Anglicans for cen-
turies. However, there is no evidence that Samuel Johnson 
paid any heed to doctrinal debates among theologians. He 
gave scant attention to the origin of human corruption; 
it was the effect which concerned Johnson--the reality of 
which he could observe all about him. 
Yet Johnson's genuine piety saved him from merely 
surrendering to the bestial in man--to exalting pure force 
which characterized the views of Hobbes and Mandeville. 
Johnson 1 s treatment is altogether different: 
Religion informs us that misery and sin were 
produced together. The depravation of human 
will was followed by a disorder of the harmony 
of nature; and by that providence which often 
places antidotes in the neighborhood of poisons, 
vice was checked by misery, lest it should swell 
to universal and unlimited dominion (Idler 89, 
275). -
Here is no exaltation of selfishness or the ruthless 
exercise of power as true virtue, no Mandevillean argument 
to "make the worse appear the better cause.'' Johnson 
recognizes evil as evil, not something to be glorified and 
50 
cultivated but to be viewed with horror. What Johnson 
admired in Mandeville was his keenness of observation, his 
recognition of the ubiquity of human depravity. However, 
Johnson emphatically rejected Mandeville's contention that 
selfishness was the natural state of man which ought to be 
cultivated at the expense of bogus altruism. 
The late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
found strong interest in intellectual circles in the 
definition of man, in the extent of human depravity and 
its effects on man's behavior. For example, Archbishop 
John Tillotson, whose sermons were perhaps the most 
formative of eighteenth-century religious thought,7 
defined human nature and the extent of man's depravity in 
these terms: 
So that the degeneracy of human nature is 
universally acknowledged, and God acquitted from 
being the cause of it: but, however, the 
posterity of Adam do all partake of the weakness 
contracted by his fall, and so still labour 
under the miseries and inconveniences of it. 
But then this degeneracy is not total. For 
though our faculties be much weakened and 
disordered, yet they are not destroyed, nor 
7 Leslie Stephen maintains that "Tillotson [was] the 
writer of the seventeenth-century who was most generally 
read and admired in the eighteenth" [History of English 
Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 3rd. ed. (New York: 
Peter Smith, 1949), I, 77). L. E. Elliot-Binns asserts 
that "just as philosophy during most of the eighteenth-
century was dominated by the influence of Locke, so 
orthodox theology was especially dominated by Archbishop 
Tillotson" [The Early Evangelicals (London: Methuen, 
1953), 90). -
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wholly perverted. Our natural judgment and 
conscience doth still dictate to us what is 
good, and what we ought to do; and the impres-
sions of the natural law, as to the great lines 
of our duty, are still legible upon our hearts. 
. . . Our judgment still dictates the very same 
things which the law of God doth enjoin.8 
The existence and effects of original sin were not widely 
disputed even by the Deists. However, they argued that if 
the ravages of the Fall have not, as Tillotson declared, 
obliterated our moral sense or our recognition of duty, 
then there seems little need for divine revelation to 
enlighten wayward humanity. Human reason retains a 
sufficient quantity of justitia originalis, original 
righteousness, to find the path to virtue and human 
fulfillment. on the other hand, the Calvinists and 
Augustinians insisted that human depravity had rendered 
man nonposse non peccare, as Augustine put it, unable not 
to sin. Therefore, man was incapable of finding the way 
to salvation without divine assistance and revelation.9 
Johnson's observations on the nature of man, as 
manifested in his Sermons, reflect a via media position 
between the Calvinists and the Deists. Johnson could not 
agree with the latter that human reason was sufficient to 
8 Archbishop John Tillotson, Works, ed. Thomas Birch. 
(London: n.p., 1820), II, 478-479. 
9 For an incisive analysis of this controversy, see: 
Douglas H. White, "Swift and the Definition of Man," 
Modern Philology (May 1976, Part 2), 48-55. 
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iead man to a useful set of ethical beliefs. For Johnson, 
reason was an aid to right conduct; he never believed that 
human nature would automatically and positively respond to 
the good. On the other hand, Johnson recognized that 
man's reason was not to be despised after the manner of 
Luther and Calvin but to be embraced as a help for man in 
his search for happiness. 
What rendered Johnson's view shocking to his friends 
was its difference from the prevalent optimism which 
seemed to dominate the age. There was great faith in the 
ability of human reason to conquer all obstacles and to 
solve all problems in human life. For most English 
intellectuals of the eighteenth century, including most of 
the Churchmen, total depravity was not the popular 
doctrine. Nor, for Johnson, was human depravity total 
because that notion would eradicate man's capacity for 
virtuous action. Yet, Johnson's own experience had taught 
him that most men were far more rascally and undependable 
than the prevailing optimism chose to acknowledge. It was 
on the basis of that experience that he insisted on his 
more pessimistic view of human nature, not on the grounds 
of fidelity to theological orthodoxy. 
The Apostle Paul provides the classic text for that 
theologically orthodox view of man: 
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As it is written, There is none righteous, no, 
not one: There is none that understandeth, 
there is none that seeketh after God. They are 
all gone out of the way, they are together 
become unprofitable; there is none that doeth 
good, no, not one. Their throat is an open 
sepulchre; with their tongues they have used 
deceit; the poison of asps is under their lips: 
Whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness: 
Their feet are swift to shed blood: Destruction 
and misery are in their ways: And the way to 
peace have they not known: there is no fear of 
God before their eyes . . • . For all have 
sinned and come short of the glory of God 
(Romans 3: 9-23). 
This view is echoed by St. Augustine when he vividly 
describes the great depths into which man is sunk: 
From the time when our nature sinned in paradise 
••• we have all become one lump of clay, a 
lump of sin (massa peccati). Since, then, by 
sinning we have forfeited our merit and God's 
mercy is withdrawn from us so that we sinners 
are owed nothing but eternal damnation, it is 
pointless for a man from this lump to reply to 
God and say: "why did you make me like this? 11 10 
Each member of the human race is sinful because he 
possesses a tainted nature, just as every pot made from a 
lump of poor quality clay will be inherently defective. 
Johnson neither accepted human depravity as inevit-
able, requiring political adaptation, nor did he advocate 
a monolithic Leviathan to regulate brutish men. Johnson's 
concern in the Sermons was religious rather than 
10 De Peccato Originalii, xxxix.44, in The Theology 
.Q! Original Sin, trans. Edward Yarnold, S.J. (Hales 
Corners: Clergy Book Service, 1971), 55-56. 
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political; he sought to assist men in attaining salvation 
in the next life by helping them enjoy the fruits of 
redemption in this life. Hobbes, on the other hand, 
eschewed moral judgments and contented himself with what 
he regarded as a realistic political philosophy. 
Mandeville scorned conventional morality as wholly alien 
to human nature and, as Johnson observed, took: 
the narrowest system of morality, monastick 
morality, which holds pleasure itself to be a 
vice, such as eating salt with our fish, because 
it makes it taste better; and he reckons wealth 
as a publick benefit, which is by no means 
always true. Pleasure of itself is not vice 
(Life, III, 292-293). 
Mandeville and Hobbes were concerned with demonstrating 
that human nature is such that it must be held in check by 
a strong government. Religion was viewed as a tool of 
government--a sort of opiate with which to keep mankind 
subservient to the monarch. There are, to be sure, 
certain parallels between Johnson's Sermons and the ideas 
of Mandeville and Hobbes. However, it appears that Bate, 
Voitle and Alken sometimes fall into the logical error of 
post hoc ergo propter hoc. The frame of reference for the 
corruption and limitations of human nature is shared by 
Hobbes and Mandeville with the Christian tradition; 
moreover, it is not simply the frame of reference which 
determines the nature of the system but the further 
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extension of the argument. To be sure, both systems of 
argument tend toward an authoritative structure; however, 
the one represented by Hobbes and Mandeville leads toward 
governmental control and the other represented by Johnson 
leads toward man's salvation. Johnson had ample 
alternatives within the classic religious tradition from 
which he extended the arguments found within his Sermons. 
Martin Luther, for example, developed his theological 
thought within the Order of the Augustinian Friars; it is 
not surprising, then, that he claimed to derive many of 
his leading ideas from his patron. Like Augustine he 
painted a dark picture of the effect of original sin on 
the human race. In his famous treatise The Bondage of the 
Will, he argued that every man possesses a "corruption of 
nature ... the secret, root-sin ... which bears the 
fruit of evil works and words. 11 11 This secret sin is not 
an act or series of acts but a state in which man finds 
himself in relation to God, neighbor and self--a state of 
estrangement which leads to radical selfishness and an 
effort to find life's meaning in self-sufficiency. 
Individual sinful acts are merely symptoms of this basic 
state of mankind. 
11 Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, in Martin 
Luther: Selections from his Writings, ed. John Dillen-
berger (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 168. 
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Following Luther's teaching on original sin, John 
Calvin explained how the consequences of the Fall not only 
deprived man of the good that was in his nature, but have 
made us a source of continual sinning: 
that perversity is never idle within us, but 
continually engenders new fruits; namely, those 
workings of the flesh that we have just de-
scribed; just as a burning furnace ceaselessly 
throws up flames and sparks, and as a spring 
spouts its water. Wherefore those who have 
defined original sin as a lack of the original 
justice which ought to be in man, although in 
these words they have comprehended all the 
substance, still they have not sufficiently 
expressed the force of it. For our nature is 
not merely empty and destitute, but it is so 
fecund of every kind of evil that it cannot be 
inactive.12 
Even one of the more liberal of the eighteenth century 
divines, Samuel Clark, urged his congregation to consider 
themselves creatures: 
who are born in sin, and conceived in iniquity; 
who are brought forth in ignorance, and grow up 
in a multiplicity of errors; whose understand-
ings are dark, wills biassed, passions strong, 
affections corrupted, a~~etites inordinate, 
inclinations irregular. 
12 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 
trans. John Allen (Philadelphia: Board of Christian 
Education, 1936), II, i, 8-9. 
13 Sermon CXLVI, "Christians Ought to Endeavor to 
Attain Perfection," 282. 
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Within his Sermons, however, Johnson resorts to the 
extreme language of St. Paul, St. Augustine and the 
Reformers only when speaking of the heinous sin of pride--
the source of all man's other imperfections. Although 
Johnson recognizes the weaknesses and limitations of man's 
nature, he is still not prepared to surrender all hope for 
the human race. Johnson never joins his more pessimistic 
theological predecessors in accepting the totality of 
human depravity nor in denying the freedom of the human 
will. 
The evidence, therefore, raises serious questions as 
to the validity of W. Jackson Bate's contention that "we 
could extract from Johnson's writings as pessimistic a 
view of the human condition as anyone ever presented" 
(298). While pessimism is certainly a salient feature of 
the Johnsonian view of man, it is no more than what Louis 
Landa, in his edition of Gulliver's Travels, termed "the 
pessimism at the heart of Christianity" (xxii). 
II 
G. K. Chesterton referred to original sin as the only 
doctrine of Christianity which could be empirically veri-
fied.14 Though it is doubtful that Johnson would have 
14 Cited in William Hordern, ~Layman's Guide to 
Protestant Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 106. 
58 
agreed that original sin is the only such doctrine, he 
clearly does believe that the evidence for its truth is 
widely manifest. Johnson never appeals to either revela-
tion or tradition to support his affirmations of human 
frailty and natural depravity. If he makes any appeal at 
all, it is an appeal to human experience. For example, at 
the beginning of his sermon on marriage, Johnson says 
that society is necessary to the happiness of 
human nature, that the gloom of solitude, and 
the stillness of retirement, however they may 
flatter at a distance, with pleasing views of 
independence and serenity, neither extinguish 
the passions, nor enlighten the understanding, 
that discontent will intrude upon privacy, and 
temptations follow us to the desert, every one 
may be easily convinced, either by his own 
experience, or that of others (Sermon 1, 3). 
In Sermon 15, Johnson bases his reflections on the 
shortness of life upon the firm foundation of experience: 
Nothing but daily experience could make it 
credible, that we should see the daily descent 
into the grave of those whom we love or fear, 
admire or detest; that we should see one genera-
tion past, and another passing, see possessions 
daily changing their owners, and the world, at 
very short intervals, altering its appearance 
••. wherever we turn our eyes, [we] find 
misfortune and distress, and have our ears daily 
filled with the lamentations of misery •.. to 
make us remember that life is miserable (160). 
Moreover, when Johnson treats such diverse subjects as 
fraud in Sermon 18 and charity in Sermon 19, he grounds 
his arguments on human experience: 
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The desire of happiness is inseparable from a 
rational being, acquainted, by experience, with 
the various gradations of pain and pleasure 
(Sermon 18, 194). 
If we cast our eyes over the earth, and extend 
our observations through the system of human 
beings, what shall we find but scenes of misery 
and innumerable varieties of calamity and 
distress, the pains of sickness, the wounds of 
casualty, the gripings of hunger, and the cold 
of nakedness ... (Sermon 19, 207). 
Johnson's understanding of original sin is based, not 
on theological speculation, but on the solid foundation of 
experiential reality. As he dictated to Boswell in 1781: 
With respect to original sin, the inquiry is not 
necessary; for whatever is the cause of human 
corruption, men are evidently and confessedly so 
corrupt, that all the laws of heaven and earth 
are insufficient to restrain them from crimes 
(Life, IV, 123-124). 
In Rambler 175, Johnson again suggests that corruption is 
so apparent in human experience that it cannot be ignored; 
he portrays man's nature in terms which are similar to 
those we noted earlier in his sermon on marriage [Sermon 
lJ. 
The depravity of mankind is so easily 
discoverable, that nothing but the desert or the 
cell can exclude it from notice. The knowledge 
of crimes intrudes uncalled and undesired. They 
whom their abstraction from common occurrences 
hinders from seeing iniquity, will quickly have 
their attention awakened by feeling it. Even he 
who ventures not into the world, may learn its 
corruption in his closet. For what are the 
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treatises of morality, but persuasives to the 
practices of duties, for which no arguments 
would be necessary, but that we have continually 
been tempted to violate or neglect them? What 
are all the records of history, but narratives 
of successive villainies, of treasons and 
usurpations, massacres and wars? (Rambler 175, 
160).15 -
A Christian, then, need not receive his belief about the 
fallen nature of man from second-hand sources. He should 
be able to infer it from his own empirical observations: 
"for what can any man see, either within or without 
himself, that does not afford him some reason to remark 
his own ignorance, imbecillity, and meanness?" (Sermon~, 
94). 
There are certain topics, however, traditionally 
associated with the doctrine of original sin, which cannot 
be verified experientially. Concerning these topics, 
Johnson, not surprisingly, has almost nothing to say. 
Consequently, though we are to consider his belief in the 
universal, innate depravity of man a version of the tradi-
tional Christian doctrine, we must also be aware that it 
is a relatively spare and attenuated version, containing 
only the barest essence of the doctrine as expounded by 
St. Augustine and as understood by the Reformation church. 
15 Samuel Johnson, The Rambler, ed. w. J. Bate and 
Albrecht B. Strauss, VolS:-III-V of The Yale Edition of 
the Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1969). Hereafter, cited in the text by Rambler and 
Page number. 
About the cause of human depravity, for instance, 
Johnson's only statement seems curiously disinterested. 
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He says only that original sin is "the propensity to evil, 
which no doubt was occasioned by the Fall" (Life, V, 88). 
Furthermore, he expresses no opinion at all about the 
other subjects commonly included in expositions of the 
doctrine--nothing about the transmission of Adam's sin 
through generation, nothing about the nature of 
concupiscence, nothing about the inheritance of Adam's 
guilt as well as his corruption, nothing about the extent 
of human depravity, whether partial or total. What 
reasons exist for his reticence we cannot say with 
absolute certainty, though he most probably relegated 
these questions to the realm of idle speculation.16 The 
16 Johnson may be following a tradition in English 
theology which expressed strong reservations toward those 
aspects of the doctrine of original sin which stressed 
feelings of self-pity and guilt more than the corrective 
moral activities necessitated by man's condition. For 
example, Boswell notes: 
Dr. Ogden, in his second sermon "On the Articles 
of the Christian Faith," with admirable 
acuteness thus addresses the opposers of that 
Doctrine, which accounts for confusion, sin, and 
misery, which we find in this life: "It would 
be severe in God, you think, to degrade us to 
such a sad state as this, for the offence of our 
first parents; but you can allow him to place us 
in it without any inducement. Are our calami-
ties lessened for not being ascribed to Adam? 
If your condition be unhappy, is it not still 
unhappy, whatever was the occasion? with the 
aggravation of this reflection, that if it was 
as good as it was at first designed, there seems 
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onlY conclusion we may safely draw is that the doctrine of 
original sin for Johnson is not a set of complex 
theological hypotheses, but an obvious and very simple 
fact of daily life: "men are evidently and confessedly so 
corrupt, that all the laws of heaven and earth are 
insufficient to restrain them from crimes" (Life, IV, 123-
124). 
In addition to its indebtedness to experience and its 
heavy reliance on concrete example rather than abstract 
theory, Johnson's view of human nature is also distin-
guished from the Augustinian conception of original sin by 
its lack of interest in any dimensions of the fallen state 
of man that are not moral. It is clear from Sermon 2, for 
example, that the Johnsonian version of the doctrine of 
original sin represents not so much a religious as an 
ethical conception of the human predicament: 
... when [God] created man, he created him for 
happiness; happiness indeed dependant upon his 
own choice, and to be preserved by his own 
conduct • . • Reason and experience assure us 
that they [physical and moral evil] continue for 
the most part so closely united, that, to avoid 
misery, we must avoid sin, and that while it is 
in our power to be virtuous, it is in our power 
to be happy (Sermon 2, 55). 
to be somewhat the less reason to look for its 
amendment" (Life, IV, 123; note 3). 
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Johnson does not share the preoccupation of many 
eighteenth century divines with a deep sense of man's 
alienation or estrangement--the "Dark Night of the Soul." 
He shows little concern for probing the mystery of how 
evil entered the world, a world created and governed by a 
God of love and righteousness. He is not troubled by a 
need to probe deeply into the nature of man to find 
ontological explanations for the evil propensity so 
obvious in the human species. Johnson appears to have 
attached no other meaning to sin than that given in his 
Dictionary: "an act against the laws of God, a violation 
of the laws of religion." For Johnson, original sin is 
simply the inherent propensity to commit these "act[s] 
against the laws of God." Salvation, accordingly, is not 
obtained merely by looking to God for forgiveness and 
reconciliation but rather by an active striving to 
overcome one's sinfulness, using both one's own reason and 
the aids provided by religion. Johnson's religion is more 
visceral than contemplative or devotional. Chester Chapin 
makes the point more forcefully when he observes that 
Johnson's 
considered opinion . is that most men are 
neither greatly good nor greatly wicked. 
Johnson believes, as Miss Boothby [an Evangeli-
cal friend who adhered to the Calvinist doctrine 
of total depravity] does not, that most men, by 
an effort of will or 'reasoning' may become, if 
not virtuous, at least more virtuous than they 
are ... And so, for Johnson, the natural man 
is not utterly helpless, utterly depraved.17 
It is this divergence from the classical Protestant 
tradition that no doubt prompted Jean Hagstrum to assert 
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that Johnson "seems not to have accepted fully or perhaps 
even to have understood the doctrine of original sin or 
total depravity in its extremer forms. 11 18 
III 
Samuel Johnson's reticence to speculate on the causes 
and the extent of natural depravity allowed him to confine 
his homiletic writing to the entirely appropriate subject 
of man's present condition. The vacuity of life is a 
favorite observation of Johnson on man's present circum-
stances; his basic metaphor for human experience is the 
empty receptacle which cannot tolerate its own empti-
ness .19 In the funeral sermon for his wife, Johnson used 
17 
Arbor: 
The Religious Thought of Samuel Johnson 
University of Michigan Press, 1968), 62. 
(Ann 
18 Jean Hagstrum, Samuel Johnson's Literary Criticism 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 69. 
19 Arieh Sachs, in Passionate Intelligence: 
Imagination and Reason in the Work of Samuel Johnson 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 
perceptively notes the fundamental position which the 
vacuity of life held in Johnson's writings. Sachs 
observes that 
where the vacuity of life is not the explicit 
theme of his writings or conversation, it is 
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this metaphor to describe the effects which the death of a 
ioved one has on even "the best minds": 
the whole mind becomes a gloomy vacuity, without 
any image or form of pleasure, a chaos of 
confused wishes, directed to no particular end, 
or to that which, while we wish, we cannot hope 
to obtain (Sermon 25, 267). 
The mind is powerfully dissatisfied with emptiness, but 
its endeavors for filling itself cannot be successful 
precisely because human nature is inherently frail and 
imperfect as a result of original sin. When he analyzes 
man's insatiable desire for happiness in Sermon 14, 
Johnson's underlying assumption is, once again, this sense 
of the vacuity of life: 
that almost every man is disappointed in his 
search after happiness is apparent from the 
clamorous complaints which are always to be 
heard; from the restless discontent, which is 
hourly to be observed, and from the incessant 
pursuit of new objects, which employ almost 
every moment of every man's life. For a desire 
of change is a sufficient proof, that we are 
dissatisfied with our present state •.•. It 
will easily appear, that men fail to gain what 
they so much desire, because they seek it where 
it is not to be found, because they suffer 
themselves to be dazzled by specious appear-
ances, resign themselves up to the direction of 
present as the underlying assumption and 
constantly shows up in the imagery. All human 
activity is seen as a futile attempt to fill an 
aching inner void, an incessant and hopeless 
search for 'novelty' and 'diversity' with which 
to feed the hunger of the mind (5). 
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their passions, and, when one pursuit has failed 
of affording them that satisfaction which they 
expected from it, apply themselves with the same 
ardour to another equally unprofitable, and 
waste their lives in successive delusions • . . 
and in attempts to grasp a bubble, which ... 
is neither solid nor lasting (Sermon 14, 149-
150). -
The fact is that nothing ensures discontent as certainly 
as the active pursuit of contentment. Courting merriment 
will leave one mirthless; the search for happiness will 
always end in unhappiness. Yet all men, Johnson asserts 
in sermon 14, seek happiness and, when they think that 
they have found it, are only too willing to conceal from 
themselves their dissatisfaction with their hard-won 
"joy. " 
The Johnsonian axiom that the human condition can be 
defined by the vacuity of its experiences suggests that 
life in his view is basically stagnant, but Johnson always 
coupled this observation with an insistent stress on the 
activity of the human will. His understanding of this 
human dilemma is extremely close to the classical 
religious view of concupiscence which sees human nature 
hungering insatiably for money, power, fame or sexual 
pleasure. None of them satisfy completely. They only 
make man more aware of his emptiness and lack of 
fulfillment. However, Johnson always coupled his 
observations about the vacuity of the human condition with 
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an insistent emphasis on the activity of the human will.20 
He believed that this faculty could best be described as 
an innate hunger inextricably fixed in man's nature; its 
constant seeking of objects for satisfaction could never 
be satisfied. Moreover, he viewed this desire as really a 
spiritual hunger, only accidentally and unsatisfactorily 
seeking vacuous earthly satisfactions. These facts 
explain why Johnson's solution is to redirect and regulate 
the desire of the will rather than try to eliminate it. 
In Johnson's view, the will can be completely satisfied 
only when it is redirected to seek God. Since his notion 
of man's will is much closer to the traditional concept of 
this faculty than to that of many of his contemporaries, 
it would be good to examine some of these parallels. 
According to a tradition that has its roots in both 
Biblical and classical thinking, man is seen as a creature 
dissatisfied with his immediate circumstances; he remains 
so regardless of what he does to change or improve his 
condition. Man's nature is desirous but insatiable: "all 
the rivers run into the sea, yet the sea is not full, for 
20 The paradox of the vacuity of human experience and 
the insatiable activity of the will provides a fundamental 
tension which inspires much of Johnson's secular and 
religious writings. For example, it is discussed in 
Rambler 2, 11-14, 6, 31-35, 8, 41, 16, 86-91, 41, 221, 66, 
351-353,-85, 85-87~ 114, 243~247, 127, 315, 152; 44, 207"; 
310; it iS-implicit in The Vision of Theodore:-The VanI'ty 
21 Human Wishes, and Rasselas; and it is made explicit in 
all of his Sermons. 
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the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled 
with hearing" (Ecclesiastes 1: 7-8). The wise Solomon 
wrote that the eyes of man are as insatiable as the fires 
of hell (Proverbs 27: 20). The problem is not entirely 
man's inability to fulfill his wishes, even though this is 
a crucial issue in understanding and regulating behavior, 
because "the desires of mankind are much more numerous 
than their attainments" (Rambler 104, 191; and Rasselas, 
XLIV). 
However, an even more serious problem--more serious 
because of the futility implied in human endeavor--is that 
achieved desires or realized goals do not bring happiness 
or contentment: 
He that succeeds in his first attempts is 
animated to new designs; new designs produce new 
anxieties and new opposition; and though the 
second attempt should be equally happy, it will 
be found, as soon as the transports of novelty 
have ceased, as soon as custom made elevation 
familiar, that peace is yet to sought, and that 
new measures must be taken for the attainment of 
that tranquillity, for which it is the nature of 
man to languish, and the want of which, is ill 
supplied by hurry and confusion, by pomp and 
variety (Sermon l_!, 152). 
This is an important point because its consequence is that 
the happiness of an individual is not promoted by increas-
ing acquisitions or fulfilling desires. In his Sermons, 
Johnson concentrated his efforts on the desire--the power 
of the will--itself, rather than on its objects. For 
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example, Sermon 12 echoes the wisdom of the preacher in 
Ecclesiastes: 
all human actions terminate in vanity, and all 
human hopes will end in vexation, is a position, 
from which nature with-holds our credulity, and 
which our fondness for the present life, and 
worldly enjoyments, disposes us to doubt; 
however forcibly it may be urged upon us, by 
reason or experience •••. Everyone wants 
something to happiness, and when he had gained 
what he first wanted, he wants something else; 
he wears out life in efforts and pursuits, and 
perhaps dies, regretting that he must leave the 
world, when he is about to enjoy it .... So 
great is our interest . . . to believe ourselves 
able to procure our own happiness, that ex-
perience never convinces us of our impotence--
. . . But surely we may be content to credit the 
general voice of mankind . . • that if happiness 
had been to be found, some would have found it, 
and that it is vain to search longer for what 
all have missed (Sermon 12, 127). 
Sermon 12 reflects the Johnsonian axiom that human nature 
is defined by the vacuity and boredom which results from 
the incompatibility between the will's infinite desires 
and the futile quality of the experience available to it 
in this elusive temporality of life [cf. Rasselas]. The 
expectation of any kind of permanent contentment or 
happiness, then, is mocked by life itself: whether we 
strive for power, fame, wealth, wisdom, social achieve-
ment, perfection, or even attention, we do so only to be 
happy and at peace with ourselves. Yet the chasm between 
expectation and result, promise and performance, hope and 
reality, can never be bridged by human endeavor. It is 
man's refusal to confess this fact that leads to his 
ultimate frustration. 
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Aristotle described the soul as the center of desire. 
He recognized that this desire was not necessarily for 
things--f or the satisfaction of physical wants by physical 
objects--but rather that the need was for satisfaction 
itself [for pleasure, for happiness]. Aristotle main-
tained that this need was made inevitable because of the 
construction of the soul: 
If [the soul] has sensation, it must also have 
imagination and appetite; for, where sensation 
is, there is also pain and pleasure, and where 
these are there must also be desire .... For 
appetite consists of desire, inclination, and 
wish .... and that which has sensation knows 
pleasure and pain, the pleasant and the painful, 
and that which knows these has also desire; for 
desire is an appetite for what is pleasant.21 
Rasselas' conclusion about his discontent hints at this 
idea, as the prince suggests to himself either that man 
has some non-animal sense not gratified by the Happy 
Valley or that "he has some desires distinct from sense 
which must be satisfied before he can be happy" [emphasis 
21 Aristotle, Aristotle on the Soul, in Aristotle on 
~ Soul, Parva Naturalia, On""""Breath-:---tr'ans. W. S. Hett---
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), 413b-414b, 
77-81. 
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mine].22 In Sermons l, &, 12, 14, 12., 16, and 18, Johnson 
explores this notion of "desires distinct from sense" as 
he describes man's futile pursuit after perfect peace. 
And yet, though man recognizes the impossibility of 
achieving perfect peace in any task he undertakes, he 
strives for it anyway, and he never fails to be bitterly 
disappointed when he falls short of this unrealistic goal: 
He that succeeds in his first attempts is 
animated to new designs; new designs produce new 
anxieties and new opposition; and though the 
second attempt should be equally happy, it will 
be found, as soon as the transports of novelty 
have ceased, as soon as custom has made eleva-
tion familiar, that peace is yet to be sought, 
and that new measures must be taken for the 
attainment of that tranquillity, for which it is 
the nature of man to languish (Sermon 14, 152). 
Perfect peace is clearly beyond the reach of imperfect 
man; hence, Johnson urges man to redirect this desire by 
placing complete trust only in God's perfect will. 
Moreover, in his admonitions against such dangers to the 
practice of religion as hardness of heart in Sermon 3 and 
vanity in Sermon 12, Johnson again appeals to this concept 
of "desires distinct from sense." He insists that man can 
begin the process of self-reformation by fixing his desire 
solely on heaven: 
22 Samuel Johnson, Rasselas, in Samuel Johnson: The 
Oxford Authors, ed. Donald Greene (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1984), 339. Hereafter cited in the text as 
Rasselas. 
72 
He is happy that carries about with him in the 
world the temper of the cloister . . . who can 
manage the business of life, with such indif-
ference, as may shut out from his heart all in-
citements to fraud or injustice; who can partake 
the pleasures of sense with temperance . . • 
and, among all the vicissitudes of good and 
evil, have his heart fixed only where true joys 
are to be found (Sermon l, 33-34). 
When the present state of man is considered, 
when an estimate is made of his hopes, his 
pleasures, and his possessions; when his hopes 
appear to be deceitful, his labours ineffectual, 
his pleasures unsatisfactory, and his posses-
sions fugitive, it is natural to wish for an 
abiding city, for a state more constant and 
permanent, of which the objects may be more 
proportioned to our wishes, and the enjoyments 
to our capacities (Sermon 1£, 135). 
Johnson would have come across a similar idea to the 
notion of "desires distinct from sense" in Robert Burton's 
Anatomy of Melancholy, a book he admired and quoted often. 
Burton also recognized that desire seemed to rise as a 
character independent of the needs or physical objects 
that it sought, and that it was thus capable of wide 
extension and rapid switching from one more or less ar-
bitrary object to another without producing any kind of 
satisfaction or happiness. Burton saw in desire an almost 
manic quality and he knew how little calculation or 
deliberation was required to set it intensely onto an 
object. The resulting pain of unfulfillment Burton called 
melancholy: 
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A true saying it is, 'Desire hath no rest,' is 
infinite in itself, endless, and as one calls 
it, 'a perpetual rack, or horse mill .•. ' 'It 
extends itself to everything,' as Guianerios 
will have it, 'that is superfluously sought 
after'; or to any 'fervent desire,' as Fernelius 
interprets it; be it in what kind soever, it 
tortures if immoderate, and is (according to 
Plater and others) an especial cause of melan-
choly .... Austin confessed, that he was torn 
a-pieces with his manifold desires: and so doth 
Bernard complain that he could not rest from 
them a minute, an hour: 'this I would have, and 
that, and then I desire to be such and such' 
(II.i.3.11). 
The intensity of desire and the severity of the melancholy 
resulting from the frustrating lack of satisfaction even 
when each thing desired is obtained are two important 
aspects of Burton's discussion which Johnson shared. 
In his Dictionary, Johnson had carefully defined 
desire as "wish; eagerness to obtain or enjoy," implying 
perhaps that the eagerness to enjoy might exist initially 
apart from an eagerness to enjoy some thing. Desire as a 
verb is defined as "to wish" (rather than "to wish for"), 
and under wish Johnson discriminates between the faculty 
and the object in defining the noun in definition one as 
"Longing desire" and in definition two as "Thing desired." 
The example he gives from Dryden under desire shows at 
least that desire is somewhat detached from expected 
gratification: "Desire's the vast extent of human mind; I 
It mounts above, and leaves poor hope behind." Johnson 
also cites an example of the use of desire from Locke's 
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!ssay Concerning Human Understanding: "Desire is the 
uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of any 
thing." This example shows the beginning of a movement 
away from tradition and toward a connection of desire to 
objects, making desire a result of other operations 
triggered by sensory stimuli. Locke's view, however, is 
much more complicated than this brief quotation reveals.23 
Elsewhere in the Essay Concerning Human Understand-
ing, Locke defines desire as "an uneasiness of the mind 
for want of some absent good" (II.xxi,31). His choice of 
the term uneasiness--a term which by itself crosses the 
barrier between the physical and the psychological--allows 
him to move toward a near merging of the sensuous and the 
intellectual in the fulfillment of desire, because pain 
and pleasure are at once both physical and psychic: 
All pain of the body, of what sort soever, and 
disquiet of the mind, is uneasiness: and with 
this is always joined desire, equal to the pain 
or uneasiness felt; and is scarce distinguish-
able from it. For desire being nothing but an 
uneasiness in the want of any good, in reference 
to any pain felt, ease is that absent good; and 
till that ease be attained, we may call it 
23 The similarity between Johnson's views and Locke's 
Philosophy has been examined in several studies. For 
example, see: Jean Hagstrum, Samuel Johnson's Literary 
Criticism, Chapter I; Donald Greene, The Politics of 
Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), 
76-80, 244-46; Paul Alken, Samuel Johnson and Moral 
Discipline, Chapter III and especially pages-90-100; 
Wilbur Samuel Howell, "John Locke and the New Rhetoric," 
Q..uarterly Journal of Speech, 53 (1967}, 319-333. . 
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desire .... Besides this desire of ease from 
pain, there is another of absent positive good. 
. . • A.s much as we desire any absent good, so 
much are we in pain for it .... But so much as 
there is anywhere of desire, so much is of 
uneasiness (II.xxi.31). 
The easing of mental or physical pains (which is to say, 
the fulfillment of desires) results in "pleasure" which 
Locke traces to "happiness," when the pleasure is "produ-
ced in us by the operation of certain objects, either on 
our minds or our bodies .•. '' (II.xxi.43). That is, the 
ultimate source of desire and the eventual recipient of 
its actions is a purely psychological state: happiness. 
If it be further asked,--What is it moves 
desire? I answer,--happiness, and that alone. 
Happiness and misery are the names of two 
extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not. 
. . . but of some degrees of both we have very 
lively impressions; made by several instances of 
delight and joy on the one side, and torment and 
sorrow on the other; which, for shortness' sake, 
I shall comprehend under the names of pleasure 
and pain; there being pleasure and pain of the 
mind as well as the body ••.• Or, to speak 
truly, they are all of the mind; though some 
have their rise in the mind from thought, others 
in the body from certain modifications of motion 
[emphasis mine] (II.xxi.42). 
Happiness, "the utmost pleasure we are capable of" 
(II.xxi.43), keeps us desiring even when previous desires 
have been obtained. Seged, lord of Ethiopia, seems to 
enact this idea when he dreams of and pursues ten days of 
perfect happiness (Rambler 204 and 205), even though he 
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describes himself in terms which would seem to represent 
the culmination of all the hopes and ambitions of a ruler 
(Rambler 204, 296). He does this, Locke would say, 
because there are "infinite degrees of happiness which are 
not in our possession" (II.xxi.45) and because the 
unregulated mind will always suffer when it allows itself 
to desire an unlimited amount of some satisfaction before 
it will be content. This explains in part why possession 
of a thing desired is often followed by disgust (Rambler 
207; sermons .§., 12, 14, 15, 16, and 18). 
But the desires for security, peace or happiness did 
not provide Johnson with a completely satisfactory 
explanation for the insatiable craving of man's will 
because he knew that total fulfillment in this life was 
impossible. The explanation that appeared to fit was one 
that transcended the physical and even the psychological 
realms of human existence. The Biblical tradition had 
long recognized that human desire was really a spiritual 
hunger: 
As a hart longs for flowing streams, so longs my 
soul for thee, o God. My soul thirsts for God, 
for the living God (Psalm 42: 1-2). 
Man's desire is really the soul's hunger for union with 
its Creator; it is displaced when it fixes upon earthly 
objects: 
The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want; 
he makes me lie down in green pastures. 
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He leads me beside still waters; he restores my 
soul .... Even though I walk through the 
valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil; 
for thou are with me; thy rod and thy staff, 
they comfort me (Psalm 23: 1-4). 
The Lord drew me up from the desolate pit, out 
of the miry bog, and set my feet upon a rock, 
making my steps secure .... Blessed is the man 
who makes the Lord his trust, who does not turn 
to the proud, to those who go astray after false 
gods! (Psalm 40: 2-4). 
Following this tradition, Johnson's Sermons acknowledge 
the spiritual benefits that can accrue to man when his 
desire is properly regulated and directed: 
... it is natural to wish for an abiding city, 
for a state more constant and permanent, of 
which the objects may be more proportioned to 
our wishes, and the enjoyments to our capacities 
(Sermon 1£, 135). 
The man who has accustomed himself to consider 
that he is always in the presence of the Supreme 
Being . • • easily withstands those temptations 
which find a ready passage into the mind not 
guarded and secured by this awful sense of the 
Divine Presence (Sermon 1§., 174). 
The knowledge that man's nature has a "capacity which our 
present state is not able to fill" permits Johnson not 
only to conclude that there is a "better mode of exis-
tence, which shall furnish employment for the whole soul, 
and where pleasure shall be adequate to our powers of 
fruition" (Idler 37, 117, and Sermons l, 33; &, 63; 12, 
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135; 16, 174), but it keeps him from exhibiting a naive 
surprise at the incorrigible restlessness of human nature. 
He declares that there is nothing unusual in the claim 
that "all our gratifications are volatile, vagrant, and 
easily dissipated." Such a fact needed no proof, because 
all admitted it in their own behavior: 
It is, indeed, not necessary to shew by many 
instances what all mankind confess, by an inces-
sant call for variety, and restless pursuit of 
enjoyments, which they value only because unpos-
sessed (Rambler 78, 46). 
Man, in his present state •.. has his mind 
perpetually employed, in defence, or in 
acquisition, in securing that which he has, or 
attaining that which, he believes, he either 
does, or shall, want. 
He that desires happiness must necessarily 
desire the means of happiness, must wish to 
appropriate, and accumulate, whatever may 
satisfy his desires. It is not sufficient to be 
without want. He will try to place himself 
beyond the fear of want; and endeavour to 
provide future gratifications for future wishes, 
and lay up in store future provisions for future 
necessities (Sermon 18, 194). 
Johnson is careful to teach that desire exists apart 
from the things eventually desired. This innate power of 
the human will exists autonomously--hungering for anything 
and everything insatiably--and it will fix upon almost any 
object. Consequently, the objects it is directed toward 
can often be the result of choice or calculation. This 
conclusion is important and remarkable because Johnson was 
quite unusual in recognizing that the thing desired is not 
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the real stimulus for desire and that the objects of 
desire could be controlled to a large degree by man's free 
will.24 The implications of this position for moral 
activity are very great--man can make choices about both 
his wants and his pursuits, and with proper knowledge and 
sufficient power, can change the objects of his desire and 
pursuit from bad ones to good or from less good to better. 
He is not chained by destiny to evil, misery, or failure; 
he has the capacity to escape from his vacuous existence. 
Johnson's astute focus on the process of desiring 
itself allowed him to steadfastly defend the liberty of 
man's will. On hearing the freedom of man's will being 
questioned on one occasion, Johnson exclaimed: "All 
theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience 
for it!" (Life, III, 291). For Johnson, if theory and 
experience conflict, it is theory which must give way; the 
fact that men act as though they are free agents is a 
sufficient answer to all theoretical objections. In 
particular, Johnson found troublesome the conclusions 
concerning free will which had been popularized through 
24 This perceptive distinction within Johnsonian 
thought was noted by Bate (The Achievement of Samuel 
Johnson, 68-69). ~-
the preaching and writing of Luther, Calvin, and their 
followers.25 For example, in The Bondage of the Will, 
80 
25 Luther and Calvin, by denying the freedom of the 
will, put man under a necessity of sinning; man was thus 
deprived of moral responsibility for his actions. Johnson 
was not the first to attack the pernicious effect of such 
a theory on Christianity. As early as 1655, Jeremy 
Taylor, in Unum Necessarium, attacked the Calvinist 
position as 
a destruction of all laws. It takes away 
reward and punishment, and we have nothing 
whereby we can serve God. And precepts of 
holiness might as well be preached to a 
wolf as to a man, if man were naturally and 
inevitably wicked • . . . There would be no 
use of reason or of discourse, no delibera-
tion or counsel; and it were impossible for 
the wit of man to make sense of thousands 
of places of Scripture which speak to us if 
we could hear and obey, or could refuse [In 
Anglicanism: The Thought and Practice of 
the Church of England, Illustrated from the 
Religious Literature of the Seventeenth 
Century, ed. Paul E. More and Frank L. 
Cross (1935; rpt. London: S.P.C.K., 
1962), 650]. 
Samuel Clarke also argued that man was sufficiently 
free to be morally responsible for his actions. For 
example, in Sermon .JJ., Clarke wrote that 
God . . • has not made us necessarily 
wicked; he had made us, subject and liable 
to temptation, but not of necessity slaves 
to sin. That we are capable of corrupting 
ourselves, is indeed the consequence of 
that nature which God has given us; but all 
actual corruptions, are the effects of our 
free choice [Sermons on Several Subjects, 
VII, 234-235]. 
Like Jeremy Taylor and Samuel Clarke, there is no 
idea more characteristic of Johnson's religious position 
than the notion that man is morally responsible for his 
behavior. Johnson's exposure to the writings of Calvin, 
Taylor, and Clarke can be demonstrated from Christie's 
81 
Luther had insisted that human depravity is so extensive 
as to exclude any notion of free will: 
So, if we believe that Satan is the prince of 
this world, ever ensnaring and opposing the 
Kingdom of Christ with all his strength, and 
that he does not let his prisoners go unless he 
is driven out by the power of the Divine Spirit, 
it is again apparent that there can be no free 
will [emphasis mine] (203). 
John Calvin follows Luther in stressing that man, while in 
his separated state, can do nothing to overcome his in-
herited sinfulness; man is helpless, utterly corrupt, and 
in bondage to sin. In his Institutes of the Christian Re-
ligion, Calvin argues that 
Since the Fall, it is certain that man has had 
no free will to do good. . . . Man is now 
destitute of free will and miserably subjected 
to every evil ...• [Man] is a slave to sin, 
the meaning of which is that his spirit is so 
wholly alienated from the righteousness of God 
that he neither knows, desires, nor undertakes 
anything that is not wicked, perverse, iniqui-
tous and defiled [emphasis mine] (II.ii.5-6). 
Johnson vigorously objected to such ideas: "In 
examining what part of our present misery is to be imputed 
to God," he says, "we must carefully distinguish that 
sale catalogue for Johnson's personal library. For 
example, the works of Calvin are listed as entries 115 and 
118; the works of Jeremy Taylor are listed as entries 213, 
351, and 477; and the works of Samuel Clarke are listed as 
entries 242 and 251. [Christie, ~ Catalogue of the 
Valuable Library of Books, of the late learned Samuel 
Johnson (London: Mr. Christie, 1785]. 
which is actually appointed by him, from that which is 
only permitted, or that which is the consequence of 
something done by ourselves," without his direction 
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(Sermon 2, 56). Based on his experience of human nature, 
Johnson argued further in Sermon 2 that self-improvement 
is possible for man only because freedom of the will does 
exist. Johnson 1 s consistent opposition to the concept of 
determinism is perhaps best summarized in his response to 
the idea of a ruling passion. In the Life of Pope, he 
calls Pope's presentation of the doctrine ''pernicious as 
well as false" because it at once preached submission to 
irrational behavioral forces and the indulgence of 
appetite: 
... its tendency is to produce the belief of a 
kind of moral predestination, or overruling 
principle which cannot be resisted: he that 
admits it, is prepared to comply with every 
desire that caprice or opportunity shall excite, 
and to flatter himself that he submits only to 
the lawful dominion of Nature, in obeying the 
resistless authority of his ruling Passion (Life 
of Pope, 357). 
Johnson's belief in free will was based in part on 
his recognition that men often project the blame for their 
problems onto other people or circumstances, refusing to 
see the cause in their own natures. For example, Johnson 
says of Cowley, who thought that travelling would 
alleviate his unhappiness, that 11 he never suspected that 
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the cause of his unhappiness was within, that his own 
passions were not sufficiently regulated" (Rambler~, 35). 
Because of pride, "the general source of our infelicity" 
(Sermon~, 57), we refuse to blame ourselves for our 
discontent--"Vanity inclines us to find faults anywhere 
rather than in ourselves" (Idler 70, 218)--because "we are 
all naturally credulous in our own favour" (Adventurer 74, 
219). The word naturally here is the key. Humans are 
proud by their very nature and, apart from the light and 
power of religion, they will refuse to see themselves as 
their own main problem. We are "unwilling to believe 
anything to our own disadvantage" (Adventurer 108, 448) 
Johnson notes, and frequently we are "unwilling to be 
taught" (Rambler ~, 14) anything new. "Advice has no 
force to suppress •.. vanity" (Rambler 155, 61-62), so 
that reason by itself cannot cast off the daring desires 
and behaviors which lead to unhappiness. 
Free will, then, is the basis for Johnson's belief in 
the possibility of moral and physical improvement for 
man's present state. In Sermon~, for example, Johnson 
argues that men are reasoning creatures and not 
automatons: 
If we examine all the afflictions of mind, body, 
and estate . . . we shall find God not otherwise 
accessary to them, than as he works no miracles 
to prevent them, as he suffers men to be masters 
of themselves, and restrains them only by 
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coercions applied to their reason. If God 
should, by a particular exertion of his omnipo-
tence, hinder murder or oppression, no man could 
then be a murderer or an oppressor, because he 
would be with-held from it by an irresistible 
power; but then that power, which prevented 
crimes, would destroy virtue; for virtue is the 
consequence of choice. Men would be no longer--
rational, or would be rational to no purpose, 
because their actions would not be the result of 
free-will, determined by moral motives; but the 
settled and predestined motions of a machine 
impelled by necessity [emphasis mine] (Sermon 5, 
56). -
God created man for happiness, "happiness indeed dependant 
upon his [man's] own choice, and to be preserved by his 
own conduct" (Sermon .2_, 55). Man need not submit help-
lessly to fate "like a machine impelled by necessity" 
(Sermon .2_, 56). 
Furthermore, Boswell records several conversations in 
which Johnson defends man's free will. For example, 
speaking on the question of atheism, when the supposition 
of an eternal necessity without design, without a 
governing mind, was discussed, Johnson counters the idea 
with the "all-powerful intelligence" which creates men 
having freedom of choice. Thus, Johnson again rejects the 
notion of human nature being a "machine impelled by 
necessity" (Sermon .2_, 56) in this discussion with Boswell 
(~, v, 47-48). 
On a later occasion, Boswell again returned to the 
topic of free will, and was finally won over by Johnson. 
Here, Johnson clearly states the position for Boswell 
which he had previously outlined in Sermon 5: 
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Moral evil is occasioned by free will, which 
implies choice between good and evil. With all 
the evil that there is, there is no man but 
would rather be a free agent than a mere machine 
without evil; and what is best for each indi-
vidual may be best for the whole. If a man 
would rather be the machine, I cannot argue with 
him. He is a different being from me (Life, v, 
117).26 
Johnson, then, stoutly asserted the freedom of man's will 
in his Sermons, his secular writing,27 and his conversa-
tions. According to Miss Reynolds, 
There was nothing Dr. Johnson used to say of 
which he was so certain as of the freedom of his 
will, and no man, I believe, was ever more 
attentive to preserve its rectitude ••. in 
conformity with his religious tenets respecting 
original sin (Johnsonian Miscellanies, II, 256). 
By considering the will as a fundamental principle of 
human nature, Samuel Johnson departed from much current 
psychological theory, which included the desire or hunger 
of the will as just one of a list of passions, either 
26 Boswell records several other occasions when 
Johnson spoke in defense of man's free will. Perhaps the 
most famous remark is: "Sir, we know our will is free, 
and there's an end on't" (Life, I~2). 
27 See Rambler 43, 234-235; Rambler 113, 239; and 
Idler 11, 37-39, for-additional evidence of Johnson's 
belief--:that freedom of the will implies that man exercise 
Personal responsibility for his moral improvement. 
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direct (arising inunediately from objects or sensations) or 
derivative (arising from other passions in conjunction 
with objects and sensations). Locke had listed love, 
hatred, desire, joy, sorrow, hope, fear, despair, anger, 
and envy as the passions (Essay, II.xx.1-13), while Hume's 
list included desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, 
despair, and security.28 Such rankings certainly take the 
focus off desire as the single passion in need of careful 
attention and regulation, and they leave singular 
Johnson's view that "to subdue passion, and regulate 
desire, is the great task of man, as a moral agent" 
(Sermon~' 193). 
Johnson's view, then, is that the power of man's will 
to desire is a very powerful faculty existing apart from 
outer stimuli; it cannot be suppressed, but it can be 
regulated by a conscious selection of objects (Rambler 49, 
266). Since its essence is a spiritual hunger, it cannot 
be satisfied by any quantitative worldly acquisition: 
gratifying appetites only increases their demands (Rambler 
38, 208), "our desires always increase with our posses-
sions" (Adventurer 67, 387), and we "create wants as fast 
as they are satisfied" (Adventurer 119, 462). The power 
of the human will can be satisfied only when it is 
28 David Hurne, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. 
Selby-Bigge (Oxford:- Clarendon-Press, 1888), 277. 
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properly directed to "wish for an abiding city, for a 
state more constant and permanent, of which the objects 
maY be more proportioned to our wishes, and the enjoyments 
to our capacities" (Sermon .J:.l, 135). Meanwhile, the task 
of the sermon writer is not only to remind man of this, so 
that man will cease the endless and futile pursuit of 
every idle wish and irrational craving, but also to 
instruct men, as personally responsible moral agents, 
regarding their duty to direct and regulate desire to its 
proper end. It is notable that Johnson's pragmatic view 
of human desire is different from that of many of the 
theorists we have examined both in its nature and 
importance. Johnson was not content to rest his 
observations on the nature of man with no more than a 
theory of the will; he wanted to apply his ideas to the 
improvement of the human condition--to reduce the miseries 
caused by man's erroneous desires and pursuits, and to 
warn men of the dangers of expecting their innate 
faculties to lead them to perfect happiness in their 
present state. 
IV 
In Johnson's understanding of human motivation, the 
powers of the will and the imagination are viewed as 
complementary drives. The imagination is often the 
88 
dangerously creative and delusive faculty of human nature 
which invents objects or goals, real or unreal, possible 
or impossible, for the power of the will--man's desire--to 
fix upon. Imagination in Johnsonian thought is ultimately 
that power in man which blinds him to the limitations of 
his nature. When unregulated it is the cause of much of 
man's unhappiness, extending his desires far beyond his 
ability to obtain them, always promising happiness but 
always disappointing the fulfillment. However, the 
imagination is not inherently "bad"; it is capable, with 
the right direction, of benefiting man by acting 
creatively rather than destructively. Thus, it follows 
that, as with man's will, Johnson does not propose to 
suppress or eliminate the imagination; he seeks rather to 
regulate and redirect it. 
Some difficulty arises in attempting to define the 
imagination for Johnson because he uses the term in 
several different and not always interrelated senses--
showing, to begin with, the complexity of the concept, and 
to some extent, perhaps, the imprecision of identifying 
similar processes with one name. Raymond D. Havens gives 
six senses in which Johnson uses the word imagination, 
ranging from the source of literary creation to an agent 
Which not only distorts the real world, but which can 
Produce non-existent things for the mind to dwell on and 
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wish to be rea1.29 Havens calls the imagination in this 
latter sense a "power of conceiving what is unusual, what 
is outside his experience, and perhaps improbable or 
impossible" (245). While the kind of imagination we are 
concerned with derives from this idea, it is not just the 
"power of conceiving" something new, unusual, or unreal 
that gave Johnson his great distrust of the imagination, 
but the power that faculty has to impose itself and its 
creations upon the mind in the guise of truth or reality, 
and the power to disturb man's faculty of the will. Thus, 
even though Johnson does believe that it has a certain, 
though relatively small, constructive role, so often 
harmful are the workings of an uncontrolled or over-
indulged imagination that he almost always focuses on its 
negative powers. 
Johnson had reason to fear the imagination--a fear 
born of his own experience. As he left Oxford, he fell 
into a state of terrible depression against which all his 
efforts at rational analysis and self-management seemed 
futile. He wallowed in guilt and self reproach; he 
doubted his own sanity and entertained thoughts of 
suicide: 
29 Raymond D. Havens, "Johnson's Distrust of the 
Imagination," English Literary History, 10 (1943), 243-
255. 
90 
It may at first seem ironic that Johnson, who 
was to figure in literary history as the supreme 
exponent and symbol of practical common sense, 
of unremitting grip on concrete reality, should 
have begun his adult life in fear for his sanity 
(Bate, Samuel Johnson, 116). 
However, it was precisely his long and harrowing battle 
with his own demonic imagination which turned him toward 
the real world and away from those shadows which lured him 
towards self-destruction. So, although Johnson found 
creative potential in the imagination, he also feared it 
and never departed from his firm belief that it must be 
held in control. 
Johnson's Dictionary definitions and examples are 
especially revealing here because they almost all show or 
imply some uneasiness about or some suspect feeling toward 
the imaginative faculty. He defines imagination as 
"fancy; the power of forming ideal pictures; the power of 
representing things absent to one's self or others." One 
function of the imagination, then, is creating things 
which do not exist--"ideal pictures." Johnson's first 
example, taken from Bacon, is a morally neutral one: 
Imagination I understand to be the representa-
tion of an individual thought. Imagination is 
of three kinds: joined with belief of that which 
is past; and of things present, or as if they 
were present: for I comprehend in this imagina-
tion feigned and at pleasure, as if one should 
imagine such a man to be in the vestments of a 
pope, or to have wings. 
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The next example he offers, this time from Pope, is much 
more disturbing because of imagination's power to alter or 
destroy the memory of the real: "Where beams of warm 
imagination play, I The memory's soft figures melt away." 
A second definition Johnson gives is "conception; image in 
the mind; idea," and the examples, like this one from King 
~, imply a less-than-trustworthy faculty: 
Better were I distract, 
so should my thoughts be sever'd from my 
griefs; 
And woes, by wrong imaginations, lose 
The knowledge of themselves. 
The final definition is even more sinister: "contrivance; 
scheme," and the example is from Lamentations 3: 60: 
"Thou hast seen all their vengeance and all their 
imaginations against me." 
As with the faculty of man's will, the belief that 
the imagination posed certain hazards to rational man goes 
back to antiquity. Since the classical view of the 
imagination is quite similar to Johnson's understanding in 
several respects, it is worth examining these parallels 
briefly as a means of clarification. Donald F. Bond has 
made clear that the imagination was distrusted in 
classical thought because of its attractive and disturbing 
power.30 Both the Platonic and Stoic philosophers were 
suspicious of the imagination, the Platonic philosophers 
because of "its deceptive qualities and its inability to 
attain to abstract truth" and the Stoics because it had 
"the power of stirring up the passions to revolt" (58). 
Marcus Aurelius, for example, repeatedly insists on 
controlling imagination by a careful and continuous 
examination of its products. He writes: 
Never allow yourself to be swept off your feet 
when an impulse stirs, see first that it will 
meet the claims of justice; when an impression 
forms, assure yourself first of its certainty . 
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. . . Do away with all fancies. Cease to be 
passion's puppet .... Learn to recognize every 
experience for what it is .... Erasing all 
fancies, keep on saying to yourself ... 'it 
lies with me to perceive all things in their 
true light, and to deal with each of them as it 
merits. 1 31 
One of the most significant pre-eighteenth-century 
accounts of the imagination comes in Burton's Anatomy of 
Melancholy. In the section of this work on "The Force of 
Imagination," Burton discusses the conditions which can 
arise in those whose reasons are not capable of regulating 
the imagination. Of such people he says, "How many 
30 Donald F. Bond, "'Distrust' of Imagination in 
English Neoclassicism," Philological Quarterly, 14 
(1935), 54-69. 
31 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, trans. Maxwell 
Staniforth (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964), IV.22-
VIII.29. 
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chimeras, antics, golden mountains, and castles in the air 
do they build unto themselves'' (I.ii.3.2). Some are led 
into "all vices" by a "false and corrupt imagination," 
many suffer from hysterical and psychosomatic complaints 
as well as real diseases through imagination's power, and 
sometimes the imagination can cause even death itself. 
Burton's picture is extremely disturbing: 
So that I may certainly conclude this strong 
conceit or imagination is astrum hominis [man's 
guiding star], and the rudder of this our ship, 
which reason should steer, but, overborne by 
phantasy, cannot manage, and so suffers itself 
and this whole vessel of ours to be overruled, 
and often overturned (I.ii.3.2). 
Throughout his Sermons, Samuel Johnson recognized two 
principal characteristics of the imagination which reflect 
his appreciation and development of this classical 
heritage. The first was that our self-deception is not 
entirely a product of a powerful imagination overthrowing 
the will. We are overpowered only part of the time; often 
we willingly deceive ourselves, and encourage extensive 
delusions because they are so pleasing. Imlac discusses 
this at length in the chapter of Rasselas on the 
"Dangerous Prevalence of Imagination," where he says that 
a man will begin by indulging the power of fiction, grow 
to amuse "his desires with impossible enjoyments," and 
finally confirm the reign of imagination (Chapter XLIV). 
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Johnson emphasizes the willing credulity men allow to 
their imaginations; the imposition of imagination upon us 
is a welcome and desired one, not always one forced 
against our will. He summarizes this position in Sermon 
12. when he observes that the imagination allows man to 
withdraw from it [his present troubled and 
dangerous state] to a fancied futurity, in which 
whatever is crooked is to be made straight; in 
which temptations are to be rejected, and 
passions to be conquered; in which wisdom and 
piety are to regulate the day; in which every 
hour shall have its proper duty. The morning 
shall awake beneficence, and the evening still 
the soul in gratitude and devotion. Purposes 
like these are often formed, and often forgot-
ten. When remorse and solitude press hard upon 
the mind, they afford a temporary refuge, which, 
like other shelters from a storm, is forsaken, 
when the calm returns (Sermon 12,, 163). 
The second characteristic of the imagination em-
phasized by Johnson was that it is not simply a theoreti-
cal faculty to be defined and studied by philosophers, but 
that it had actual and important effects upon the daily 
life of average men, and that when it took over the mind, 
tyrannizing over the will, very serious results were 
inevitable. The philosophical definition of imagination 
to which Johnson assented, that it was the power of 
forming ideas or images by recalling or combining 
remembered sense impressions (Idler 44), was fairly common 
in the century, and can be traced back to Locke and 
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Hobbes.32 Hobbes had written, in the Leviathan, that 
"imagination • is nothing else but sense decaying or 
weakened, by the absence of the object" (I, 27). But as 
we have seen from Johnson's own definitions of the term in 
the Dictionary, the meanings more closely related to what 
we might call practical or observable effects are more 
significant for understanding the nature of man and his 
actions than are the purely speculative, theoretical, 
ones.33 Johnson consistently described the imagination in 
terms of its practical effects: 
Imagination, a licentious and vagrant faculty, 
unsusceptible of limitations, and impatient of 
restraint, has always endeavoured to baffle the 
logician, to perplex the confines of 
distinction, and burst the inclosures of 
regularity (Rambler 125, 300). 
The mind, long vitiated with trifles, and 
entertained with wild and unnatural combinations 
of ideas, becomes in a short time unable to 
support the fatigue of reasoning; it is dis-
gusted with a long succession of solemn images, 
and retires from serious meditation, and 
tiresome labour, to gayer fancies .... Thus he 
soon grows indifferent to truth or falsehood, 
32 See Kenneth MacLean, John Locke and English 
Literature of the Eighteenth Century (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1936), p. 55ff. 
33 This point is also made by Alkon in Samuel Johnson 
~Moral Discipline (69-75). Alkon notes that Johnson 
sees the imagination "as the handmaiden of illusion, 
impossibility, and evil" (73) not because of any inherent 
quality in its theoretical construction, but because of 
the results it produces. Again, we see that the practical 
finds more significance in Johnsonian thought than the 
speculative. 
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and almost incapable of discerning one from the 
other ..•. There are others who deride 
religion for the sake of displaying their own 
imaginations, of following the fashion of a 
corrupt and licentious age, or gaining the 
friendship of the great, or the applause of the 
gay (Sermon 20, 221-222; 225). 
The real danger of the imagination is the power it 
possesses to persuade, to seem real or true, by actively 
mimicking reality. "Because imaginations persist in us 
and resemble sensations," Aristotle had said, "living 
creatures frequently act in accordance with them" (On the 
soul, 429a). Men do so "because the mind is temporarily 
clouded over by emotion, or disease, or sleep" (428a). 
Johnson believed that the imagination forcefully and 
creatively presented its images to the mind for accep-
tance. So the harm of the imagination is to present as 
real or possible things unreal or impossible and thereby 
to propose feelings (such as happiness) or successes (such 
as possession of some object) both in nature and degree 
incapable of being realized or enjoyed. Yet, because of 
the power of the imagination, these proposed feelings or 
successes appeal so strongly as things both possible and 
necessary, that they oppress the entire conscious mind and 
will in anticipation. For this reason, Johnson went far 
beyond an attitude of critical amusement toward anyone who 
"shuns fancied ills or chases airy good" (Vanity of Human 
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wishes, I. 10). He connected this shift from illusion to 
delusion to a species of insanity: 
There is no man whose imagination does not 
sometimes predominate over his reason, who can 
regulate his attention wholly by his will, and 
whose ideas will come and go at his command. No 
man will be found in whose mind airy notions do 
not sometimes tyrannise, and force him to hope 
or fear beyond the limits of sober probability. 
All power of fancy over reason is a degree of 
insanity (Rasselas, Chapter XLIV, 405-406). 
When Johnson cautions against temptations to the sin of 
"charging God foolishly" in Sermon 16, he observes this 
same dangerous progression from illusion to delusion 
whenever man attempts to escape the vacuity of existence: 
It is frequently observed in common life, that 
some favourite notion or inclination, long 
indulged, takes such an entire possession of a 
man's mind, and so engrosses his faculties, as 
to mingle thoughts perhaps he is not himself 
conscious of with almost all his conceptions, 
and influence his whole behavior. It will often 
operate on occasions with which it could scarce-
ly be imagined to have any connection, and will 
discover itself, however it may lie concealed, 
either in trifling incidents, or important 
occurrences, when it is least expected or 
foreseen. It gives a particular direction to 
every sentiment and action, and carries a man 
forward, as by a kind of resistless impulse, or 
insuperable destiny (Sermon 16, 173). 
In its tyranny over man's will, the imagination can 
produce three principal effects. The first is to alienate 
completely the imager from reality and to place him in a 
dream world where all events take place purely by wishing. 
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In this case the imagination paralyzes the thinker by 
making reality irrelevant to his supposed accomplishments, 
and thereby prevents any actions from being undertaken. 
Johnson describes this indulgence as daydreaming merely 
for the pleasure of it, without any real intent to act: 
These gay sallies of imagination . . . are of no 
farther use to mankind than to divert, and can 
have no higher place in our esteem than any 
other art that terminates in mere amusement 
(Sermon 1.Q, 221). 
This daydreaming does bring a degree of happiness or at 
least amusement, but there is a danger not only of seeking 
such idleness because of the ease with which it grants 
pleasure, but of allowing the imagination to habitually 
predominate over the reason: 
All sin that is committed by Christians, is 
committed either through an absolute forgetful-
ness of God, for the time in which the inor-
dinate passion, of whatever kind it be, predomi-
nates and prevails; or because, if the ideas of 
God and religion were present to our minds, they 
were not strong enough to overcome and suppress 
the desires excited by some pleasing, or the 
apprehensions raised by some terrible, object. 
. . . All mental images influence our conduct 
with more or less force, as they are more or 
less strongly impressed upon the mind; and they 
are impressed more strongly, as they are more 
frequently recollected or renewed (Sermon 2 1 
101). 
The second effect of the imagination's tyranny over 
the will is its power to impose upon man, in order to 
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flatter the ego and assuage the conscience, the idea that 
no self-improving action is needed because he is already 
superior to others. "Men please themselves with imagining 
that they have made a deeper search, or wider survey, than 
others" (Rambler~, 9). Because of the natural workings 
of pride in the learned, scholars are especially subject 
to this self-indulgence: 
A man of learning has such frequent opportuni-
ties of comparing himself [to those engaged in 
manual occupations]; and is so strongly incited, 
by that comparison, to indulge the contemplation 
of his own superiority; that it is not to be 
considered as wonderful, that vanity creeps in 
upon him; that he does not willingly withdraw 
his imagination from objects that so much 
flatter his passions, that he pursues the train 
of thought, from one reflection to another, 
places himself and others, in every situation, 
in which he can appear with advantage in his own 
eyes; rises to comparisons with still higher 
characters, and still retains the habit of 
giving himself the preference; and in all 
disputable cases turns the balance in his own 
favour, by super-adding, from his own conceit, 
that wisdom, which by nature he does not 
possess, or by industry he has not acquired 
(Sermon~, 88) [See Rasselas, Chapter XL]. 
Here we see the debilitating effect of imagination acting 
upon pride; the connection between pride and this kind of 
imagination is clarified in those "men who have flattered 
themselves into this opinion of their own abilities": 
He that overvalues himself will undervalue 
others, and he that undervalues others will 
oppress them. To this fancied superiority it is 
owing, that tyrants have squandered the lives of 
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millions, and looked unconcerned on the miseries 
of war (Sermon~, 68). 
The danger of this self-delusion goes beyond its resulting 
pride and the contempt of others. The deceived imager 
often exhibits the damning tendency to believe that his 
life will be long and that his day of judgement will be 
distant: 
Of self-deceit, in the great business of our 
lives, there are various modes. The far greater 
part of mankind deceive themselves, by willing 
negligence, by refusing to think on their state, 
lest such thoughts should trouble their quiet, 
or interrupt their pursuits .•.. Their mode of 
self-deception which prevails most in the world, 
and by which the greatest number of souls is at 
last betrayed to destruction, is the art, which 
we are all too apt to practise, of putting far 
from us the evil day, of setting the hour of 
death, and the day of account, at a great 
distance (Sermon ..!...Q., 110-11) . 
. . . nothing is more dangerous than spiritual 
pride. The man that esteems himself a saint 
will be in danger of relaxing his circumspec-
tion, of stopping in his progress of virtue, 
and, if once he stops, of falling back into 
those infirmities from which his imaginary 
exemption made him presumptuous and supine 
(Sermon 16, 175). 
But whether idleness results from pleasing ourselves 
that we need not labor or from an inability to fix upon a 
project, this deficiency created by the imagination 
clearly needs to be remedied. Moreover, Johnson believed 
that "the great business of our lives" (Sermon 10, 110) 
was more than self-knowledge; rather, "the business of 
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life is to work out our salvation; and the days are few, 
in which provision must be made for eternity" (Sermon 1..2., 
161). 
The third effect produced by the imagination in its 
oppression of the will is to generate pointless desires 
and subsequent discontent whether or not those desires are 
satisfied. As we have seen, man has an innate desire to 
seek satisfaction. The imagination functions as a kind of 
goad to the faculty of the will, spurring it on to focus 
on successive goals by promising inflated rewards from 
reduced efforts. To change metaphors, we could say that 
the imagination amplifies the proposed pleasure fixed upon 
by the will. Johnson admonished man to place his trust in 
God as the only source of complete happiness; yet he ack-
nowledged that it was man's nature to seek various kinds 
of temporal satisfaction. The young, for example, 
instead of founding happiness on the solid basis 
of reason and reflection, they [the young] raise 
an airy fabrick of momentary satisfaction, which 
is perpetually decaying, and perpetually to be 
repaired. They please themselves, not with 
thinking justly, but with avoiding to think at 
all, with a suspence of all the operations of 
their intellectual faculties, which defends them 
from remembrance of the past, or anticipation of 
the future. They lull themselves in an ener-
vate, and cowardly dissipation, and, instead of 
being happy, are only indolent [emphasis mine] 
(Sermon 14, 150). 
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The great danger of the imagination, then, lies in 
its capacity to create artificial or non-existent needs, 
goals, and wants--so rapidly and continuously that man 
cannot obtain them: "It is impossible to supply wants as 
fast as an idle imagination may be able to form them" 
(Rambler 126, 319). Man is therefore inevitably in want 
of satisfaction. Locke had pointed out that physical 
desires caused men significant "uneasiness" by themselves, 
but that when the desires of the imagination were added, 
there was no time for a man to pursue real good: 
If, besides accidental harms, we add the 
fantastical uneasiness (as itch after honour, 
power or riches, etc.) which acquired habits by 
fashion, example, and education, have settled in 
us, and a thousand other irregular desires, 
which custom has made natural to us, we shall 
find that a very little part of our life is so 
vacant from these uneasinesses, as to leave us 
free to the attraction of remoter absent good. 
We are seldom at ease, and free enough from the 
solicitation of our natural or adopted desires, 
but a constant succession of uneasinesses out of 
that stock which natural wants or acquired 
habits have heaped up, take the will in their 
turns; and no sooner is one action dispatched, 
which by such a determination of the will we are 
set upon, but another uneasiness is ready to set 
us on work. (Locke, Essay, II.xxi.46). 
What Locke ascribed to the "acquired habits" that fashion 
and custom might dictate, William Law, in ~ Serious Call 
To ~ Devout and Holy Life, connected to wilful human cul-
pability. Law asserted that man had imagined himself into 
unhappiness through his own fault by increasing his 
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desires beyond the easily satisfiable requirements of 
nature. Man, he said, was "born with few wants, and into 
a large world very capable of supplying them." But man 
will not be content with nature: 
Though God, and nature, and reason, make human 
life thus free from wants and so full of happi-
ness; yet our passions, in rebellion against 
God, against nature and reason, create a new 
world of evils, and fill human life with 
imaginary wants, and vain disquiets (A Serious 
Call, 118). -
In Sermon !l, Johnson seems to balance Locke and Law while 
at the same time going on to imply rather darkly that our 
imaginations will prevent us from ever being completely 
happy. "Works of absolute necessity are few and simple," 
he says, but we create further needs: 
As we extend our pleasures, we multiply our 
wants. The pain of hunger is easily appeased, 
but to surmount the disgust of appetite vitiated 
by indulgence, all the arts of luxury are 
required, and all are often vain. When to the 
enjoyments of sense, are superadded the delights 
of fancy, we form a scheme of happiness that 
never can be complete, for we can always imagine 
more than we possess (Sermon !l, 132). 
The hunger of the imagination is a striving to create 
artificially both pleasures and satisfactions beyond those 
of the real world, sometimes only elusively, but often 
delusively. The kingdom of imagination is the unreal and 
the untrue, where the future may be arranged and 
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rearranged, the present may be falsely perceived, and the 
past may be erroneously remembered. The imager believes 
he can find happiness by allowing the imagination to focus 
away from empirical truth and thereby escape the need to 
deal with life's bitterness and vexations; but Johnson 
believed that by doing so happiness and productivity would 
be prevented. He knew from his own experience during the 
years after he left Oxford, when he struggled with self-
doubt and self-rejection, just how destructive the 
imagination could be. 
This personal struggle explains in large measure why 
Johnson's general view of the imagination is so negative. 
He often spoke of its "dangerous prevalence" and refers to 
it as a "licentious and vagrant faculty." But what of the 
constructive role mentioned earlier? Among the uses or 
positive aspects Johnson ascribed to the faculty was, as 
many critics have pointed out rather extensively, its role 
in artistic creation, especially the composition of 
poetry.34 More than this, however, Johnson believed that 
the imagination does have uses in the lives of ordinary 
34 See, for example, Jean Hagstrum, Literary 
Criticism, 48-49, 89-92; W. R. Keast, "The Theoretical 
Foundations of Johnson's Criticism," in Critics and 
Criticism, ed. R. s. Crane (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1952), 389-407; Tommy G. Watson, "Johnson 
and Hazlitt on the Imagination in Milton," Southern 
Quarterly, 2 (1964), 123-33; Donald O. Rogers, "Samuel 
Johnson's Concept of the Imagination," South Central 
~ulletin, 33 (1973), 213-218. 
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man. Like man's desire, it is a faculty to be "regulated 
rather than extinguished" (Rambler~, 266), not simply 
because extinguishing it would be impossible, but because 
it has a certain positive potential: "Since the mind is 
always of itself shrinking from disagreeable images, it is 
sometimes necessary to recall them" (Sermon 12_, 160). 
Imagination, according to Johnson, can make us kinder 
and more understanding toward others, as we think what 
pains they may have; the feelings of sympathy and shared 
joy are in fact "produced by an act of the imagination" as 
we put ourselves fancifully into the circumstances of 
those we see happy or sad and consider how we would feel 
(Rambler 60, 318). Imagination is an aid to religion by 
helping to make "the future predominate over the present" 
(Rambler z, 37-9), so that we will forego expedient but 
harmful pleasures in the hope of an ultimate reward later 
on, and so that we will be willing to undergo hardships 
for the sake of future blessings (Rambler 178, 174). In 
the funeral sermon for his wife, Johnson echoes these 
ideas from his Rambler essays as he reminds the 
congregation that there are some who refuse to engage 
their imagination productively in the service of religion: 
There were, doubtless, at all times, as there 
are now, many ••. [who] had no regard to 
distant events, but withheld their imagination 
from sallying out into futurity, or catching any 
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terror that might interrupt their quiet (Sermon 
E' 262). 
Finally, imagination, through hope, makes life 
happier. Hope elevates and makes delightful the life of a 
man and is "necessary in every condition" (Rambler 67, 
354). Reasonably grounded or not, hope is "necessary to 
the production of every thing great or excellent" (Rambler 
_f, 12), for "where there is no hope, there can be no 
endeavour" (Rambler 110, 221). Our wants or desires--the 
specific objects of pursuit upon which we have finally 
fixed--become objects of anticipation, and because we 
believe that their attainment will bring happiness, we 
derive some happiness from the hope itself. Consequently, 
the imagination, if properly directed and regulated, will 
allow a man to meditate on God until the divine presence 
becomes a fixation of spiritual strength: 
The man who has accustomed himself to consider 
that he is always in the presence of the Supreme 
Being ... easily withstands those temptations 
which find a ready passage into the mind not 
guarded and secured by this awful sense of the 
Divine Presence. 
He is not enticed by ill examples, because 
the purity of God always occurs to his imagina-
tion; he is not betrayed to security by soli-
tude, because he never considers himself as 
alone (Sermon 16, 174). 
In Johnson's view, the benefits of the imagination are 
relatively small when measured against its capacity to 
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damage. Johnson had a strong dialectical view of the 
imagination. He knew the contributions his imagination 
made to his capacity to empathize with his fellow men as 
they wrestled with the limitations of their nature. At 
the same time, he knew the power of the imagination to 
drag him into the depths of self-delusion and despair. 
so, the imagination for Johnson required eternal vigilance 
and stern discipline: 
Men are very seldom disappointed, except when 
their desires are immoderate, or when they 
suffer their passions to overpower their reason, 
and dwell upon delightful scenes of future 
honours, power, or riches, till they mistake 
probabilities for certainties, or wild wishes 
for rational expectations (Sermon 2, 58). 
Reason is the lawful sovereign of the imagination, 
designed to control and direct imagination's operations. 
To resign oneself to the tyranny of the imagination is to 
cast reason aside and to give up the necessarily painful 
efforts at self-regulation and improvement. 
Throughout the Sermons, Johnson exhorts us to keep 
going forward despite fears and anxieties; yet he was 
keenly aware that the world of the imagination is often a 
self-centered one which can lead to madness or despair. 
He strongly believed that the present state of man owed to 
the future state an active striving for improvement and 
not a stagnant self-indulgence. Johnson steadfastly 
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upheld man's obligations and ultimate accountability to 
God. Yet he recognized the dangerous propensity of human 
nature to eschew this responsibility and to prefer "the 
gay sallies of the imagination" (Sermon 20, 221) or to 
"indulge any desire that happens to arise, with very 
little resistance or compunction" (Sermon 10, 111) in a 
futile attempt to fill the vacuity of existence. Johnson 
was never content to rest his observations on the nature 
of man with theories on the consequences of original sin, 
speculations about man's fallen and weak condition, or 
with hypotheses concerning the operations of the will and 
the imagination. He wanted his ideas to be useful for the 
practical improvement of man's present lot--to alleviate 
the miseries caused by man's delusive imagination and 
insatiable will, and to warn man of the dangers of 
expecting his innate faculties to lead him to perfect 
happiness in this life. In the following chapter we will 
see how Johnson, basing his argument on the observations 
concerning the nature of man we have here developed, 
persuades the auditors of his Sermons to examine the 
reasonableness of religion's consolations for the vacuity 
Of life. 
CHAPTER THREE 
JOHNSON'S SERMONS AND THE 
CONSOLATION OF SALVATION 
I 
Modern scholars have of ten noted that Johnson viewed 
reason as superior to imagination.1 Behind him was a long 
tradition, ranging from classical figures like Boethius2 
to contemporaries such as Isaac Watts, who wrote "let calm 
and sedate reason govern and determine our opinions . 
Fancy is the inferior faculty and ought to obey."3 
Johnson believed that reason should discipline and direct 
1 see, for example, Robert Voitle, Samuel Johnson the 
Moralist {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961-)-,-
23 ff; Sachs, Passionate Intelligence, xiv and 69-70; 
Alken, Samuel Johnson and Moral Discipline, 65-80; 
Sheridan Baker, "Rasselas: Psychological Irony and 
Romance," Philological Quarterly, 45 {Jan. 1966}, 253. 
2 For Boethius, human reason is classified as 
inferior to divine thought but as above imagination and 
wit [See, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. Richard 
Green {New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1962}, Book V, 
Prose 2, 103-104]. Boswell mentions Johnson's unqualified 
recommendation of and personal fondness for Boethius' 
Consolation of Philosophy because it demonstrated the use 
of man's reason as a source and method for the defense of 
free will (Life, I, 139 and Sale Catalogue, entry 295). 
3 Isaac Watts, Logick, 2!. the Right Use of Reason in 
!he Enquiry after Truth (London: n.p., 1755), 186. 
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human imagination which tends to lead one astray into 
delusions and falsehood. He says that 
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we can only, in whatsoever state we may be 
placed, secure ourselves from disquiet and from 
misery, by a resolute attention to truth and 
reason (Sermon l, 13). 
This chapter will seek to show that Johnson was not 
the doctrinaire rationalist that he has sometimes been 
made to appear. Reason was not for him sufficient to 
encompass the whole range of human experience. Some 
eighteenth century philosophers were dualists who 
maintained a strict division between reason and emotion, 
and between the mind and its objects in the external 
world. They were wrestling with what William Temple, late 
Archbishop of Canterbury, once called "the Cartesian faux-
pas." Because of Johnson's common sense approach to life, 
this problem was simply too abstract to trouble him 
greatly. In a celebrated gesture, he refuted Berkeley's 
solipsism with a kick of the stone. Johnson found his 
mind engaged with the external world, not separated from 
it. Johnson viewed the nature of man as being engaged in 
a process of integration; he explained man's nature in 
terms which combined rather than dissected the faculties 
into hierarchical categories. One can see in Johnson's 
Philosophy striking anticipations of the process philos-
ophy of Alfred North Whitehead and the pragmatism of John 
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Dewey. Indeed, Johnson's theorizing was never far from 
the practical experience of daily life which he believed 
ought to be lived with common sense. 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Johnson believed the 
imagination was prone to extend our desires and to create 
unrealistic hopes; it required the eternal vigilance of 
reason in order to preserve sanity, virtue, and happiness. 
However, Johnson's use of the term reason differs from 
that of several of his contemporary theorists. He did not 
mean by the word what Locke, for example, meant: an 
abstract intellectual exercise governed by the rules of 
logic with "truth" or "falsehood" determined by careful 
intellectual analysis. For Johnson, reason was broader 
and more practical. Throughout the Sermons, Johnson calls 
for the exercise of practical reason, of a kind of common-
sense and enlightened self-interest, to cope with the 
concrete problems of life. He was thoroughly familiar 
with the process Freud was to call "rationalization"--
using the ego to justify and defend what the id desires. 
Indeed, Johnson made the same distinction that Freud made 
between the "pleasure principle," which seeks immediate 
gratification regardless of consequences, and the "reality 
Principle," which defers immediate pleasure for the sake 
of later and greater satisfactions: 
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Every man is conscious, that he neither per-
forms, nor forbears anything upon any other 
motive than the prospect, either of an immediate 
gratification, or a distant reward; that whether 
he complies with temptation, or repels it, he is 
still influenced by the same general regard to 
his own felicity; but that when he yields to the 
solicitation of his appetite, or the impulse of 
his passions, he is overborne by the prevalence 
of the object before him; and when he adheres to 
his duty, in opposition to his present interest, 
he is influenced by the hopes of future happi-
ness (Sermon 14, 149). 
He astutely acknowledged man's predilection for self-
delusion--man often does not use his reason to integrate 
his appetites and passions for his long-term happiness. 
Rather, he prefers the immediate gratification of his 
desires or the chimeras created by his imagination. 
Furthermore, in a similar context, we can recall Swift's 
famous comment: 
I have got materials towards a treatise, proving 
the falsity of that definition animal rationale, 
and to show it would be only rationis capax. 
Upon this great foundation of misanthropy . . . 
the whole building of my Travels is erected; and 
I never will have peace of mind till all honest 
men are of my opinion • . . . The matter is so 
clear that it will admit of no dispute.4 
In this letter, Swift suggests two broad views of reason 
included in the legacy of philosophical debate on the 
4 Letter to Alexander Pope, September 29, 1725, 
quoted in Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels and Other 
Writings, ed. Louis A. Landa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1960), 494. 
nature of man. His definitions--animal rationale and 
yi.tionis capax--suggest the two traditions of reason we 
will examine under the headings "peripatetic" and 
"Lockean." 
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The first of these inherited concepts, drawn from the 
developments of Renaissance psychology, argued that reason 
was an independent faculty, able to derive truths from 
innate ideas, apart from any reliance on data supplied by 
the senses. In Samuel Johnson the Moralist, Robert Voitle 
has called this "Peripatetic Reason" (2), partly because 
it was the more traditional and philosophical view, 
holding that reason was our connection with God. The 
continental rationalists, like Descartes and Spinosa, 
subscribed to this exalted view of reason. Descartes, for 
example, believed that reason was the "only valid criter-
ion of truth,"5 and noted that using his reason in 
everything was what pleased him most about his philosoph-
ical methodology.6 In his Discourse on Method, Descartes 
described how reason alone was the source of all truth: 
First, I tried to discover the general prin-
ciples, or first causes, of all that is or can 
be in the world, without for this purpose 
5 William S. Sahakian, History of Philosophy (New 
York: Barnes and Noble, 1968), 133. 
6 Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, 
~eometry, and Meteorology, trans. Paul J. Olscamp (New 
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 18. 
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considering anything but God alone, its Creator, 
and without deriving these principles from 
anything but certain seeds of truth which are 
naturally in our souls. After that, I examined 
what were the first and most ordinary effects 
that we could infer from these causes. And it 
seems to me that I thereby discovered the skies, 
the stars, and earth, and even, on the earth, 
water, air, fire, minerals, and certain other 
such things ... (52). 
This high view of reason was also embraced in Eng-
land. For example, the Deist Tindal insisted that the 
priority of reason to revelation was proved either by 
revelation's acknowledgment of that priority or by the 
obvious falsity of a denial of man's rationality. By 
emphasizing reason, Tindal was also emphasizing the 
sufficiency of natural theology; he made truth and 
happiness the product of "right reason": 
the happiness of all beings consists in the 
perfections of their nature; and the nature of a 
rational being is most perfect when it is per-
fectly rational; that is, when it governs all 
its actions by the rules of right reason; for 
then it arrives at the most perfect, and 
consequently the happiest state a rational 
nature can aspire to: and every deviation from 
the rules of right reason, being an imperfec-
tion, must carry with it a proportionable 
unhappiness; and a man's happiness and duty must 
consist in the same things, since no one can be 
obligated to do anything that does not some way 
or other contribute to his happiness; and 
consequently, according to the sense men have of 
their own happiness, and of the means which will 
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naturally procure it, they may assuredly attain 
the knowledge of their respective duties.7 
Tindal argued that religious revelation could offer man no 
truths that he could not discover through his reason (78); 
indeed, he believed that natural religion and revealed 
religion were the same: 
Whereas, if we allow the Light of Nature suffi-
cient to enable us to judge rightly in these 
matters, and consequently to distinguish truth 
from falsehood, we must own since there can be 
no disagreement in truth that there's an exact 
conformity between internal and external 
revelation, with no other difference but as the 
manner of their being revealed (58).8 
In similar fashion, William Wollaston, a natural re-
ligionist, defined religion as "an obligation to do . 
what ought not to be omitted, and to forbear what ought 
not to be done. 11 9 This religion is discoverable by reason 
alone; it does not require any necessary reinforcement 
7 Matthew Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation 
(London, n.p., 1730), 25-26. 
8 The general position of the Deists toward revela-
tion is perhaps best illustrated by the full title to 
Toland's influential work: Christianity Not Mysterious: 
.Q.£ ~ Treatise Showing that there is Nothing in the Gospel 
Contrary to Reason, nor above It, and that No Christian 
Doctrine can be Properly Called~ Mystery (1718). 
9 William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature 
Delineated (1724; 8th ed., 1759), in British Moralists: 
B~ing Selections from Writers Principally of the 
Eighteenth Century, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1897), II, 374. 
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from an external source, such as divine revelation. 
samuel Clarke also reflects the tradition of the continen-
tal rationalists when he asserts that 
reason, which is the proper nature of man, can 
never . . • lead man to anything else than 
universal love and benevolence: and Wars, 
Hatred, and Violence6 can never arise but from extreme corruption.1 
In spite of this high view of reason, Clarke recognized 
that 
the practice of Vice, is accompanied with great 
Temptations and Allurements of Pleasure and 
Profit, and the practice of Virtue is often 
threatened with great Calamities, Losses, and 
sometimes even with Death itself (34). 
Therefore, "the eternal rule of right and equity" which is 
discoverable by reason alone is not adequate for 
motivating moral behavior. Clarke believed if good and 
evil were equally balanced in the world, each having 
similar allurements and similar difficulties, then reason 
would be able to choose virtue. But the pleasure of vice 
and the difficulty of virtue 
alters the Question, and destroys the practice 
of that which appears so reasonable in the whole 
10 Samuel Clarke, ~ Discourse Concerning the 
Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the 
Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation (London: 
n.p., 1716), 107. Quinlan notes the indebtedness of 
Clarke to Descartes (28). 
Speculation, and introduces a necessity of 
Rewards and Punishments (34-35). 
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Nevertheless, Clarke believed that "love and benevolence" 
were the products of right reason. 
Johnson agreed with Clarke regarding the existence of 
an indispensable relationship between reason and religion. 
Indeed, Johnson pointed out that "religion is the highest 
Exercise of Reason; let us not begin by turning all reason 
out of Doors, 11 11 and he steadfastly maintained that 
truth, indeed, is always truth, and reason is 
always reason; they have an intrinsic and 
unalterable value, and constitute that intellec-
tual gold which defies destruction.12 
Moreover, he frequently spoke "with great commendation of 
Clarke's Universality ••. and seemed not disposed to 
censure him for his Heterodoxy" (Life, IV, 524). Specif-
ically, Johnson agreed with Clarke that reason can engage 
man in ethical considerations--"he that thinks reasonably 
must think morally. 11 13 Johnson accepted much of Clarke's 
11 K. c. Balderston, ed., Thraliana, The Diary of 
~Hester Lynch Thrale (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 
I, 183. 
12 Samuel Johnson, Life of Cowley, in Samuel Johnson: 
~ Oxford Authors, ed. Donald Greene (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), 695. 
13 Samuel Johnson, Preface to Shakespeare, in The 
Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, ed. Arthur 
Sherbo (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), VII, 71. 
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traditional notion that reason is supreme in moral 
_lllought. 
Indeed, Johnson would not quarrel with the Deists in 
their appeal to reason in matters of religion; however, he 
believed that the Deists had not given certain proofs of 
Christianity, such as Biblical revelation and miracles, a 
fair examination: "no honest man could be a Deist; for no 
man could be so after a fair examination of the proofs of 
Christianity" (Life, II, 8-9). Johnson esteemed reason as 
an important tool by which man ought to examine "the 
proofs of Christianity" against the touchstone of daily 
experience: 
It is astonishing that any man can forbear 
enquiring seriously, whether there is a God; 
whether God is just; whether this life is the 
only state of existence; whether God has 
appointed rewards and punishments in a future 
state; whether he has given any laws for the 
regulation of our conduct here; whether he has 
given them by revelation; and whether the 
religion publickly taught carries any mark of 
divine appointment. These are questions which 
every reasonable being ought undoubtedly to 
consider with an attention suitable to their 
importance; and he, whom the consideration of 
eternal happiness or misery cannot awaken from 
his pleasing dreams, cannot prevail upon to 
suspend his mirth, surely ought not to despise 
others for dulness and stupidity. 
Let it be remembered that the nature of 
things is not alterable by our conduct. We 
cannot make truth; it is our business only to 
find it. No proposition can become more or less 
certain or important, by being considered or 
neglected. It is to no purpose to wish, or to 
suppose, that to be false, which is in itself 
true, and therefore to acquiesce in our own 
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wishes and suppositions, when the matter is of 
eternal consequence, to believe obstinately 
without grounds of belief, and to determine 
without examination, is the last degree of folly 
and absurdity (Sermon 20, 222-223). 
Moreover, in opposition to the Deists, Johnson refutes any 
purely rational or moral doctrine that is 
entirely abstracted from religion . . . . Men 
left wholly to their appetites and instincts, 
with little sense of moral or religious obliga-
tion, and with faint distinctions of right and 
wrong, can never be safely employed or confi-
dently trusted: they can be honest only by 
obst~nacy4 and diligent only by compulsion or caprice. 
Johnson recognized that, while man can use his reason to 
discover moral principles, acting on the knowledge 
supplied by his reason requires the motivation provided by 
religion: 
To subdue passion, and regulate desire, is the 
great task of man, as a moral agent; a task, for 
which natural reason, however assisted and 
enforced by human laws, has been found insuffi-
cient, and which cannot be performed but by the 
help of religion (Sermon 18, 193). 
The great task of him, who conducts his life by 
the precepts of religion, is to make the future 
predominate over the present, to impress upon 
his mind so strong a sense of the importance of 
obedience to the divine will, of the value of 
the reward promised to virtue, and the terrors 
14 Samuel Johnson, "Review of [Soame Jenyns], A Free 
Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil," in Samue_l __ 
~ohnson: The Oxford Authors, ed. Donald Greene (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), 528. 
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of the punishment denounced against crimes, as 
may overbear all the temptations which temporal 
hope or fear can bring in his way, and enable 
him to bid equal defiance to joy and sorrow, to 
turn away at one time from the allurements of 
ambition, and push forward at another against 
the threats of calamity (~ambler 1, 37-38).15 
Man's reason can discover morality, but only "the value of 
the reward promised to virtue, and the terrors of the 
punishment denounced against crimes" can supply him with 
the motivating power to be moral. Indeed, the motivating 
power of "obedience to the divine will" allows man to 
partially atone for his weak and corrupt nature and 
anticipate the happy prospect of salvation: 
He will naturally pour out his supplications to 
the Supreme Being . . . for assistance and 
protection .... and by recollecting His prom-
ises, [he] will confirm himself in the hope of 
obtaining what he desires, and if .•. he 
steadily practices the duties on which they 
depend, he will soon find his mind stayed on 
God, and be kept in perfect peace, because he 
trusteth in him (~ermon 14, 157-158). 
The pragmatic Johnsonian emphasis on obedience as 
motivation for man's ethical conduct is generally lacking 
in the doctrines of the Deists, the rationalists, and the 
natural religionists. 
Another important figure in this tradition which 
exalted reason is William Law. Indeed, the influence Law 
15 For similar ideas see Rambler !1, 225, Rambler 78, 
50; Sermons 2, 12, 14, 15, , 28. 
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exerted on Johnson is testimony to the rationality of 
Johnson's own religious beliefs.16 The fact that Johnson 
described Law as an "overmatch" for him (Life, I, 68) and 
the serious Call as "the finest piece of hortatory 
theology in any language" (Life, II, 122) makes an 
examination of the book desirable. 
The whole of the Serious Call to ~ Devout and Holy 
~ might be described as an argument for an ordered, 
deliberate, and above all a rational Christianity. Reason 
should guide men in everything: 
All men . . . as men, have one and the same 
important business, to act up to the excellency 
of their rational nature, and to make reason and 
order the law of all their designs and 
actions.17 
Reason is the great and distinctive force of humanity, so 
that to deny it is to deny one's humanity: 
16 The intellectual affinities between Samuel Johnson 
and William Law have been examined extensively. Among the 
studies noting parallels or influences are these: 
Quinlan, 5-11; Katharine c. Balderston, "Dr. Johnson's Use 
of William Law in the Dictionary," Philological Quar-
terly, 39, (July 1960), 379-388; Katharine C. Balderston, 
"Doctor Johnson and William Law," Publications of the 
Modern Language Association, 75 (Sept. 1960), 382-394; 
Paul K. Alkon, "Robert South, William Law, and Samuel 
Johnson," Studies in English Literature (Rice), 6 (Summer 
1966), 499-528; James Gray, Johnson's Sermons, 50-85; 
Bate, Samuel Johnson, 101-107; Sachs, Passionate Intel-
ligence, 115. 
17 William Law, A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy 
Life (1728; rpt., New-York: Dutton,-r906), 109.~-
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If you live contrary to reason, you do not 
commit a small crime, you do not break a small 
trust; but you break the law of your nature 
(100). 
To avoid this, we must train the reason through the right 
kind of schooling, since "the only end of education is to 
restore our rational nature to its proper state" (231) in 
order that we may learn to do everything "by strict rules 
of reason and piety" (52). 
Law sees religion not merely in harmony with reason, 
but even to a large degree dictated by it, so that "true 
religion is nothing else but simple nature governed by 
right reason" (243). The "reason and wisdom which He 
[God] has implanted" in us are to be our guides and rulers 
(124), and if we examine the situation closely, we will, 
he says, discover that the demands of reason and the 
duties of religion are the same (123-128). Furthermore, 
Law maintains that reason is God's unique gift to man and 
is a kind of link with God since His primary attribute is 
also reason. To use one's reason or to follow the 
dictates of "right reason" meant to discover the attri-
butes of that celestial link. It meant to recognize and 
accept the Divine order of the universe. Law observed 
that reason was man's unique and identifying 
characteristic; therefore, the famous dictum know thyself 
ultimately meant that man was to know the qualities and 
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content of "right reason" and so know his proper 
relationship to God: 
Now knowledge itself would be no excellence, nor 
ignorance any reproach to us, but that we are 
rational creatures. But if this be true, then 
it follows plainly that knowledge which is most 
suitable to our rational nature, and which most 
concerns us, as such, to know, is our highest, 
finest knowledge .... If, therefore, our 
relation to God be our greatest relation, if our 
advancement in His favour be our highest 
advancement, he that has the highest notions of 
the excellence of this relation . . . proves 
himself to be master of the best and most 
excellent knowledge (302). 
Law felt that man's entire life should be devoted to God 
in a way that translated itself into a strict daily 
regimen of virtuous behavior and frequent self-
examination. He believed that man's proper use of his 
reason would provide him with the knowledge of his duties 
towards God and neighbor. Law's rules for self-
examination are rules for achieving the only kind of self-
knowledge that he felt was necessary or worthwhile--
knowledge of one's follies and sins. Through such self-
examination, man will know not only his relationship to 
God, a relationship of forgiveness and mercy on His part 
and gratitude on ours, but also he will know his proper 
relationship to other people, a relationship of tenderness 
and compassion for follies and sins: 
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Consider these great truths; that this mysteri-
ous redemption, all these sacrifices and 
sufferings, both of God and man, are only to 
remove the guilt of sin . • . you know more of 
the folly of your own heart than you do of other 
people's; and can charge yourself with various 
sins that you only know of yourself, and cannot 
be sure that other sinners are guilty of them . 
. . . If you will deal justly, you must fix the 
charge at home, and look no farther than your-
self . . • . A serious and frequent reflection 
upon these things will mightily tend to humble 
us in our own eyes, make us very apprehensive of 
the greatness of our own guilt, and very tender 
in censuring and condemning other people (292-
295). 
Law not only set the standards high but he felt that 
salvation was achieved by a herculean struggle. The great 
business of man was to enter into that struggle and to 
discipline his life into one of obedience to the commands 
of God: 
The salvation of our souls is set forth in 
Scripture as a thing of difficulty, that 
requires all our diligence, that is to be worked 
out with fear and trembling . . . .Many will 
miss of their salvation who seem to have taken 
some pains to obtain it (21). 
After Law set up perfect obedience as a standard, he faced 
the obvious objection to it that it was impossible to 
follow. Law conceded that it was so; therefore, he 
shifted his ground of argument from an insistence that man 
~ his life in perfect obedience to the law of God to 
man's sincere endeavor to be obedient. Was he trying the 
best he knew how to so rule his life? 
125 
You perhaps will say, that all people fall short 
of the perfection of the Gospel, and therefore 
you are content with your feelings . . . . For 
the question is not whether Gospel perfection 
can be fully attained, but whether you come as 
near it as a sincere intention and careful 
diligence can carry you (21). 
Thus, Law answered his critics by maintaining that man can 
test his sincerity through the performance of virtuous 
actions. 
The problem Johnson found with a tradition which 
maintained such an exalted view of reason was that it 
tended to ignore human experience. A basic assumption of 
Tindal, Wollaston, Clarke and other natural religionists 
was that man's nature was almost completely amenable to 
the dictates of his reason. However, Johnson observed 
that man's nature reflected a predilection to rationalize 
--to be guided not by evidence but by the vagaries of 
imagination and desire. Johnson saw man as a creature 
prone to error because of his finite ability to use his 
reason without self-delusion. Moreover, unlike William 
Law, Johnson did not understand human nature in terms of 
static concepts of mind against body or in a hierarchy of 
separate faculties of reason, instinct, will, and 
imagination; rather, he described these attributes of 
man's nature in terms of a process of integration. He 
recognized that the faculties of human nature were 
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intimately connected and that it was the integration of 
man's instincts, passions, desires, and imagination with 
reason that created the possibility for reason to be in 
command of human nature [Ramblers!, 41, 47]. Further-
more, Johnson understood the dictum "know thyself" as not 
meaning primarily or exclusively a knowledge of one's 
relationship to God but rather a knowledge of one's own 
qualities and attributes--knowing the cause for one's 
feelings of anxiety, depression, alienation and isolation. 
Within the Sermons, Johnson demonstrates that a radical 
~ of self-knowledge produces immature individuals who 
remain alienated from others and experience a vacuous 
existence: 
We are lulled with indolence, we are seduced by 
pleasure, we are perverted by bad examples, and 
we are betrayed by our own hearts. No sooner do 
we, in compliance either with the vanities or 
the business of life, relax our attention, than 
we grow cold and indifferent, dilatory and 
negligent (Sermon 19, 204). 
Johnson speaks of a morality which is not static, nor even 
completely dependent on eternal commands, but rather 
dynamic and almost evolutionary. It looks forward toward 
modern psychological conclusions regarding the 
interrelationship between human attributes rather than 
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backward to the hierarchical distinctions of the classical 
and medieval philosophers.18 
Johnson steadfastly maintained that reason was 
extremely useful in regard to religion: 
For the truths of religion are attested by 
evidence, which must be yielded to as soon as it 
is considered; and confirmed by proofs, which 
nothing but inattention can resist. But to 
consider, and weigh this evidence seriously and 
impartially, the mind must be abstracted, in 
some measure, from the objects that surround us; 
objects that strike us strongly, not because 
they are great, but because they are near; while 
the views of futurity affect us but faintly, not 
because they are unimportant, but because they 
are distant (Sermon 16, 176-177). 
He believed that man must carefully examine the remedies 
suggested by religious revelation in order to determine 
their suitability for dealing with the realities of human 
experience: 
When revelation is consulted, it appears that 
such a state is really promised, and that, by 
the contempt of worldly pleasures, it is to be 
obtained. We then find, that instead of lament-
ing the imperfection of earthly things, we have 
reason to pour out thanks to him who orders all 
for our good, that he has made the world, such 
as often deceives, and often afflicts us; that 
the charms of interest are not such, as our 
frailty is unable is resist, but that we have 
such interruptions of our pursuits, such languor 
in our enjoyments, such pains of body and 
18 See, w. J. Bate, The Achievement of Samuel 
Johnson, 93-94, for Bate's perceptive observation that 
Samuel Johnson anticipates many of Freud's insights on 
human nature. 
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anxieties of mind, as repress desire, and weaken 
temptation (Sermon 11_, 135). 
As we have seen, the natural religionists argued that 
reason seemed to render divine revelation unnecessary for 
salvation. Johnson disapproved of their failure to use 
reason to objectively examine the claims of religious 
revelation: 
The prevailing spirit of the present age seems 
to be the spirit of skepticism and captiousness, 
of suspicion and distrust, a contempt of all 
authority, and a presumptuous confidence in 
private judgement; a dislike of all established 
forms, merely because they are established, and 
of old paths, because they are old (Sermon 7, 
77). -
Johnson's methods for validating the truth of revelation 
are the pragmatic ones of appealing to the authority of 
common testimony and of demonstrating that the events 
narrated in Scripture are relevant to human experience: 
The Christian religion has very strong evi-
dences. It, indeed, appears in some degrees 
strange to reason; but in History we have 
undoubted facts against which reasoning ~ priori 
we have more arguments than we have for them; 
but then testimony has great weight and casts 
the balance" (Life, II, 398). 
It is clear that all arguments of the natural religionists 
seemed to Johnson less important than the testimony of 
ancient authority which tended to establish revelation 
itself as grounded in the facts of history. For example, 
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William Windham asked for Johnson's opinion of "natural" 
and "revealed" religion. Johnson bypassed the traditional 
arguments and artificial distinctions of the natural 
religionists and chose to discuss "revealed" religion 
only: 
For revealed religion there was such historical 
evidence as, upon any subject not religious, 
would have left no doubt .... With respect to 
evidence, Dr. Johnson observed that we had no 
such evidence that Caesar died in the Capitol, 
as that Christ died in the manner related.19 
For Johnson, then, a reliable way to examine the truth of 
revelation is to appeal to the authority--to the callee-
tive reason--of the ancients: 
The oral doctrines and occasional explications 
of the apostles would not be immediately 
forgotten in the churches to which they had 
preached, and which had attended to them with 
the diligence and reverence which their mission 
and character demanded ••.. Thus, by consult-
ing first the holy Scriptures, and next the 
writers of the primitive church, we shall make 
ourselves acquainted with the will of God; thus 
shall we discover the good way, and find that 
rest for our souls which will amply recompence 
our studies and enquiries ... (Sermon z, 83). 
On another occasion, speaking of those who denied the 
truth of revealed religion, Johnson said: 
It is always easy to be on the negative side. 
If a man were now to deny that there is salt 
19 Johnsonian Miscellanies, Vol. II, 384. 
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upon the table, you could not reduce him to an 
absurdity. Come, let us try this a little 
further. I deny that Canada is taken, and I can 
support my denial by pretty good arguments. The 
French are a much more numerous people than we; 
and it is not likely that they would allow us to 
take it. "But the ministry have assured us, in 
all the formality of the Gazette, that it is 
taken." Very true! But the ministry have put 
us to an enormous expense by the war in America, 
and it is their interest to persuade us that we 
have got something for our money. "But the fact 
is confirmed by thousands of men who were at the 
taking of it." Aye, but these men have still 
more interest in deceiving us. They don't want 
that you should think the French have beat them, 
but that they have beat the French. Now suppose 
you should go over and find that it is really 
taken, that would only satisfy yourself; for 
when you come home we will not believe you. We 
will say, you have been bribed. Yet, Sir, 
notwithstanding all these plausible objections, 
we have no doubt that Canada is really ours. 
such is the weight of common testimony. How 
much stronger are the evidences of the Christian 
religion! (Life, I, 428). 
We may conclude, then, that Johnson's esteem for man's 
reason made him as wary of unprovable assumptions in 
religion as in other branches of human inquiry. Unlike 
the natural religionists, however, Johnson believed that 
man should use his reason to objectively examine religious 
revelation against the touchstone of human experience and 
the testimony of authority. 
The Vision of Theodore is the locus classicus for the 
Johnsonian conception of the relation of reason to 
religion. It is written in the form of a moral allegory 
Which describes man's difficult journey up the Mountain of 
Existence. In the allegory, Theodore, Hermit of 
Teneriffe, observes some travellers struggling up the 
mountain; they graduate from Education's care into the 
protection of "two powers of superior aspect 11 20--Reason 
and Religion. As one of the two superior powers on the 
Mountain of Existence, properly directed Reason safely 
guides the traveller to the truth of Religion: 
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I am Reason, of all subordinate beings the 
noblest and the greatest; who, if thou [a 
traveller] wilt receive my laws, will reward 
thee like the rest of my votaries, by conducting 
thee to Religion (169). 
In the allegory, Reason watched Religion's steps "with the 
most anxious attention, and was visibly confounded and 
perplexed if ever she suffered her regard to be drawn 
away" (169). Early in the journey, some travellers became 
literally perplexed--entangled in Habit's chains--and 
fell; now, about half-way up the mountain, Reason is 
described as becoming philosophically perplexed without 
Religion's constant attendance. 
As the journey continues, Theodore, rewarded for his 
obedience to Reason, meets Religion and chooses her for 
his guide. Again, he observes travellers struggling with 
Habits; they attempt two opposite strategies to defeat 
20 Samuel Johnson, The Vision of Theodore, in Samuel 
!l_ohnson: The Oxford AuthOrs, ed. Donald Greene (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), 169. 
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them: either loosening Habit's chains one by one or 
bursting out suddenly. Theodore learns that the first 
strategy, of retreating "by the same degree as they 
advanced" (171) into Habits' chains, is inadequate. The 
second strategy exhausts the fugitive, weakening him into 
renewed susceptibility to the next attack. Having reached 
an impasse where neither alternative works, some of the 
travellers fail to recognize the need for outside help. 
unaided, they founder. A few, recognizing their need, 
address Reason; these choose less wisely than their 
fellows who, like Theodore, address Religion: 
Reason counselled them, at their first entrance 
upon her province, to enlist themselves among 
the votaries of Religion; and informed them that 
if they trusted to her alone, they would find 
the same fate with her other admirers, whom she 
had not been able to secure against Appetites 
and Passions, and who, having been seized by 
Habits in the regions of Desire, had been 
dragged away to the caverns of Despair (169). 
The Vision of Theodore uses the term reason in the 
sense of abstract logic; as such, it leaves the pilgrims 
perplexed and lost. Indeed, Theodore's Reason was what 
Kant would later call "Pure Reason;" it lacked the conunon-
sense wisdom of "Practical Reason." What "Pure Reason" 
lacks, despite theoretical rigor and adherence to 
intellectual demands, is the ability to direct the will to 
virtuous behavior. Pascal sagely recognized this truth in 
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his well-known aphorism: Le coeur ~ ses raisons que la 
!?ison ne connait point. Both Theodore and Johnson found 
reason wanting in its abstract and theorizing sense; it 
required the assistance of religion to guide men along the 
path of virtue. 
The second concept of reason developed from seven-
teenth-century influence was what is sometimes called 
Lockean reason. Alexander Campbell Fraser defines it in 
these terms: 
[Reason] signifies the inferential faculty, or 
power of drawing conclusions, either demon-
stratively, by deduction from self-evident 
principles, or inductively, on grounds of 
probability. It is thus synonymous with 
reasoning.21 
Here, reason is not a "bloodless, cock-sure rationalism," 
but a "particular way of reasoning" based on a "deductive-
empirical analysis" [emphasis mine).22 
Locke believed in the power and limits of reason. 
He, like Johnson, saw reason as an inferential mode of 
thinking. Locke asserted that it is proper for man to use 
. 21 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Htunan Understand-
ing, ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser (1894; rpt., New York: 
Dover Publications, 1959), II.385n [note to IV.xvii.l of 
the Essay). 
22 Franklin L. Ford, "The Enlightenment: Towards a 
Useful Redefinition," in Studies in the Eighteenth 
£entur~: Papers Presented at the David Nichol Smith 
~ernorial Seminar, Canberra, 1966, ed. R. F. Brissenden 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 26-27. 
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his reason to examine and judge the truths of revelation, 
where such truths can be known through our own ideas 
(IV. xviii. 4, 8). Moreover, we are not "obligated" to 
believe any statement in religion which is distinctly 
contrary to reason (IV.xviii.6). Reason, however, is not 
opposed to faith: 
faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: 
which, if it be regulated, as is our duty, 
cannot be afforded to anything but upon good 
reason; and so cannot be opposite to it 
(IV.xvii.24). 
But again, reason is limited because of certain inhibiting 
factors beyond man's control. Personifying reason, Locke 
says that: 
Reason, though it penetrates into the depths of 
the sea and earth, elevates our thoughts as high 
as the stars, and leads us through the vast 
spaces and large rooms of this mighty fabric, 
yet it comes far short of the real extent of 
every corporeal being. And there are many 
instances wherein it fails us (Essay, 
IV .xvii. 9). 
Among the instances Locke catalogues are the lack of ideas 
(the material of reasoning) to work with, obscure or 
imperfect ideas (such as the concept of infinity or a ten-
thousand-sided figure), an inability to see the connection 
between two ideas (as in premise and conclusion), and the 
use of unclear terms. More importantly for our purposes, 
Locke asserted that man must provide his reason with the 
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empirical data necessary for it to determine the validity 
of religion (Essay, IV.xvii.6). 
An early eighteenth-century representative of the 
Lockean tradition of reason is Berkeley, whose philosophy 
Johnson and Boswell occasionally discussed (Life, I, 471; 
IV, 27). Like Johnson, Berkeley ranked reason above 
imagination,23 and said that "upon all subjects of moment 
... a man ought to use his reason," (Alciphron, III, 
251) which is "the principle part of our nature" 
(Alciphron, III, 86). Reason is an important regulator: 
It is highly needful that all the motions, 
and passions of the soul should be under the 
regulation and influence of Reason, whose off ice 
it is to see they are placed on proper 
objects.24 
However, like Locke (though with more of a specifically 
religious emphasis), Berkeley believed that reason 
sometimes leads us "into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, 
and inconsistencies 11 25 because we too often begin with 
23 George Berkeley, Alciphron: or, the Minute 
Philosopher, in The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of 
Cloyne, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, 9 vols. (London: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1950), Vol. III, 85-86. 
24 Berkeley, Sermon II, "On Religious Zeal," in The 
Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, ed. A. A. Luce 
and T. E. Jessop (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1950), 
Vol. VIII, 16. 
25 Berkeley, ~ Treatise Concerning the Principles of 
!!.uman Knowledge (1710), in Works, Vol. II, 25. 
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false principles. He noted that some people attribute too 
much to reason while others attribute too little 
(~lciphron, III, 182). Reason is "a faculty of such 
mighty extent and power, especially towards mischief" 
(Alciphron, III, 207) that conscience and religion are 
necessary to keep it in line with good. Thus, a 
"Christian, indeed, is for confining reason within its due 
bounds; and so is every reasonable man'' (Alciphron, III, 
182). 
Joseph Butler, in his Analogy of Religion,26 while 
providing a reasoned defense of Christianity, extended 
Locke's arguments and concentrated on proving reason to be 
mysterious in its operation and inconclusive in its find-
ings. He says, "reason gives us the advantage and super-
iority over 11 27 the animal kingdom, and yet it imperfectly 
comprehends many of the truths of nature (Analogy, 223). 
Reason, according to Butler, can guide us along the way to 
faith, but cannot discover all truth: 
By reason is revealed the relation, which God 
the Father stands in to us. In Scripture are 
revealed the relations, which the Son and Holy 
26 Johnson's exposure to Butler's Analogy of Religion 
can be demonstrated from Christie's Sale Catalogue to 
Johnson's personal library. Butler's work is listed as 
entry 250. 
27 Joseph Butler, The Analogy of Religion to the 
£onstitution and Course of Nature (1736ff; rpt., 3rd ed., 
Philadelphia:---:1. B. Lippincott, 1860), 119. 
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Spirit stand in to us .... God is the gover-
nor of the world, upon the evidence of reason; 
that Christ is the mediator between God and man, 
and the Holy Ghost our guide and sanctifier, 
upon the evidence of revelation ... [emphasis 
mine] (Analogy, 194). 
Reason is to be a judge of revealed religion: "Reason 
can, and it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but 
also of the morality and the evidence of revelation" 
(Analogy, 220), even though in spiritual and revelatory 
matters it is limited to examining proofs and evidence and 
cannot discover the benefits or consequences of faith, 
which is a matter for experience (Analogy, 197). Like 
Locke, Butler believed that reason was by itself incapable 
of establishing a full moral system, especially one 
uncomplicated by superstition, so that revelation was 
necessary for the completion and perfection of morality 
just as it was for religion (Analogy, 186-7). 
Two main characteristics of the Lockean tradition of 
reason--(1) that it is a process, and (2) that it makes 
use of experimental data--are important for understanding 
Johnson's view. In the Dictionary, he defines reason as 
"the power by which man deduces one proposition from 
another, or proceeds from premises to consequences; the 
rational faculty." This faculty or power he associates 
With process: 
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Few men have been made infidels by argument and 
reflection; their actions are not generally the 
result of their reasonings, but their reasonings 
of their actions. Yet these reasonings, though 
they are not strong enough to pervert a good 
mind, may yet, when they coincide with interest, 
and are assisted by prejudice, contribute to 
confirm a man, already corrupted, in his 
impieties, and at least retard his reformation, 
if not entirely obstruct it (Sermon 2, 54). 
Reason is not an automatic faculty which can issue truths 
at will; it is a kind of mental tool which man must 
energetically manipulate to produce either virtuous or 
sinful results. 
Further, Johnson frequently associated reason with 
experiment or experience--reason needs the data of the 
external world to function properly. An example from 
Richard Hooker in the Dictionary shows that "reason is the 
director of man's will, discovering in action what is 
good; for the laws of well-doing are the dictates of right 
reason." Without action there can be no rational 
discovery. Because Johnson invariably regarded reason as 
operating upon an "empirical collection of materials, 11 28 
he was not, as Arieh Sachs has claimed, "doomed in his 
commitment to the kind of faith which could afford him no 
comfort at all. 11 29 Rather, in his Sermons, Johnson 
28 Jean Hagstrum, "The Nature of Dr. Johnson's 
Rationalism," English Literary History, 17 (1950), 194. 
29 "Reason and Unreason in Johnson's Religion," 
M.odern Language Review, 59 (1964), 522. 
139 
consistently maintained that the comfort provided by 
religious faith was associated with its capacity to deal 
effectively with the actualities of human nature and the 
pragmatic problems of this life: 
The love of God will engage us to trust in his 
protection, to acquiesce in his dispensations, 
to keep his laws, to meditate on his perfection, 
and to declare our confidence and submission, by 
profound and frequent adoration, to impress his 
glory on our minds by songs of praise, to 
inflame our gratitude by acts of thanksgiving, 
to strengthen our faith, and exalt our hope, by 
pious meditations, and to implore his protection 
of our imbecillity, and his assistance of our 
frailty, by humble supplication: and when we 
love God with the whole heart, the power of 
godliness will be shewn by steadiness in 
temptation, by patience in affliction, by faith 
in the divine promises, by perpetual dread of 
sin, by continual aspirations after higher 
degrees of holiness, and contempt of the pains 
and pleasures of the world, when they obstruct 
the progress of religious excellence (Sermon 13, 
145). ~ 
Far from being spun out of the innate materials of one 
person's mind, the products of reason are an aggregate of 
cumulative human experience. Reason must combine with 
experience to make virtue or truth a reality: 
But though we should suppose, what reason and 
experience disprove, that poverty and ignorance 
were calamities to those only on whom they fall, 
yet surely the sense of their misery might be 
sufficient to awaken us to compassion [emphasis 
mine] (Sermon 19, 213). 
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Johnson's position concerning reason is broader than 
either the Peripatetic or the Lockean understanding we 
have sketched in the preceding pages. Johnson insists 
that man is a co-agent in his own salvation and that his 
will is free; however, Johnson also argues that man cannot 
by his own devices, not even with his rational faculty, 
manage the integration of his reason with his imagination, 
emotions, passions and desires. Man cannot, unaided by 
religion, escape from his present state of vacuity. 
Johnson's view of reason as the controlling faculty in 
man's nature is more comprehensive than that of many of 
his contemporaries; moreover, it is an aspect of his 
thought that has been neglected by most modern critics. 
Two examples from the Dictionary, under his 
definition of reason, testify to Johnson's awareness that 
others held a narrower view of reason than his own. One 
illustration is taken from Dryden's Religio Laici: 
Dim, as the borrow'd beams of moon and stars 
To lonely, weary, wand'ring travellers, 
Is reason to the soul: and as on high, 
Those rowling fires discover but the sky, 
Not light us here; so reason's glimmering ray 
Was lent, not to assure our doubtful way, 
But guide us upward to a better day. 
For Dryden, reason plays only a preparatory role, like the 
Greek pedagogue who accompanied the young scholar from 
home to school, providing protection and guidance but not 
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education. The dim and borrowed light cannot truly 
illumine and fulf .ill but only "guide us upward to a better 
day." The other example, from Swift's Miscellanies, 
combines the ideas of a reason "true and just" yet limited 
both in religious matters and in our general lives: 
It would be well, if people would not lay so 
much weight on their own reason in matters of 
religion, as to think every thing impossible and 
absurd, which they cannot conceive: how often 
do we contradict the right rules of reason in 
the whole course of our lives? Reason itself is 
true and just, but the reason of every particu-
lar man is weak and wavering, perpetually swayed 
and turn'd by his interests, his passions and 
his vices. 
Johnson himself sometimes remarks on the various 
limitations of reason. For example, reason is frequently 
incapacitated by a simple lack of knowledge or time with 
which to work. Without properly established conditions, 
reason is further limited and may not be able to function: 
Not only knowledge, judgement, and experience, 
but uninterrupted leisure and retirement are 
necessary, that the chain of reasoning may be 
preserved unbroken, and the mind perform its 
operations, without any hindrance from foreign 
objects (Sermon 1, 81). 
Occasionally we will be able to discover some knowledge, 
but because it is only partial or because we insist upon 
considering only one aspect of it, we might form a wrong 
judgment on the issue (Life, II, 131). 
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Even with all necessary information present, however, 
reason still doe~ not always prevail. Sometimes the 
emotions or the violence of the passions overpower reason 
and cause us to act against what we have calmly thought 
out and know to be right: 
Men are very seldom disappointed, except when 
their desires are immoderate, or when they 
suffer their passions to overpower their reason, 
and dwell upon delightful scenes of future 
honours, power, or riches, till they mistake 
probabilities for certainties, or wild wishes 
for rational expectations [emphasis mine] 
(Sermon ~' 58) . 
Moreover, many times the strength of reason is not suffi-
cient to overcome the impressions of our senses, so that, 
for example, someone who strikes us as "void of pity" can 
never appear merciful afterwards, however much our reason 
may tell us that he is (Sermon!, 41). 
Some people purposefully "lay their reason asleep" 
(Rambler ~' 288) when they know that its conclusions 
would be opposite to their desires, for we do not always 
want to do what reason informs is right. We are like 
those engaged 
in shew, in merriment and noise [who] please 
themselves, not with thinking justly, but with 
avoiding to think at all, with a suspence of all 
the operations of their intellectual faculties, 
which defends them from remembrance of the past, 
or anticipation of the future (Sermon 14, 150). 
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often we do not refuse to hear reason altogether, but we 
manipulate it for our own ends: 
Such men suffer frequent disturbance from the 
remonstrances of reason, and the reproaches of 
conscience, and do not set reason, or con-
science, at defiance, but endeavour to pacify 
them with assuasive promises of repentance and 
amendment (Sermon.!.?_, 162-3). 
when this manipulation of reason has continued long 
enough, we become a slave to our desires and our willing-
ness to be ruled by reason is weakened. We resign our 
reason to empty expectations for happiness and thus pay 
little or no attention to the problems of our current 
state (Sermon 15, 163). Reason then is prevented from 
warning us of approaching calamity, and has become a 
distorted, if not useless, faculty. A man sunk into 
corruption has so diligently and effectively ignored his 
reason that: 
he is indeed not easily to be reclaimed; his 
reason, as well as his passions, is in 
combination against his soul, and there is 
little hope, that either persuasion will soften, 
or arguments convince him (Sermon!, 41). 
However, Johnson steadfastly maintained that reason 
was extremely useful in regard to religion. Johnson's 
astute observations on human nature--man's dangerous 
Propensity to eschew moral responsibility and to prefer 
"the gay sallies of the imagination" (Sermon l.Q., 221) or 
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to "indulge any desire that happens to arise, with very 
little resistance or compunction" (Sermon 10, 111) in a 
futile attempt to fill the vacuity of life--reflect his 
belief that man is susceptible to self-indulgence and 
self-delusion. Indeed, it is not easy to tell how 
blinding such pleasant arts of self-delusion can be but we 
receive some indication from those who are in love, where 
we see "how much a secondary passion can cloud our 
judgment" (Rambler 28, 152). True self-knowledge comes 
only through the correcting lens of reason which allows us 
to 
controul all those emotions, which comparison 
produces: he will not consider himself as made 
poorer by another's wealth, or richer by 
another's poverty; he will look, without 
malignity, upon superiority, either external or 
intellectual; he will be willing to learn of 
those that excel in wisdom, and receive 
instruction with thankfulness; he will be 
willing to impart his knowledge, without fearing 
lest he should impair his own importance, by the 
improvement of his hearer (Sermon 1J:., 121). 
He frequently remarked on the delusion which results when 
man fails to use his reason to examine the data of 
concrete experience or to yield to the weight of authority 
in his search for the stability of truth: 
Some of the philosophers, indeed appear to have 
sought a nobler, and a more certain remedy, and 
to have endeavoured to overpower the force of 
death by arguments, and to dispel the gloom by 
the light of reason. • • . It is plain, that the 
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constitution of mankind is such, that abstruse 
and intellectual truths can be taught no other-
wise th.an by positive assertion, supported by 
some sensible evidence, by which the asserter is 
secured from the suspicion of falsehood (Sermon 
25, 263-265). 
Furthermore, Johnson maintained that we are 
blessed with a clearer light, and taught to know 
the will of our Maker, not from long deductions 
from variable appearances, or intricate dis-
quisitions of fallible reason, but by messengers 
inspired by himself .•. (Sermon!, 40). 
We can see, then, that Johnson's view of reason is 
strikingly original. He relied on some concepts of 
traditional Christian theology as well as on contributions 
of the secular philosophers. However, he selected from 
the sources what he saw as cogent and persuasive; he left 
behind what simply did not make sense to him. Johnson 
could not ascribe such lofty powers to reason as the 
rationalists had conferred on it, but neither could he 
dismiss reason as merely a slave to the passions as Luther 
and others had argued. Johnson stressed consistently 
personal moral responsibility and the importance of choice 
in which practical reason plays its part. However, 
Johnson recognized that even practical reason is weakened 
by the rationalizing and self-delusive capacity within 
man's nature to think up arguments which justify whatever 
he desires. 
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Johnson, then, is no irrationalist, no mechanistic 
determinist, like Hobbes; neither is he a rigorous 
rationalist, like Locke, believing reason capable of 
leading man to full understanding and control over his 
life. Johnson recognized that the mind and will 
cooperate in shaping man's life by a series of choices--
some of which spring from non-rational sources. Religion 
supplies a practical guide partly because it is based upon 
divine revelation, but partly also because it is true to 
human experience. Religion provides pragmatic 
consolations for the problems caused by man's weak and 
self-delusive nature. 
II 
The substance and depth of Johnson's religious 
beliefs has been carefully examined and analyzed by a 
number of contemporary critics.30 These same critics have 
also detailed the background of Johnson's faith in the 
30 See, for example, Chester F. Chapin, The Religious 
Thought of Samuel Johnson (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan--Press, 1968), esp. Chapters v, VI, and VII; 
Charles E. Pierce, Jr., The Religious Life of Samuel 
~ohnson (London: The Athlone Press, 1983); Voitle, Samuel 
Johnson the Moralist, Chapters VI and VII; Maurice J. 
Qu~nlan,--simuel Johnson: ~Layman's Religion (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), esp. Chapters III 
through VIII; Richard B. Schwartz, Samuel Johnson and the 
!:_roblem of Evil (Madison: University of Wisconsin PresS:-
1975), 3-7, 22-59; James Gray, Johnson's Sermons: A Study 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 131-166. -
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popular doctrines and controversies of the eighteenth 
century which surrounded him; arguments over Deism, 
whether truth beyond sense data and reason could be known, 
the freedom of the human will, and other issues, some of 
which has been touched on above.31 Johnson's serious 
interest in these matters is reflected in his library, 
which at the time of his death contained books by more 
than eighty theologians, almost three hundred books and 
the largest category in his collection.32 
In the previous chapter, we examined Johnson's 
steadfast belief that one of the most important inferences 
to be drawn from the free agency of man was the relevancy 
of Christianity for man's nature. Without the inescapable 
teaching of personal moral responsibility supplied by 
religion, and without the invigorating power supplied by 
the idea of future rewards and punishments, Johnson 
believed that few would struggle with themselves very 
long. Instead, a kind of psychological defense mechanism 
would cause them to project the blame for unhappiness onto 
. 31 See, for example, Meyrick Carre, Phases of Thought 
,!!! England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 292-342; 
Sahakian, History of Philosophy, Chapter IX; David 
Daiches, ~ Critical History of English Literature, 2nd ed. 
(London: Secker and Warburg, 1969), Vol. III, 766-776; 
Chapin, The Religious Thought of Samuel Johnson, 82-91. 
32 Donald J. Greene, Samuel Johnson's Library: An 
b_nnotated Guide (Victoria, B.C.: University of Victoria, 
1975), 14. 
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other people or onto some external circumstances. Then, a 
world of delusion and wrong perceptions would be created; 
this self-delusion would reconcile what they wanted to 
believe with what actually is. Johnson says that "on many 
occasions we make the musick which we imagine ourselves to 
hear" (Rambler ~, 136) and we constantly practice many 
"arts of voluntary delusion" (Rambler 146, 15) which are 
intended to reconcile us to our vices and which effective-
ly keep us from inquiring into our true state. 
If we refuse to recognize that "the limits of human 
enjoyment" are fixed "by immoveable boundaries" (Rambler 
178, 173) and allow our desires to increase, to fix on 
earthly objects, to inflame the imagination with wild 
hopes, pain is inevitable:33 
We fail of being happy because we determine to 
obtain felicity by means different from those 
which God hath appointed (Sermon~' 58). 
Johnson reasons to the relevancy of religion by 
demonstrating its pragmatism--the motivation provided by 
religion fits man's frail and self-delusive nature. 
Lacking such motivation, a man will be totally at the 
mercy of his animal drives: 
. 33 See, for example, The Vanity of Human Wishes; The 
Vision of Theodore; Rasselas; sermons 10, 12, 14, 15, 18, 
.fQ, 25;""Rambler 2, 13; Rambler 106, 20Q; Rainblers 67, 101, 
116,-and 123. - ~-
A man whose attention is disengaged, who is 
neither stimulated by hope, nor agitated by 
fear, is wholly exposed to the tyranny of his 
appetites(Sermon 26, 282). 
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Nothing is worthy of our ardent wishes, or 
intense solicitude, that terminates in this 
state of existence; those only make the true use 
of life, that employ it in obtaining the favour 
of God, and securing everlasting happiness 
(Sermon ~' 54). 
Moreover, in the Dictionary, the very definition of 
religion is "virtue, as founded upon reverence of God, and 
expectation of future rewards and punishments." These 
"future rewards and punishments" are the only complete 
fulfillment for man; indeed, Johnson stresses that 
to live religiously, is to walk, not by sight, 
but by faith; to act in confidence of things 
unseen, in hope of future recompense, and in 
fear of future punishment (Sermon lQ, 110). 
Hope itself, then, can be a great blessing and source of 
happiness to man but, since it is subject to the mis-
directions of desire and the wrong expectations of 
imagination, it must be regulated by the pragmatic demands 
of religion: 
He that hopes to find peace by trusting in God, 
must obey him; and when he has at any time 
failed in his obedience, which amongst the best 
men will be very frequent, he must endeavour to 
reconcile God to him by repentance. He may then 
find another occasion of exercising his trust, 
by assuring himself, that "when the wicked 
forsakes his way, and the unrighteous man his 
thoughts, and returns unto the Lord, he will 
have mercy upon him, and abundantly pardon" 
(Sermon 14, 157). 
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Furthermore, about one-third of the examples Johnson gives 
for hope in the Dictiona_ry refer to the fulfillment of 
man's hope in religion's promise of eternal life. A 
typical selection is a quotation from Davies: 
When in heav'n she shall his essence see, 
This is her sov'reign good, and perfect bliss; 
Her longing, wishings, hopes, all finish'd be; 
Her joys are full, her motions rest in this. 
If man does not hope in the promises of God as contained 
in revelation, but hopes in the assurances of men, his 
hope will be fallacious and great unhappiness will result. 
A practical consolation of religion, then, is that it 
supplies man with the motivating power to lead an ethical 
life. It is the emphasis on future rewards and 
punishments which supplies religion with the remedies 
required for man's weak nature. This is the reason, as 
James Gray says, for "religion and morality being 
inextricably united" (150); and, in the words of Robert 
Voitle, "morality must ultimately be based on religion" 
(180). 
Johnson follows the tradition, going back at least to 
the Restoration, of seeing immortality as the distinctive 
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feature of Christian religion.3 4 Boswell once remarked 
that "the great article of Christianity is the revelation 
of immortality" and Johnson "admitted it was" {Life, III, 
188). While the Deists maintained that they could arrive 
at the truth of immortality through deduction, Johnson 
appeals to the authority of "the preachers of Chris-
tianity" to support his belief: 
that any man could be a Jew, and yet deny a 
future state, is a sufficient proof that it had 
not yet been clearly revealed, and that it was 
reserved for the preachers of Christianity to 
bring life and immortality to light. In such a 
degree of light they are now placed, that they 
can be denied or doubted no longer, but as the 
gospel, that shews them, is doubted or denied. 
It is now certain that we are here, not in our 
total, nor in our ultimate exist.e'Ilce, but in a 
state of exercise and probation, commanded to 
qualify ourselves, by pure hearts and virtuous 
actions, for the enjoyment of future felicity in 
the presence of God; and prohibited to break the 
laws which his wisdom has given us, under the 
penal sanction of banishment from heaven into 
regions of misery (Sermon 10, 108-109). 
The writers of antiquity, Johnson maintains, had no true 
knowledge of immortality: 
34 Robert south, for instance, states that the 
distinctive motivating power of religion is based on the 
revelation of immortality. south observes that "the 
discriminating excellency of Christianity consists not so 
much in this, that it discovers more sublime truths, or 
indeed more excellent precepts than philosophy • . . as 
that it suggests more efficacious arguments to enforce the 
performance of those precepts, than any other religion or 
institution whatsoever" (Sermon V [second series], on 
Titus 1.1, Sermons, V, 81). 
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The ancient heathens, with whose notions we are 
acquainted, how far soever they might have 
carried their speculations of moral or civil 
wisdom, had no conception of a future state 
(Sermon 10, 107). 
It is this ignorance of futurity which explains their 
eager pursuit of temporal happiness and their recommenda-
tion of that pursuit to others: 
The darkness and uncertainty through which the 
heathen were compelled to wander in the pursuit 
of happiness, may, indeed, be alleged as an 
excuse for many of their seducing invitations to 
immediate enjoyment, which the moderns, by whom 
they have been imitated, have not to plead. It 
is no wonder that such as had no promise of 
another state should eagerly turn their thoughts 
upon the improvement of that which was before 
them; but surely those who are acquainted with 
the hopes and fears of eternity, might think it 
necessary to put some restraints upon their 
imagination (Rambler 29, 158). 
The ultimate consolation which religion offers man 
for the vacuity of life is the possibility of personal 
salvation through "obedience to the divine will" (Rambler 
z, 37). Indeed, the crux of Johnson's position in the 
Sermons rests on his observation that man's experience of 
vacuity in this life argues for the experience of satiety 
in the next life. For Johnson, salvation simply means a 
state of eternal happiness after death. In the Diction-
ary, his only definition for salvation is "preservation 
from eternal death; reception to the happiness of heaven." 
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He uses the word synonymously with "eternal bliss," 
"heaven," "eternal happiness," and "future happiness." 
There can be no doubt that Johnson regards the attainment 
of this state as the only proper goal of human existence. 
saving one's soul is "the business of life" (Sermon 1...2., 
161) and "the object of greatest importance" (Life, IV, 
417). The problem of how salvation is attained by man is 
"the important question, which it becomes every human 
being to study from the first hour of reason to the last" 
(Sermon 28, 302). 
Indeed, the question of how salvation could be 
attained--specifically, the role of good works or morality 
and the role of faith--was a matter of considerable debate 
between the Evangelicals and the Anglicans in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. Both factions agreed 
that works without faith were vain; however, the Evangeli-
cals accused the Anglicans of over-emphasizing morality at 
the expense of saving faith. The Evangelicals feared that 
such emphasis created the erroneous belief that the 
performance of good works was sufficient for salvation. 
For example, William Law, in his Serious Call To ~ Devout 
b.n.Q. Holy Life, answered the question of how salvation is 
attained by emphasizing the fact that man must struggle to 
perform good works: 
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Weak and imperfect men shall, notwithstanding 
their frailties and defects, be received as 
having pleased God if they have done their 
utmost to please Hirn . . . • We cannot off er to 
God the service of angels; we cannot obey Hirn as 
man in a state of perfection could; but fallen 
men can do their best, and this is the perfec-
tion that is required of us; it is only the 
perfection of our best endeavours, a careful 
labor to be as perfect as we can (66-67).35 
On the other hand, the Evangelical's overwhelming 
emphasis on faith and on the utter inadequacy of good 
works opened them up to the accusation of abandoning 
morality totally.36 The Evangelical position was 
popularized by George Whitefield and John Wesley. For 
example, Wesley insisted that man's good works amounted to 
nothing without faith. Indeed, Wesley maintained that man 
possessed "a present inward-light, a saving faith" and 
that salvation was offered gratuitously through Christ's 
universal sacrifice for mankind: 
For there is nothing we are, or have, or do, 
which can deserve the least thing at God's hand 
.•.. Wherewithal then shall a sinful man 
35 Similar passages are found in Samuel Clarke, 
Sermon l, I, 2. 
36 John Calvin's first and most important dogma in 
his Institutes of the Christian Religion is that God is 
totally sovereign; man is totally depraved (II, 68). In 
this concept of God's omnipotence and man's complete 
depravity are implied the doctrines of predestination 
(election and reprobation}, the lack of freedom of the 
Will, and the limited atonement (Christ died only to save 
the elect. Calvin's beliefs in election and limited 
atonement denied the efficacy of good works. 
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atone for any the least of his sins? With his 
own works? No! Were they ever so many or holy, 
they are not his own, but God's.37 
wesley did admit that there was some room for human voli-
tions in the appropriation of divine grace, but he 
stressed that man ultimately relied on the gratuitous 
nature of Christ's grace: 
a full reliance on the blood of Christ; a trust 
in the merits of His life, death and resurrec-
tion; a recumbency upon him as our atonement and 
our life, as given for us, and living in .!:!.§.; and 
in consequence hereof, a closing with him, and 
cleaving to him (V, 9). 
The well-known Evangelical clergyman William Romaine, 
whose work Miss Hill Boothby recommended to Johnson,38 
wrote that saving faith is an inward experience; it needs 
no support from human experience or from the general 
testimony of man: 
And whoever has received these ordinary opera-
tions of the Holy Spirit, has in his own heart 
clear and full testimony of the Godhead, and 
almighty power of the blessed Spirit. He wants 
no outward miracles. This great inward work is 
to him complete evidence; and he is able to rest 
his salvation with as full trust and confidence 
upon it, as if he had seen the apostles exert 
their miraculous gifts and graces • • . . We 
37 John Wesley, The Works of the Reverend John 
~esley, ~ !1.:_, ed. John Telford--(New York: n.p:-;-1835), 
v , 7 • 
38 Hill Boothby, An Account of the Life of Dr. Samuel 
~ohnson, ed. Richard Wright {London:---ri'.P:-:-180S-)-,-100-102. 
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must plead and intreat, and importune you to 
seek his assistance, but the success must come 
from him. The word itself is but a dead letter, 
unless he animate it; and therefore the preach-
ing of it can have no power, unless he accompany 
it. We may plant and water, but he must give 
the increase.39 
In similar fashion, in his Sermon on "The Parable of the 
Ten Virgins," Tillotson warns against the danger of 
emphasizing the efficacy of virtuous actions without 
faith: 
Some have proceeded to that height, as if they 
could drive a strict bargain with God for 
eternal life and happiness; and have treated him 
in so insolent a manner, by their doctrine of 
the merit of their devotions and good works, as 
if God were as much beholden to them for their 
service and obedience, as they are to him for 
the reward of them (Sermon l1_, II, 551). 
All this Johnson understood and his praise for the works 
of Wesley and Whitefield was sincere but qualified (Life, 
I, 458; III, 409). Indeed, there were some things about 
the Evangelical position of which he was severely 
critical. The "inner light of grace," he told Maxwell, 
seemed to him a vicious principle because it was neither 
reasonable nor natural based on his observations of human 
nature: 
39 William Romaine, "A Discourse on the Benefit Which 
the Holy Spirit of God Is of to Man, in his Journey 
through Life," Works (London: n.p., 1821), Vol. IV, 275; 
288-289. 
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Speaking of the inward light, to which some 
Methodists pretended, he [Johnson] said, it was 
a principle utterly incompatible with social or 
civil security. If a man pretends to a prin-
ciple of action of which I can know nothing, 
nay, not so much as that he has it, but only 
that he pretends to it; how can I tell what that 
person may be prompted to do? When a person 
professes to be governed by a written ascer-
tained law, I can know where to find him! (Life, 
II, 126). --
Perhaps Johnson's most characteristic religious 
assumption is that salvation is offered not gratuitously 
but conditionally: 
Trust in God, that trust to which perfect peace 
is promised, is to be obtained only by 
repentance, obedience, and supplication, not by 
nourishing in our own hearts a confused idea of 
the goodness of God, or a firm persuasion that 
we are in a state of grace; by which some have 
been deceived, as it may be feared, to their 
destruction. We are not to imagine ourselves 
safe, only because we are not harassed with 
those anxieties about our future state, with 
which others are tormented; but which are so far 
from being proofs of reprobation, that though 
they are often mistaken by those that languish 
under them, they are more frequently evidences 
of piety, and a sincere and fervent desire of 
pleasing God. We are not to imagine, that God 
approves us because he does not afflict us, nor, 
on the other hand, to persuade ourselves too 
hastily that he afflicts us, because he loves 
us. We are, without expecting any extraordinary 
effusions of light, to examine our actions by 
the great and unchangeable rules of revelation 
and reason, "to do to others as we would that 
they should do to us," and to love God with all 
our heart, and express that love by keeping his 
commandments (Sermon 14, 156-157). 
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Christ's sacrifice has merited salvation but only for 
those who fulfill the conditions under which it is 
offered. Johnson's Sermons reflect his understanding of a 
God who is closely associated with human experience: 
It is just that we should consider every oppor-
tunity of performing a good action, as the gift 
of God, one of the chief gifts which God bestows 
upon man, in his present state, and endeavour to 
improve the blessing, that it may not be with-
drawn from us, as a talent unemployed; for it is 
not certain, that he, who neglects this call to 
his duty, will be permitted to live, till he 
hears another (Sermon 19, 212). 
For Johnson, God does not justify or sanctify man without 
man's co-operation in this process as a free and respon-
sible moral agent. As Jean Hagstrum has pointed out, this 
"belief in conditional salvation" constitutes one of the 
"main features" of Johnson's Christianity.40 Johnson 
warns against allowing faith in salvation to obscure the 
fact that there are still terms to be fulfilled: 
Yet let us likewise be careful, lest an 
erroneous opinion of the all-sufficiency of our 
saviour's merits lull us into carelessness and 
security. His merits are indeed all-sufficient! 
But he has prescribed the terms on which they 
are to operate (Sermon 28, 304). 
40 Jean H. Hagstrum, "On Dr. Johnson's Fear of 
Death," Journal of English Literary History, 14 (1947), 
314. 
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The Evangelicals in general and the Calvinists in 
particular were absolutely insistent on salvation by grace 
alone. Nonetheless, they placed great stress on the 
importance of virtue and good works not as a means of 
gaining salvation but as a sign that one is of the elect. 
If one believed himself to be saved and continued to live 
a life of wickedness, he would be deceived because no man 
truly saved by divine grace could continue in such a life. 
The Calvinists, therefore, had the strongest motivation to 
manifest good works--not as a means of earning their 
salvation (for such is clearly impossible) but rather as a 
means of displaying their membership in the elect. The 
Evangelicals in practice tended to place greater stress on 
holiness of living and personal virtue than did the 
Anglicans, who were, again in practice, somewhat more 
relaxed about individual morality. Consequently, Johnson 
never challenged the orthodox position of salus sola 
gratia but his practical nature advocated the necessity of 
maintaining moral standards given the weakness of human 
nature. He found it understandably difficult to see how 
man could be genuinely "saved" and still lack personal 
virtue. The Calvinists agreed. The only difference was a 
semantic one. Johnson spoke of good works as a condition 
Of salvation, while the Puritans and the Methodists called 
good works a manifestation of salvation. 
160 
Johnson was fearful of a failure to manifest 
sufficient virtue, whether it be called a condition or a 
sign of salvation, and this anxiety led to his almost 
pathological fear of death.41 He was skeptical of the 
!!Ssurance of salvation felt by the followers of Wesley and 
Calvin, remarking to Boswell that "the most rational . 
look upon salvation as conditional; and as they never can 
be sure that they have complied with the conditions, they 
are afraid" (Life, IV, 278). Johnson obviously included 
himself among "the most rational" group. Boswell reported 
a similar remark made during a visit to Oxford during the 
same year: 
• . . as I cannot be sure that I have fulfilled 
the conditions on which my salvation is granted, 
I am afraid I am one of those who may be damned 
(looking dismally). DR. ADAMS: What do you mean 
by damned? JOHNSON: (passionately and loudly) 
Sent to Hell, Sir, and punished everlastingly! 
(Life, IV, 299). 
Not many critics who have given attention to 
Johnson's religious beliefs have paid sufficient attention 
to the fact that his fear of death is above all a logical 
and natural extension of his conviction that holy fear is 
necessary for virtuous living and hence for eternal 
41 For an excellent analysis of the intellectual 
foundation for Johnson's fear of death see Jean Hagstrum's 
article, cited above. Hagstrum's fine study makes some of 
my points redundant. 
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happiness.42 He envied those who were so very sure they 
were saved but his common sense told him that such 
assurance was highly questionable. Far from being 
something to be ashamed of, the fear of death, in 
Johnson's view, is the mark of a good and pious man. When 
Boswell observed that William Dodd, the convicted forger, 
seemed unafraid at his hanging, Johnson replied: 
Sir, Dr. Dodd would have given his hands and 
legs to have lived. The better a man is, the 
more afraid he is of death, having a clearer 
view of infinite purity (Life, III, 154). 
In Sermon 14, Johnson reminds his readers that 
those anxieties about our future state . . . far 
from being proofs of reprobation . • . are more 
frequently evidences of piety, and a sincere 
and fervent desire of pleasing God (157). 
The fear of death is actually man's anxiety over not 
having fulfilled the conditions necessary for salvation; 
hence, it is a fear of what might follow death--hell. As 
such, it is something to be desired and cultivated, not 
something to be avoided.43 No other reason can account 
42 See, for example, Quinlan, Samuel Johnson: A 
Layman's Religion, 127, 135-136; Hagstrum, "On Dr. 
Johnson's Fear of Death,'' 308-319. 
43 For additional evidence of Johnson's belief that 
the fear of what follows death positively influences man's 
moral conduct, see Johnsonian Miscellanies, I, 223-234, 
227, II, 16; Life, II, 298, IV, 278, v, 180; Thraliana, I, 
203; Samuel Johnson, The Letters of Samuel Johnson, col. 
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for his general lack of reticence about his own fears or 
for having the face of his watch inscribed in Greek with 
the words of the New Testament--"the night cometh [when no 
man can work]" (Life, II, 57). 
Johnson believed that the practice of virtue would 
yield remedies for the vacuity of life because virtuous 
actions help to alleviate the miseries and problems of 
daily living and partially contribute to man's hope for 
eternal salvation. For example, he states that 
the terms, upon which we are to hope for any 
benefits from the merits of Christ, are faith, 
repentance, and subsequent obedience (Sermon 9, 
104).44 -
Even though a man does not know if these conditions have 
been met in his life, he must strive to live ethically. 
In his statement of purpose for Sermon 28, Johnson names 
the same three virtues: 
and ed. R. W. Chapman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 
III, 143. 
44 The use of all three designations was perhaps not 
as common as simply "repentance and faith" or "faith and 
obedience," though the meaning was the same no matter what 
combination was used. For example, Archbishop Secker 
employs the same categories as Johnson in his popular 
Lectures on the Catechism of the Church of England (1769): 
Now these Conditions, or Obligations, on our 
Part, are three: that we renounce what God 
forbids: that we believe what he teaches, and 
do what he commands; or, in other words, 
Repentance, Faith, and Obedience (17-18). 
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Salvation is promised to us Christians, on the 
terms of faith, obedience, and repentance. I 
shall therefore endeavour to shew how • . . we 
may exert faith, perform obedience, and exercise 
repentance, in a manner which our heavenly 
Father may, in his infinite mercy, vouchsafe to 
accept [Johnson's own emphasis] (Sermon 28, 
303). 
By faith, first of all, Johnson signifies a firm 
belief in Christian doctrine. For instance, faith is 
defined as: 
a full and undoubting confidence in the declara-
tions made by God in the holy Scriptures, a 
sincere reception of the doctrines taught by our 
blessed Saviour, with a firm assurance that he 
died to take away the sins of the world, and 
that we have, each of us, a part in the bound-
less benefits of the universal sacrifice (Sermon 
28, 303-304). 
Also, the first definition of faith in the Dictionary is 
simply "belief of the revealed truths of religion." This 
notion of faith is woven throughout Johnson's discussions 
of the topic in the Sermons. For example, in Sermon]_, "a 
well-grounded belief" is equated with "a firm and settled 
persuasion of the fundamental articles of our religion" 
(83). The person who lacks faith possesses 
a mind restless and undetermined, continually 
fluctuating betwixt various opinions, always in 
pursuit of some better scheme of duties, and 
more eligible system of faith, eager to embrace 
every new doctrine, and adopt the notions of 
every pretender to extraordinary light (Sermon 
]_, 83). 
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The truths which are the proper objects of belief 
include all of divine revelation--"the declarations made 
bY God in the holy Scriptures . the doctrines taught 
by our blessed Saviour" (Sermon 28, 303-4). Of course, 
some of these truths and doctrines are more important than 
others. Sermon 22 contains a brief list of truths to be 
believed: 
we must then endeavour to invigorate our faith 
by returning frequently to meditate upon the 
objects of it, our creation, our redemption, the 
means of grace, and the hope of glory (Sermon 
22, 235). 
As we have already seen, it is the last item on this list 
which Johnson seems to have considered the most useful--
the one most likely to prompt the performance of virtuous 
activity. 
Faith, then, provides some practical consolations for 
the vacuity of life. First, it teaches us to seek our 
happiness in eternity. The Sermons are filled with 
references to the preparatory nature of this life for the 
life of the world to come, with the relative 
insignificance of what happens to us now except as it 
relates to what we shall be in the hereafter, and with the 
great blessing of Christianity in bringing immortality to 
light [Sermons~, 10, 25]. Religion offers man "a 
reasonable expectation of a more happy and permanent 
existence" (Sermon 4, 44). 
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second, and somewhat paradoxically, this very focus 
on eternal happiness brings some degree of happiness or at 
least contentment to this life. Most of our unhappiness 
is caused by some "fictitious good" (Adventurer 111, 451), 
so that when we focus on eternity and give up our 
desperate grasping after worldly things, we begin to grow 
happier, not only because of our future hope but also 
because, by reducing and devaluing our earthly wants, we 
grow less anxious about them. Here religion serves as a 
regulator of desire, keeping us from fixating upon every 
worldly object as some new thing necessary for happiness, 
and thereby allowing a natural happiness to rise up in the 
soul:45 
The consideration of the vanity of all human 
purposes and projects, deeply impressed upon the 
mind, necessarily produces that diffidence in 
all worldly good, which is necessary to the 
regulation of our passions, and the security of 
our innocence. In a smooth course of 
prosperity, an unobstructed progression from 
45 Johnson repeatedly stresses the healing benefits 
of recognizing our weak condition in the light of 
eternity. See, for example, The Vanity of Human Wishes, 
Idler 37, 116, Adventurer 67,~7-389, AdVenturer 119, 
461-468";" Rambler 8, 40-46,~ambler 17, 92-97, Rambler 28, 
156, Rambler 58, 309-313, Sermon 15-,-112, Sermon 18, 193. 
Other Christian writers also emphasized the practical 
benefits of frequently focusing on our eternal destiny. 
See, for example, William Law, A Serious Call, 116, 122, 
133-147, 268. - --
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wish to wish, while the success of one design 
facilitates another, and the opening prospect of 
life shews pleasures at a distance, to conclude 
that the passage will be always clear, and that 
the delights which solicit from far, will, when 
they are attained, fill the soul with enjoy-
ments, must necessarily produce violent desires, 
and eager pursuits, contempt of those that are 
behind, and malignity to those that are before. 
But the full persuasion that all earthly good is 
uncertain in the attainment, and unstable in the 
possession, and the frequent recollection of the 
slender supports on which we rest, and the 
dangers which are always hanging over us, will 
dictate inoffensive modesty, and mild benevo-
lence (Sermon ]d, 134). 
This process of a "backward transfer" of happiness from 
futurity to present is made clearest when Johnson con-
siders the comforts of the dying: 
To afford adequate consolations to the last 
hour, to cheer the gloomy passage through the 
valley of the shadow of death, and to ease that 
anxiety, to which beings, prescient of their own 
dissolution, and conscious of their own danger, 
must be necessarily exposed, is the privilege 
only of revealed religion (Sermon 25, 261). 
Elsewhere he says, "Piety is the only proper and adequate 
relief of a decaying man" (Rambler 69, 367). To recognize 
a secure future in the face of death is certainly a source 
of happiness in this life; so that sick or well, anyone 
who contemplates his end with a focus on his eternal 
reward should derive some comfort from it. Yet, Johnson 
remained terrified at the prospect of death because 
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experience had taught him that the conditions of salvation 
were extremely difficult to fulfill. 
Johnson's understanding of faith as a means to salva-
tion, and hence as a consolation for the vacuity of life, 
derives not from what faith is but from what it does--it 
produces obedience and repentance. Faith that does not 
produce these attributes is not true faith. Johnson makes 
this very clear when he asserts that those whose faith is 
not productive of good works will be consigned to 
everlasting flames: 
Those who contented themselves with believing, 
and professing Christianity, without obeying its 
precepts; those, who while they call the Author 
of our faith, the Lord, their Master, and their 
God, and yet neglect his precepts and work 
iniquity, will be rejected by him at the last 
day, as those whom he has never known; those to 
whom his regard never was extended; and, not-
withstanding the confidence with which they may 
claim his intercession, will not be distin-
guished by any favour from other sinners (Sermon 
11, 156). 
To have the same opinions naturally produces 
kindness, even when these opinions have no 
consequence; because we rejoice to find our 
sentiments approved by the judgment of another. 
But those who concur in Christianity, have, by 
that agreement in principle, an opportunity of 
more than speculative kindness; they may help 
forward the salvation of each other, by counsel 
or by reproof, by exhortation, by example; they 
may recall each other from deviations, they may 
excite each other to good works (Sermon 11, 122-
123). 
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Faith, the cause of obedience, is also considered an act 
of obedience, a virtue, a good work. 
Johnson's morally pragmatic view of religion is 
demonstrated by the fact that he places less emphasis on 
faith than on obedience and repentance--virtues which are 
intrinsically linked to authority. It is not faith, not 
the intellectual assent to theological propositions, which 
is central for Johnson but rather repentance and obedi-
ence. Indeed, the references to faith in his works and 
conversations are minimal. Boswell reports only one 
statement regarding faith (Life, IV, 123); virtue, by 
contrast, appears nineteen times in the index to the Life. 
Moreover, in the periodical essays, Johnson never 
discusses faith as such, though several explicitly treat 
religious subjects and though Rambler 110 is entirely 
devoted to the topic of repentance. Most of the explicit 
references to faith occur in the Sermons; indeed, Sermons 
i, z, 10, 14, and 28 contain substantial discussions of 
the topic. Finally, in Johnson's prayers and diaries, 
where obedience and repentance are a constant theme, there 
are no more than sixteen uses of the word faith or its 
synonyms.46 
46 see, for example, pages 64, 66, 76, 79, 106, 124, 
130, 140, 144, 162, 262, 293, 302, 363, 369, 378 in Samuel 
Johnson, Diaries, Prayers, and Annals, ed. E. L. McAdam, 
Jr., with Donald and Mary Hyde. Vol. I of The Yale 
~dition of the Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1958). 
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Indeed, it is not faith but the second virtue--
obedience--which receives the heaviest emphasis in the 
Johnsonian scheme of religion. For Johnson, the 
performance, in obedience to divine law, of virtuous acts 
is the practical manifestation of religion. As we may 
recall, the very definition of religion in the Dictionary 
is "virtue, as founded upon reverence of God, and 
expectation of future rewards and punishments." Johnson 
asserts that tranquility can be found only by the man who 
realizes that he is "a being sent into the world only to 
secure immortal happiness by his obedience to those laws 
which he has received from his Creatour" (Sermon.§., 63). 
Rambler l designates "the perpetual renovation of the 
motives of virtue" as "the end for which all the rites of 
religion seem to be instituted" (40). In Sermon 1 1 the 
salvif ic necessity of good works is forcefully asserted: 
The Bible tells us, in plain and authoritative 
terms, that there is a way to life, and a way to 
death; that there are acts which God will 
reward, and acts that he will punish. That with 
soberness, righteousness, and godliness, God 
will be pleased; and that with intemperance, 
iniquity, and impiety, God will be offended; and 
that of those who are careful to please him, the 
reward will be such, as eye hath not seen, nor 
ear heard; and of those who, having offended 
him, die without repentance, the punishment will 
be inconceivably severe, and dreadful (Sermon 3, 
29-30). -
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clearly, this constitutes an extraordinarily simple and 
logical understanding of the Christian gospel; it reflects 
Johnson's pragmatic belief in a God who is intimately 
associated with human experience. Indeed, the belief that 
salvation is partially the reward of virtue is completely 
typical of Johnson's Sermons. 
It is here, however, that a contradiction seems to 
arise. In the previous chapter, we examined Johnson's 
firm conviction that man's nature is weak, constantly 
prone to temptations, and morally corrupt. Nevertheless, 
the eternal destiny of this weak creature is dependent 
upon his fulfillment of extremely exacting divine 
precepts. Johnson, however, avoids this contradiction by 
mitigating the demands of divine righteousness. So, 
though it is true that man's eternal happiness hinges 
chiefly on obedience, it is also true that man often fails 
to be obedient. God in his mercy requires only that man 
do his best, and he graciously accepts man's "best 
endeavours" as if they were truly meritorious. 
Given man's natural weakness, it would be quite 
unreasonable for God to do otherwise. Indeed, claims 
Johnson, reason itself tells us that if God did insist on 
perfect obedience, man's worship would be vain: 
If God were a power unmerciful and severe, a 
rigid exacter of unvaried regularity and 
unfailing virtue; if he were not to be pleased 
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but with perfection, nor to be pacified after 
transgressions and offenses; in vain would the 
best men endeavour to recommend themselves to 
his favour; in vain would the most circumspect 
watch the motions of his own heart, and the most 
diligent apply himself to the exercise of virtue 
.... God would not be to be served, because 
all service would be rejected .•. (Sermon 2, 
18). -
God in his mercy therefore requires only sincere 
obedience. As long as the attempts to obey him are 
heartfelt and earnest, he will overlook the inevitable 
shortcomings. This kind of God, writes Johnson, is not 
vainly worshipped: 
It is reasonable, that we should endeavour to 
please him, because we know that every sincere 
endeavour will be rewarded by him; that we 
should use all the means in our power, to 
enlighten our minds, and regulate our lives, 
because ..• our conduct, though not exactly 
agreeable to the divine idea of rectitude . . . 
will not be condemned by that God, who judges of 
the heart, weighs every circumstance of our 
lives, and admits every real extenuation of our 
feelings and transgressions (Sermon 2, 19).47 
The final virtue of repentance is best viewed as an 
extension of this divine leniency. Though the believer 
can be assured that God will automatically overlook his 
errors and shortcomings as long as they are unintentional, 
some provision must also be made for deliberate transgres-
sions. Repentance supplies this need. Even "those that 
47 For similar statements, se~ Sermon ~, 72; Sermon 
2, 98; Sermon ~, 304-305. 
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have polluted themselves with studied and premeditated 
wickedness" are "not for ever excluded from his favour" 
because repentance gives them the 
means by which pardon may be obtained, and by 
which they may be restored to those hopes of 
happiness, from which they have fallen by their 
own fault (Sermon l, 19). 
Without the benefit of repentance, men could only languish 
hopelessly in their sins and the "progress of life could 
only [be] the natural descent of negligent despair from 
crime to crime" (Rambler 110, 221). 
In the Dictionary, Johnson defines repentance as 
"sorrow for sin, such as produces newness of life, peni-
tence." However, his pragmatic attitude towards religion 
is again demonstrated through his emphasis of reform over 
contrition in the practice of repentance. Sorrow is a 
necessary constituent, but the sinner 
is only to expect mercy upon his reformation. 
For reformation is the chief part of repentance; 
not he that only bewails and confesses, but he 
that forsakes his sins, repents acceptably to 
God (Sermon l, 21). 
Rambler 110 stresses a similar point: 
Repentance is the relinquishment of any prac-
tice, from the conviction that it has offended 
God. Sorrow, and fear, and anxiety, are 
properly not parts, but adjuncts of repentance 
(Rambler 110, 223). 
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The mere intention of reforming is sufficient only 
when the time or opportunity for reformation is denied. 
such is the situation addressed in Sermon 20. The 
Reverend William Dodd, a popular preacher, convicted of 
forgery and sentenced to capital punishment, appealed to 
Johnson for help. Johnson assented and sought to gain a 
pardon, but without success. Johnson then wrote Sermon 
28, which was to be preached by the soon-to-be-hanged 
clergyman before the other prisoners at Newgate. The 
sermon promotes repentance with a gallows urgency: 
God will consider that life as amended, which 
would have been amended if he had spared it. 
Repentance in the sight of man, even of the 
penitent, is not known but by its fruits: but 
our Creator sees the fruit, in the blossom, or 
the seed (Sermon 28, 308). 
Repentance, if done properly, has wonderful efficacy; it 
brings forgiveness, reconciliation, and a renewed hope of 
eternal blessedness. Even a lifelong course of sin will 
not condemn a man who repents in time: 
Yet shall no man be excluded from future 
happiness . • . even by long habits of 
intemperance, or extortion. Repentance and new 
life will efface his crimes, reinstate him in 
the favour of his judge, restore him to those 
promises which he has forfeited, and open the 
paths to eternal happiness (?ermon l.f., 232). 
Indeed, a man killed in the very commission of a crime can 
be saved if he truly repents: 
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BOSWELL: When a man is the aggressor, and by 
ill-usage forces on a duel in which he is 
killed, have we not little ground to hope that 
he is gone into a state of happiness? JOHNSON: 
Sir, we are not to judge determinately of the 
state in which a man leaves this life. He may 
in a moment have repented effectually, and it is 
possible may have been accepted by GOD (Life, 
IV, 212). 
This belief necessarily implies a less comforting idea--
the failure to repent can condemn a sinner to eternal 
punishment. For repentance is not just one way of 
abolishing past sin; it is the only way. 
That Johnson himself felt strongly about the efficacy 
and necessity of repentance is especially indicated by its 
dominance as a theme throughout his prayers and 
meditations. The majority of his prayers, for instance, 
contain a plea for assistance in repenting. The birthday 
prayer of 1758 is typical: 
Almighty and most merciful Father, who yet 
sparest, and yet supportest me, who supportest 
me in my weakness, and sparest me in my sins 
. . . enable me to improve the time which is yet 
before me to thy glory and my own salvation. 
Impress upon my soul such repentance of the days 
misspent in idleness and folly, that I may 
henceforward diligently attend to the business 
of my station in this world, and to all the 
duties which thou hast commanded (65). 
The focus here is also typical--not on contrition but on 
amendment of life. Johnson's minute examination of his 
failings is not at all unusual in the Christian tradition. 
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for example, Donald J. Greene refutes the charge of "mar-
bidity" in Johnson's "Prayers and Meditations" and he 
suggests that their emphasis on self-condemnation fits 
into the Anglican tradition of the General Confession.48 
If sorrow is mentioned in his prayers, it is usually in an 
appeal that it might be productive of reformation, as in 
this prayer of 1754: 
Almighty God vouchsafe to sanctify unto me the 
reflections and resolutions of this day, let not 
my sorrow be unprofitable; let not my resolu-
tions be vain. Grant that my grief may produce 
true repentance (55). 
As this quotation also indicates, Johnson's famous 
resolutions, so often made and so often broken, cannot 
really be understood apart from his practice of repen-
tance. True contrition brings forth resolutions which, in 
turn, ought to bring forth amendment. For example, on the 
anniversary of his mother's death, Johnson writes: 
I am sorrowful, o Lord; let not my sorrow be 
without fruit. Let it be followed by holy 
resolutions and lasting amendment (66). 
Although repentance clearly has an eminent role in 
Johnson's understanding of religion, it nevertheless 
occupies a subordinate position to obedience. As Johnson 
48 Donald J. Greene, Samuel Johnson (New York: 
Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1970), 116-117. 
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told Mrs. Knowles, the terms of salvation are first of all 
obedience, and "where obedience has failed, then, as 
~uppletory to it, repentance" [emphasis mine] (Life, II, 
294). Not only is repentance subordinate to obedience, it 
is, to some degree, itself a form of obedience. First of 
all, if, as Johnson believes, repentance consists chiefly 
of reformation or amendment, then repentance could also be 
defined simply as the resumption of obedience. Of course, 
repentance has other elements but the return to obedience 
seems paramount. Second, Johnson describes repentance, 
like faith, as a duty (Sermon l 1 26)--in other words, as 
an act of religious obligation. Hence, although Johnson 
usually prefers to treat repentance and obedience as 
fairly distinct categories, there does appear to be 
considerable overlap. 
That it is possible to be saved by the practice of 
faith, obedience and repentance presupposes that certain 
provisions have been made for man's weak, sinful and 
corrupt nature. Salvation would not be possible without 
Christ's satisfaction for sin. Man's sin required a 
"propitiation," which, among other things, compensated for 
"the imperfections of our obedience and the inefficacy of 
our repentance" (Life, IV, 129). It is Christ's "merits" 
Which supply "what is deficient in our endeavours" (Sermon 
1§., 304), allowing God to accept imperfect instead of 
perfect obedience. While the Redemption renders man's 
good works acceptable to God, it is grace that gives 
sinful man the power to perform them. 
By grace in the religious sense, Johnson almost 
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always signifies divine assistance in the form of direct 
influence or inspiration; in Roman Catholic theology this 
is called "actual grace."49 Grace gives the Christian 
both the desire and the power to obey God; indeed, no good 
work is possible without divine assistance. In his Easter 
Eve prayer of 1757, Johnson prays for "that grace without 
which I can neither will nor do what is acceptable to 
thee" (63). In a prayer of 1750, Johnson wrote that "by 
Grace whatever I have thought or acted acceptable to 
Thee has been inspired and directed" (42).50 Furthermore, 
grace is especially needed for the exercise of repentance: 
But as this reformation is not to be accomp-
lished by our own natural power, unassisted by 
God, we must, when we form our first resolutions 
of a new life, apply ourselves, with fervour and 
constancy, to those means which God has pre-
scribed for obtaining his assistance (Sermon~' 
24).51 -
49 Though grace is the word Johnson commonly uses to 
refer to divine help and influence, it should be noted 
that Holy Spirit is employed in the same sense almost as 
often. 
50 For similar usage of the term grace, see Samuel 
Johnson, Diaries, Prayers, and Annals, 70, 96, 118. 
51 For Johnson's prayers for assistance in repenting, 
see Diaries, Prayers, and Annals, 46, 69, 92. 
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As this quotation suggests, divine aid does not come 
unbidden to the needy believer; it must be sought for, 
chiefly in prayer but also in the Eucharist, which imparts 
"the supernatural and extraordinary influences of grace" 
(Sermon]!, 90). "We must," adds Johnson in the passage 
from Sermon 2 noted above, "implore a blessing by frequent 
prayer, and confirm our faith by the holy sacrament" 
(Sermon£, 24). Acquiring grace, furthermore, requires 
more than ordinary effort. It requires not only "fervour 
and constancy," but in the performance, "our utmost 
natural powers" because "God only co-operates with the 
diligent and the watchful" (Sermon]!, 101). In other 
words, God gives grace not gratuitously but in response to 
human effort. 
This is not to suggest, however, that Johnson 
believes that men can be saved by good works. Not only 
does he recognize the insufficiency of human obedience, 
which God mercifully accepts instead of true 
righteousness, but he insists upon the necessity of grace 
for all worthy human actions. Though Johnson's 
gualif ication of the efficacy of good works does not 
constitute a denial of the salvific value of works, it 
clearly defines that value in negative terms. Works are 
not that .Qy which we shall be saved but that without which 
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we shall not be saved. They are necessary but not 
necessarily sufficient for salvation. Man cannot save 
himself; he must rely on divine assistance for every good 
work. Indeed, in all of Johnson's Sermons, especially in 
the conclusions, we find requests for the grace needed to 
obey and repent. Johnson's position throughout his 
sermons is that the Christian co-operates with the grace 
of God in attaining eternal happiness.52 
Johnson cannot escape the orthodox dictum that no man 
is worthy of salvation or able to earn it; yet, Johnson 
cannot accept a concept of salvation which is barren of 
good works. His ambivalence and restless efforts to 
reconcile his pragmatic moral sense with accepted 
Christian doctrine make him somewhat unique in eighteenth 
century thought. Few critics of Johnson's religion have 
paid sufficient heed to this uniqueness. 
Johnson, then, believes in a religion which elevates 
man--not to the level assigned him by the Deists, ration-
alists, or natural religionists certainly, for man remains 
52 Though Johnson would deny the Roman Catholic 
notion that divinely-inspired good works have merit, his 
conception of the relationship between obedience and grace 
bears a striking resemblance to the doctrine of jus-
tification promulgated by the catholic Church at the 
Council of Trent, in opposition to Protestant teaching. 
See, for example, Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, 
"Justification," Theological Dictionary, 247-248; and P. 
De Letter, "Justification," New Catholic Encyclopedia (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), VIII, 77-92. 
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weak and imperfect--but at least to a level where he can 
exercise some moral freedom and thus bear responsibility 
for his actions. As we have seen, man is not perceived by 
Johnson as merely the passive object of divine favor, but 
as the co-agent of his own eternal happiness. Man has the 
ability and the freedom to co-operate or not to co-operate 
with divine grace, and he will be rewarded or punished 
accordingly. So, despite man's limitations, weaknesses, 
and his need for divine leniency and assistance, he still 
retains some measure of prelapsarian freedom and dignity. 
It is clear from Johnson's Sermons that his under-
standing of religion is not one which stresses the utter 
inability of man to contribute to his own salvation or 
which stresses the totally gracious nature of God's gift 
of eternal life. Instead, he emphasizes moral endeavor as 
a remedy for the vacuity of life and as an indispensable 
requirement for the consolation of eternal happiness. 
Though Johnson apparently considers repentance and faith 
as necessary for eternal happiness, obedience is the 
paramount condition. As we have seen, his understanding 
of faith and repentance is so moralistic that there does 
not seem to be much difference between his asserting that 
eternal happiness depends on obedience or virtue. Within 
the Sermons, repentance essentially means renewed 
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obedience, and faith 1 s value for eternal happiness seems 
to derive chiefly from its being the cause of obedience. 
Consequently, the reasons for religion's great 
consolation for the vacuity of life is its pragmatism; it 
provides solutions for the problems caused by man's frail 
and self-delusive nature. It provides not just emotional 
stability (Adventurer 107, 445), but a standard of 
judgment by which to evaluate things of this world; it 
allows us 
to proceed with our eyes open, and to see our 
state; not as hope or fancy may delineate it, 
but as it has been in reality appointed by 
divine Providence (Sermon 15, 160). 
Whenever our passions become clouded by some new wish or 
some wonderful idea, when reason grows confused about the 
goodness or possibility of the wish or idea, religion 
supplies man with the proper fixed goals for the life, 
together with the motives for action and the standard for 
measuring those actions. Throughout his Sermons, Johnson 
asks the question of how man was to be consoled for the 
misery of living and he answers it by belief in salvation 
through Christ. Yet, his answer is always framed by a 
Practical, secular, and psychological understanding of 
human nature. 
Johnson's Sermons show man how to alleviate the 
vacuity of his existence in a variety of ways. One can 
182 
integrate his reason with his desires, his instincts and 
his passions; he can cultivate a mature and realistic 
self-understanding, including social relationships; and he 
can extend the benefits of his own experience to others 
according to the rule of social benevolence. It is not 
simply a matter of looking to Christ as an ideal example 
to be followed, but an assiduous and constant pursuit of 
maturity and the emotional integration of one's whole self 
that is necessary to ease the feeling of vacuity. Since 
by nature we are creatures of the future where imagination 
and desire range "in quest of future happiness" (Rambler 
~' 25), religion supplies man's reason, imagination, and 
desires with the proper fulfillment for their cravings in 
its promise of salvation.53 So, the emptiness is filled. 
For Johnson, then, religion "appears, in every state of 
life, to be the basis of happiness" (Sermon 1 1 15). 
53 see, for example, Rambler 203, 291-294; Rambler ~, 
10; Rambler 41, 221; Sermons z, 14, 15, 20, and 25. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
JOHNSON'S SERMONS AND 
ENGLISH SERMON STYLE 
I 
While the sermon appears to have lost much of its 
eminence as a literary form in modern times, it is 
important to remember that Johnson considered it a 
significant part of English literature. He makes this 
clear in a conversation concerning the posthumous sale of 
the Honorable Topham Beauclerk's library. Wilkes remarks 
on the irony that Beauclerk, a renowned rake, should have 
owned.so many volumes of sermons: 
Mr. Beauclerk's great library was this season 
sold in London by auction. Mr. Wilkes said, he 
wondered to find in it such a numerous collec-
tion of sermons; seeming to think it strange 
that a gentleman of Mr. Beauclerk's character in 
the gay world, should have chosen to have many 
compositions of that kind. JOHNSON: Why, Sir, 
you are to consider that sermons make a con-
siderable branch of English literature; so that 
a library must be very imperfect if it has not a 
numerous collection of sermons: and in all 
collections, Sir, the desire of augmenting it 
grows stronger in proportion to the advance in 
acquisition (Life, IV, 105-106). 
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Johnson applies literary criteria to the sermon genre when 
he states that a thorough study of English letters, 
including sermons, yields riches in all areas of learning. 
He boasts that the English language is fabulously rich in 
"treasures of theological knowledge," surpassing all other 
vulgar tongues not only quantitatively but qualitatively 
as well. Moreover, Johnson observes that the English are 
blessed with a multitude of divines who are "learned, 
elegant and pious" (Idler 91, 283-284). 
Johnson's various remarks on the English sermon 
reveal his sensitivity to both the homiletic and the 
literary traditions of the genre. 1 For example, Hugh 
1 w. Fraser Mitchell, English Pulpit Oratory from 
Andrewes to Tillotson (New York, 1962), traces the 
development of the English sermon from a homiletic or 
didactic form to a literary form (133-343). Like Johnson, 
Mitchell suggests that the didactic and literary 
dimensions of the sermon were not mutually exclusive 
considerations for the sermon writer in the eighteenth 
century. He describes the sermon's evolution: 
from a period when its form and content 
were governed by certain rhetorical and 
homiletic ideals to a period when it be-
comes almost a province of literature, in 
so far as conformity to the prevailing lit-
erary standards was required also from the 
preacher. Its subject-matter underwent an 
equally important transformation, and the 
attempts early in the eighteenth-century by 
Steele and Addison to draw men off from 
strife and faction in politics, by insist-
ing on a wide range of common interests, 
found a counterpart in the choice of non-
controversial subjects, often of a strongly 
ethical character, noticeable in the work 
of dissenters and churchmen alike (136). 
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Blair is the sermonist whom Johnson most frequently 
praises for his fidelity to the didactic or homiletic end 
of the sermon genre, as well as for the artistic 
excellencies of his sermons. His spontaneous remarks on 
Blair can be seen as a reflection of those principles 
which he considers important for a good sermon; as such, 
they can be broadly understood as Johnson's "standards" 
for the genre.2 Moreover, an examination of the 
vocabulary which Johnson uses to describe Blair's 
excellencies suggests Johnson's sensitivity to the oral, 
written, homiletic and literary dimensions of the sermon 
tradition. 
on the publication of Blair's first sermon, Johnson 
writes to his printer, William Strahan, "I have read over 
Dr. Blair's first Sermon, with more than approbation, to 
say it is good is to say too little" (Letter 505.1). Two 
2 When Boswell requests a list from Johnson of "the 
best English sermons for style" (Life, III, 247-248), the 
order of the sermonists is imposed by Boswell's sugges-
tions and only towards the end of the list does Johnson 
make his own nominations. Approving or disapproving of a 
writer suggested by someone else is quite different from 
spontaneously selecting a sermonist for praise or blame. 
It is unfortunate that the catalogue requested by Boswell, 
from the sheer statistical weight of the many names it 
includes, is sometimes given such emphasis as an indica-
tion of Johnson's taste in sermons. See, James Gray, 
Johnson's Sermons: ~ Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1972), Chapter Two. Actually, it is a misleading piece of 
evidence when considered alone. Hugh Blair is a figure 
who does not appear in the catalogue at all. 
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months later he brings up the sermon in a letter to 
Boswell, when he describes it as "excellently written both 
as to doctrine and language" (Letter 507). In May, he 
again compliments Boswell on his countryman's skill, 
"Please to return Dr. Blair. Thanks for his sermons. The 
scotch write English wonderfully well" (Letter 515). By 
November, Blair seems to have made a reputation for 
himself, for Johnson writes to Boswell that "Dr. Blair's 
sermons are now universally commended, but let him think 
that I had the honour of first finding and first praising 
his excellencies" (Letter 565). Johnson admired Blair's 
measured sentences and his meticulously selected phrases 
as models of sermon style. In 1778, for example, Johnson 
offers glowing praise for Blair's ability to write sermons 
directed, not to the emotions, but to man's reason. 
Johnson says that Blair's "doctrine is the best limited, 
the best expressed: there is the most warmth without 
fanaticism, the most rational transport. I wish Blair 
would come over to the Church of England" (Life, III, 
339). 
Johnson has found in Blair a sermonist whom he can 
praise for both literary and homiletic skills. Not only 
does he appeal to Johnson's sense of propriety by fitting 
his subject matter to his audience, but he does so in a 
disciplined and restrained way--his warmth is without 
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fanaticism, and his transport is rational. Johnson is not 
toying with oxymorons; he is merely pointing to the 
careful control which he feels Blair shares with literary 
masters. Moreover, Johnson's conunents reflect some of the 
principles which he considers important for the genre. 
One of the first requirements of a good sermon is 
sensitivity to the audience, that is, the fitness of the 
subject matter developed within the sermon to the 
pragmatic moral and religious needs of the congregation to 
whom it is addressed. Blair has the skill to "limit" his 
doctrine or to select subjects that are appropriate for 
the flock he is addressing. In another conversation, 
Johnson expresses his dissatisfaction with Zachariah Mudge 
for attempting more than what his hearers could comprehend 
and hence for accomplishing nothing. Moreover, after 
expressing his dissatisfaction with Mudge, he praises 
Blair again, as if reminded of his success by Mudge's 
failure: 
Mudge's Sermons are good, but not practical. He 
grasps more sense than he can hold; he takes 
more corn than he can make into meal; he opens a 
wide prospect, but it is so distant, it is 
indistinct. I love Blair's Sermons. Though the 
dog is a Scotchman, and a Presbyterian, and 
everything he should not be, I was the first to 
praise them. Such was my candour! (Life, IV, 
98) • 
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Johnson's metaphors here are vivid and exact. Gathering 
more corn than can be made into meal conjures up a 
wondrously lively picture of superfluity and excess--
characteristics which Johnson consistently opposed. 
Nowhere is Johnson more the hardheaded and practical 
realist than in the criticism of his own church. To 
succeed a sermon must reach its audience--a much less 
sophisticated audience than the relatively intellectual 
elite who might read a volume of printed sermons. 
Although he does not lower his high literary standards 
when judging a sermon, he is concerned with how the 
sermon, as a dramatic and public form of rhetoric, can 
make religion personal and immediate to the congregation. 
Indeed, Johnson's own Sermons often reflect an uneasy 
balance between his strict sense of literary propriety and 
the pragmatic objectives of the genre. 
The chief purpose of a sermon, after all, is to 
persuade those who hear it to commit themselves to a 
change of life. A sermon must not simply effect a bland 
act of intellectual assent; rather, it must engage man's 
mind, heart, and will with the practical concerns of 
personal reformation. This makes the genre different from 
ordinary essays, even theological ones. There is a 
dialectical tension between the pulpit and the pew with 
the preacher striving for nothing less than the conversion 
189 
and salvation of his auditors. Thus, Johnson manifests an 
ambivalence about the preaching of the Evangelicals and 
Methodists. He admires the fervor and zeal of their 
preaching; yet, he remains suspicious of an unchecked and 
undisciplined appeal to the emotions--of a style that is 
primarily hortatory with little literary grace or 
theological substance. He specifically cautions against 
the abuse of oratorical techniques: 
Whether action may not be yet of use in 
churches, where the preacher addresses a mingled 
audience, may deserve inquiry. It is certain 
that the senses are more powerful as the reason 
is weaker; and that he whose ears convey little 
to his mind, may sometimes listen with his eyes 
till truth may gradually take possession of his 
heart. If there be any use of gesticulation, it 
must be applied to the ignorant and the rude, 
who will be more affected by vehemence than 
delighted by propriety. In the pulpit little 
action can be proper, for action can illustrate 
nothing but that to which it may be referred by 
nature or by custom. He that imitates by his 
hand a motion which he describes, explains it by 
natural similitude; he that lays his hand on his 
breast when he expresses pity, enforces his 
words by a customary allusion. But theology has 
few topicks to which action can be appropriated; 
that action which is vague and indeterminate 
will at last settle into habit, and habitual 
peculiarities are quickly ridiculous (Idler 90, 
280-201). ~ 
Johnson had a strong distaste for anything that smacked of 
the demagogic; he consistently praises and admires 
moderation and restraint. Describing the Reverend 
Zachariah Mudge's style of delivery, Johnson commended him 
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for being "forcible •.. [but) not turbulent; disdaining 
anxious nicety of emphasis, and laboured artifices of 
action." Moreover, Mudge's style showed "natural 
dignity''; it did not direct attention to the speaker at 
the cost of the content (Life, IV, 77). 
Johnson seems to be counseling an avoidance of the 
artificial or contrived in sermon delivery and insisting 
instead on a degree of naturalness. Johnson approved of 
those techniques which allowed the preacher to naturally 
and easily stress a point with a gesture or a change of 
tone or volume or pace. However, when the preacher calls 
such attention to himself that his auditors are diverted 
from what he is saying to the way in which he is saying 
it, then clearly, the bounds of propriety have been 
surpassed. 
Johnson's loyalty to the established church does not 
prevent him from criticizing the Anglican clergy for their 
failure to touch "the common people": 
He observed that the established clergy in 
general did not preach plain enough; and that 
polished periods and glittering sentences flew 
over the heads of the common people, without any 
impression upon their hearts. Something might 
be necessary, he observed, to excite the 
affections of the common people, who were sunk 
in languor and lethargy, and therefore he 
supposed that the new concomitants of methodism 
might probably produce so desirable an effect. 
The mind, like the body, he observed, delighted 
in change and novelty, and even in religion 
itself, courted new appearances and 
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modifications. Whatever might be thought of 
some methodist teachers, he said, he could 
scarcely doubt the sincerity of that man, who 
travelled nine hundred miles in a month, and 
preached twelve times a week; for no adequate 
reward, merely temporal, could be given for such 
indefatigable labour [emphasis mine) (Life, II, 
123). --
Johnson was enormously impressed by the sincerity of the 
Methodist preachers. He attributed the success of these 
preachers to their expressing themselves "in a plain and 
familiar manner, which is the only way to do good to the 
common people" (Life, I, 459). The learned and brilliant 
clergymen of the established church should, in Johnson's 
view, follow suit: 
To insist against drunkenness as a crime, 
because it debases Reason, the noblest faculty 
of man, would be of no service to the common 
people: but to tell them that they may die in a 
fit of drunkenness, and show them how dreadful 
that would be, cannot fail to make a deep 
impression (Life, I, 459-460). 
Johnson frankly admitted that practical moral principles 
were "better taught in English sermons than in any other 
books ancient or modern" (Idler 91, 283). Indeed, 
Johnson's own practice as a sermon writer reflects his 
sensitivity to the didactic objective of the genre. When 
we examine his Sermons, we discover that the elegant and 
restrained Rambler style predominates; only occasionally 
does he express himself in the "plain and familiar manner" 
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of the Methodists. It must be remembered, however, that 
Johnson's Sermons were not intended for an uneducated 
congregation of lower class parishioners; rather, most of 
his Sermons were written for John Taylor's congregation of 
middle class merchants, landowners, shopkeepers and 
bankers. 
Johnson's Sermons are couched in terms designed to 
appeal to common sense; they generally avoid making 
emotional appeals of a purely hortatory kind. Johnson was 
aware of the dramatic situation of the sermon and he 
recognized the skilled use made of emotional appeal by the 
Evangelicals; however, he remained suspicious of such 
appeals perhaps because of his own fears regarding the 
insatiable nature of man's desires and the tyranny of his 
imagination. Johnson feared the loss of rational control 
over the imagination and the will; an excess of emotion 
was simply in violation of the dictates of common sense 
and decorum which called for moderation, balance and 
discipline. 
Johnson noted several principles of propriety for a 
sermon writer to observe as he strove to direct his 
hearers towards religious commitment and proper moral 
activity--the fitness of the subject matter to the 
audience, the disciplined and restrained use of emotional 
appeal, gesture and intonation. Indeed, Johnson was 
193 
poignantly aware of the didactic nature of the sermon 
genre. Unlike an essay which seeks primarily intellectual 
persuasion and affirmation, he recognized that the sermon 
sought to change some practical behavior patterns in human 
nature. 
Johnson also subjects the sermon to the same 
standards of diction, structure, and decorum that he uses 
in evaluating drama and poetry.3 We have already 
discussed the homiletic elements which Johnson singles out 
3 The close connection between the development of 
English prose style in general from the seventeenth to the 
eighteenth centuries and sermon composition in particular 
has been astutely noted by Mitchell: 
That in the end preaching and prose could 
be judged by the same standards is itself 
evidence of the closeness of their connec-
tion, for taste in so large measure depends 
on what is most widely disseminated, that 
but for the reformation and simplification 
of the pulpit-address it is almost certain 
there would have been no simplification of 
English prose; or, at least, such simplifi-
cation as might have resulted from the 
influence of the Court, and the growth of 
scientific enquiry, would never have been 
universally accepted and applauded as that 
which the example and influence of the 
preachers brought about. If Elegance of 
Style, according to Hughes' quaint simile, 
is 'like a coy Mistress,' in England, it 
may be said, she was first wooed by the 
divines and given a place in the Temple, 
where men at rare intervals learned to 
revere her, and heard from her lips the 
musical and luminous utterance towards 
which in their best literary efforts they 
laboured ever afterwards to approach 
(Mitchell, 396). 
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for praise in Blair. Let us now attempt to uncover some 
of those elements in the style of Blair's Sermons for 
which Johnson admires him. 
Blair's ~ermon l, which Johnson praises on three 
occasions, discusses the unity of piety and morality; it 
is a relationship essential to Johnson's own concept of 
Christian ethics. Blair treats the complementary nature 
of prayer and good works--a pragmatic religious principle 
which Johnson firmly espouses.4 The topic sentence of 
sermon l illustrates some elements in his style for which 
Johnson praises him: 
It is to the conjunction of prayer and alms, 
that I purpose now to direct your thoughts, as 
describing the respectable and amiable character 
of a man, as forming the honour and the blessed-
ness of a true Christian; piety joined with 
charity, faith with good works, devotion with 
morality (Sermon l, 3).5 
Blair's use of parallelism is clear--it is extended, 
4 As early as 1766, Johnson expresses his commitment 
to an active social religion rather than passive and self-
centered devotion: "It is our first duty to serve 
society; and, after we have done that, we may attend 
wholly to the salvation of our own souls. A youthful 
passion for abstract devotion should not be encouraged" 
(1,lli, II, 10). 
5 Hugh Blair, Sermons (London: n.p., 1790). 
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complex, and varied just enough to prevent monotony.6 
There is a valid distinction between "respectable" and 
"amiable," between "honour" and "blessedness." The pairs 
are not merely synonyms marshalled together to swell the 
sentence. 
Blair's diction relies on a vocabulary of general 
terms. For example, Blair writes his Sermon 1 with 
universal applicability: 
Cast your eyes over the whole earth. Explore 
the most remote quarters of the east or the 
west. You may discover tribes of men without 
policy, or laws, or cities, or any of the arts 
of life: But no where will you find them 
without some form of religion (Sermon 1, 5). 
The apparent redundancy in the example cited above is 
actually a stylistic echo of the philosophical outlook 
being presented: man is everywhere the same, so 
descriptions of human nature throughout the world ought 
not to vary. 
6 A schematic representation of the parallelism in 
this sentence shows that there is one pair of parallel 
phrases with four points of parallelism, and a triplet of 
parallel phrases with two points of parallelism. The 
deviations from perfect parallelism are in parentheses: 
as describing/the respectable/and amiable (character)/ 
of a man 
as forming/the honour/ and (the blessedness)/ 
of a (true) Christian 
piety (joined)/with charity 
faith /with (good) works 
devotion /with morality 
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Besides using a style which Johnson finds agreeable, 
Blair adapts the traditional formal structure of the 
sermon. Blair's sermon is organized around a point-by-
point outline introduced early in the sermon and followed 
with varying degrees of diligence and strictness. Blair's 
outline, however, is so graceful that it actually enhances 
the sermon while serving as an organizing device: 
I shall first endeavour to show you, that alms 
without prayers, or prayers without alms, 
morality without devotion, or devotion without 
morality, are extremely defective; and then 
shall point out the happy effects of their 
mutual union (Sermon l, 3). 
The ease with which Blair dignifies the outline's 
utilitarian purpose with his meticulously selected phrases 
would have appealed to Johnson as a model of graceful 
sermon prose. 
For Johnson, then, the great appeal of Hugh Blair is 
his ability to integrate both the homiletic and literary 
dimensions of the sermon; such integration makes his 
Sermons successful instruments of moral persuasion as well 
as works distinguished by their artistic merit. Indeed, 
the Johnsonian "standards" for an effective sermon which 
we have isolated and examined--the fitness of the subject 
matter to the audience; disciplined and restrained use of 
emotional appeal, gesture and intonation; the stylistic 
characteristic of parallelism; the controlled use of 
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repetition and figurative devices; sensitivity to a choice 
of diction which stresses universal concepts over 
particular ones; and attentiveness to formal structuring 
techniques within the sermon tradition--reveal his 
sensitivity to the sermon as "a considerable branch of 
English literature" (Life, IV, 105). However, it must not 
be asswned that those elements which Johnson singled out 
for praise in Blair are to be automatically found in his 
own Sermons. Though Johnson's Sermons bear the mark of 
his own distinctive style, they were strongly influenced 
by the English homiletic tradition from the middle of the 
sixteenth until the middle of the eighteenth century.7 
Indeed, further examination of Johnson's Sermons will 
reveal some important deviations from those characteris-
tics which he found so praiseworthy in Blair's works. All 
these variations suggest Johnson's efforts to test the 
truth of religious revelation against the reality of hwnan 
experience and to blend gracefully the homiletic and the 
literary dimensions of the sermon genre within his own 
Sermons.8 
7 James Gray, Johnson's Sermons, 48. James Gray 
locates and examines Johnson's Sermons within the English 
homiletic tradition. See, for example, chapters 2 and 3 
for a comprehensive comparison of the themes found in 
Johnson's Sermons with the English pulpit tradition. 
8 In Johnson's Sermons, James Gray notes that both 
the literary and the homiletic dimensions of the sermon 
tradition are reflected in stylistic differences--in 
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It is important to examine the homiletic and literary 
characteristics of the English sermon as Johnson 
understood them in order to appreciate the significance of 
his specific deviations from the tradition. Indeed, in 
~ Achievement of Samuel Johnson, Walter Jackson Bate 
astutely notes: 
The self-protective, insomnia-like need to 
anticipate and be awake to every qualification 
is able, in his other thinking, to unite with 
the equally powerful need to extract stable 
meaning, and to "surmount" the clutter of 
conflicting reactions. But the absolute 
criteria of religion represented another sort of 
finality, different from that he was accustomed 
to struggle up to empirically, and one in which 
so much had to be taken, as it were, on trust. 
There is no reason to think that Johnson's 
general habit of "incredulity," which once led 
Boswell to say that he came "near Hume's 
argument against miracles," could be wholly 
anesthetized, or put as it were in cold storage, 
the minute he approached religion (168-169). 
separate "voices"--within Johnson's Sermons. Gray's 
critical terminology, in "The Form and Style of the 
Sermons" (chapter 4), is one of dichotomy; he speaks of 
the "Rambler voice" and the "Preacher voice" (192) in the 
Sermons. Gray observes that Johnson's sermon style 
"occasionally takes on a regularity close in manner to 
that of the Psalms and Proverbs of the Old Testament;" at 
other times, it is "intellectual and poetic"--more 
reflective of the Rambler and Rasselas style (207-208). 
However, Gray notes that there is no tension between these 
"two voices"; nonetheless, he is conscientious enough to 
observe that perhaps there ought to be. He points out 
that Johnson had always been uneasy at the thought of a 
combination of religion and rhetoric, reminding us that 
(to use Johnson's own words) "the good and evil of 
eternity are too ponderous for the wings of wit'' (230). 
199 
specifically, the Sermons reflect a struggle between the 
validity and sufficiency of two authorities: (1) the 
ability of revealed Christian religion to address the 
limitations of man's weak nature--prone to the delusions 
of the imagination, to the insatiable desires of the will, 
and to temptations of every kind; (2) the reliability of 
human experience to address these same limitations. This 
tension between Johnson's fundamental and pragmatic 
adherence to the validity of human experience and his 
belief in Scriptural revelation propels much of the 
argument in each of his Sermons; it also reflects his 
primary deviation from a tradition which tended to accept 
revelation without critical examination.9 
When Boswell requests a list of "the best English 
sermons for style," Johnson judges two authors, Tillotson 
and South, solely on the merits of their style. Regarding 
Jeremiah Seed, however, he discusses both style and 
content: "Seed has a very fine style; but he is not very 
theological." He reverts to pure literary criticism in 
his commentary on John Jortin, whom he describes as "very 
9 William R. Siebenschuh makes explicit the tension 
between human experience and Biblical revelation in 
Johnson's Sermons, a tension tentatively suggested by 
James Gray in Johnson's Sermons (see especially, Chapter 
Four). Siebenschuh argues that this tension indicates the 
strength of Johnson's religious faith. See, "On the Locus 
of Faith in Johnson's Sermons." Studies in Burke and His 
!._ime, Vol. 17 (Spring, 1976), No. 2, 103-117. ~- ---
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elegant," and on William Sherlock, who is "very elegant, 
though he has not made it his principal study." However, 
in the case of Samuel Clarke, Johnson's disapproval of his 
theology prevents him from wholehearted literary 
endorsement: "I should recommend Dr. Clarke's sermons, 
were he orthodox." Even though Boswell phrases his 
question in specific literary terms, Johnson feels the 
necessity of including commentary on doctrine as well 
(Life, III, 247-248). 
Although Johnson comments on both style and content, 
it must not be concluded that he confuses the two or 
allows his sympathy for an author's views to influence his 
evaluation of the literary quality of the work. w. Fraser 
Mitchell's description of post-Restoration critics who 
recognized the integral relationship between English prose 
style in general and effective sermon style in particular 
fits Samuel Johnson's critical awareness perfectly: 
The earlier critics had been content to attack 
their theological rivals and to denounce their 
style as out of keeping with what they believed 
to be the sacred aim of pulpit-oratory. But the 
later critics of the post-Restoration period 
were concerned not only with the abuses which 
had taken possession of the sermon, but desired 
a reform of pulpit style as a step towards the 
simplification of style in general. Perverted 
and ill-applied rhetoric came to be condemned, 
not because particular preachers or their 
parties did not approve of its use, but as being 
inherently unsuitable to the sermon and offen-
sive to cultivated taste. In this way the two 
strains of criticism--what may be described as 
201 
hermeneutic criticism and literary criticism--
combined, and the dramatists, the poets, and the 
essayists found an ally in the preacher, who had 
come to desire, quite as much as they, an 
elegance and unaffected ease of manner. The 
pulpit, consequently, which for long had been 
the last refuge of antiquated modes of rhetor-
ical expression, and a prime corrupter of style, 
not only assented to a reform too frequently 
attributed solely to the Court acting under the 
French influence and the growing exigencies of 
natural science, but was itself a pioneer in the 
movement for a simplification of style (emphasis 
mine] (Mitchell, 401-402). 
In his Pref ace to the English Dictionary, Johnson reveals 
his sensitivity to the union of hermeneutic and literary 
criticism--to the integral connection between general 
developments in English prose style and homiletic 
practice. For example, Richard Hooker, sermonist and 
stylist, is mentioned with approval in the same breath as 
the Bible, Bacon, Raleigh, Spenser, Sidney, and 
Shakespeare: 
But as every language has a time of rudeness 
antecedent to perfection, as well as of false 
refinement and declension, I have been cautious 
lest my zeal for antiquity might drive me into 
times too remote, and crowd my book with words 
now no longer understood. I have fixed Sidney's 
work for the boundary beyond which I make few 
excursions. From the authors which rose in the 
time of Elizabeth, a speech might be formed ade-
quate to all the purposes of use and elegance. 
If the language of theology were extracted from 
Hooker and the translation of the Bible; the 
terms of natural knowledge from Bacon; the 
phrases of policy, war, and navigation from 
Raleigh; the dialect of poetry and fiction from 
Spenser and Sidney; and the diction of common 
life from Shakespeare, few ideas would be lost 
to mankind for want of English words in which 
they might be expressed.lo 
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Johnson's analyses of particular sermonists must be taken 
at face value--explicit approval of style cannot be 
construed to include approval of content, nor can a 
negative opinion of style be extended to include a 
condemnation of the author's views. 
In his observations on the English sermon genre, 
Johnson almost completely ignores all pre-Restoration 
preachers. As far as we know, the prominent Renaissance 
preachers, such as John Donne and Lancelot Andrewes, had 
no impact on him because he makes no mention of their 
sermons. Moreover, Johnson's attitude toward metaphysical 
wit, such as Donne and Andrewes employed in their sermons 
and devotional writings, was such that he would have been 
unlikely to imitate it. Although he nowhere directly 
attacks the wit found in many pre-Restoration sermons, 
neither does he praise the metaphysical word-play, 
convoluted arguments or speculations about theological 
paradoxes of its practitioners.11 
10 Samuel Johnson, "Preface to the English 
Dictionary." In The Oxford Authors: Samuel Johnson, ed. 
Donald Greene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
319-320. 
11 w. Fraser Mitchell's analysis of the English 
sermon tradition offers some possible insight into 
Johnson's almost complete disregard of the sermon writers 
before the Restoration. Mitchell presents the earlier 
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A crucial exception to Johnson's disregard of sermon 
writers before the Restoration period is Jeremy Taylor.12 
If we take Taylor as a representative of seventeenth 
century style, a comparison of his style with Johnson's 
makes it clear why Johnson did not value pre-Restoration 
sermon writers. Excerpts from Taylor's sermons show that 
seventeenth-century preachers as the beginning steps in 
the evolutionary process of which the Restoration 
preachers, with their plain style, were the final result: 
Eloquence, it is obvious, was valued, but it was 
to be eloquence expressive of reason and which 
had shed pedantry and the ingenious quibbling of 
the 'metaphysical' preachers (336). 
Furthermore, in the Life of Cowley, Johnson expresses his 
well-known disdain for the heavy imagery and fine distinc-
tions of the metaphysical poets. He would have found such 
embellishments even more inappropriate for the sermon 
because they distract from the didactic purpose of that 
genre. Moreover, unlike the "metaphysical" sermonists, 
there is no dwelling on the physical symbol as an embodi-
ment of spiritual truth--almost no theological sacramen-
talism--in Johnson's Sermons. Indeed, the use of imagery 
with "its parts yoked violently together" is as foreign to 
Johnson's sermon style as to any stylistic expression that 
he employed or admired. 
12 Mitchell calls Taylor one of the two seventeenth-
century masters of elegant English prose (242). We know 
that Johnson is familiar with Taylor's work because he 
quotes him on the folly of lashing up unnecessary fear 
within one's soul (Rambler 29, 162) and cites Taylor in 
the Dictionary under charitY-and love. That Johnson knows 
Taylor's Sermons is evident from his statement that, in 
his Sermons, Taylor "gives very good advice: never lie in 
your prayers; never confess more than you really believe; 
never promise more than you mean to perform" (Life, IV, 
294-295). Furthermore, the works of Jeremy Taylor are 
listed as entries 213, 351, and 477 in Christie's sale 
catalogue for Johnson's personal library. [Mr. Christie. 
~ Catalogue of the Valuable Library of Books, of the late 
learned Samuel Johnson (London: n.p., 1785)). 
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he could not be farther removed from Johnson in terms of 
style. Perhaps the most prominent element of Taylor's 
style is a love of imagery so rich that it borders on the 
baroque. A fair example of Taylor's taste for rich 
figurative language is this simile based on God's 
displeasure with insincere prayer: 
cold prayers are not put into the account in 
order to effect an acceptation, but are laid 
aside like the buds of roses which a cold wind 
hath nipped into death and the discoloured tawny 
face of an Indian slave.13 
The combination of blasted roses and a tawny face is 
almost surrealistic in its incongruity. In another 
sermon, after a meditation on the external manifestations 
of sin, Taylor draws this memorable picture: 
We have already opened this dunghill covered 
with snow, which was indeed on the outside white 
as the snow of leprosy, but it was no better; 
and if the very colours and instruments of 
deception, if the fucus and ceruse be so spotted 
and sullied, what in the corrupted liver, and in 
the sinks of the body of sin? (Sermon 20, 247). 
Taylor has succeeded in portraying with vivid detail the 
repulsiveness of sin. 
At the risk of oversimplification, we may say that 
Taylor's style is essentially synthetic; he rejoices in a 
13 Jeremy Taylor, Whole Works, ed. Charles Page Eden 
(London: n.p., 1850), IV, 65-66. 
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profusion of images without questioning the relationship 
between parts. The stylistic implications of a synthetic 
approach are apparent in Taylor's description of the final 
judgment: 
God is pleased to compare Himself to a lion; and 
though in this life He hath confined Himself 
with promises and gracious emanations of an 
infinite goodness, and limits Himself by con-
ditions and covenants, and suffers Himself to be 
overcome by prayers, and Himself hath invented 
ways of atonement and expiation; yet when He is 
provoked by our unhandsome and unworthy actions, 
He makes sudden breaches, and tears some of us 
in pieces; and of others He breaks their bones 
or affrights their hopes and secular gaieties, 
and fills their house with mourning and cypress 
and groans and death: but when this Lion of the 
tribe of Judah shall appear upon His own moun-
tain, the mountain of the Lord, iQHis natural 
dress of majesty, and that justice shall strike, 
and mercy shall not hold her hands; she shall 
strike sore strokes, and pity shall not break 
the blow; and God shall account with us by 
minutes, and for words, and for thoughts: and 
then He shall be severe to mark what is done 
amiss; and that justice may reign entirely, God 
shall open the wicked man's treasure, and tell 
the sums and weigh grains and scruples (Sermon 
l, 23). 
Taylor's metaphor of the leonine character of the Almighty 
is powerfully vivid and dramatic. However, Taylor fails 
to apply the scene he describes to the concrete experience 
of his congregation--what specific acts of his flock will 
warrant such severity from the Almighty? 
Johnson's extreme caution when using and analyzing 
imagery is in direct opposition to Taylor's exuberant 
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employment of a multitude of images which may be only 
tenuously related to each other. For Taylor, the 
multiplication of images adds the type of complexity and 
richness he prefers in his sermons.14 For Johnson, always 
aiming at accuracy in the expression of complex relation-
ships, lavish imagery can confuse things. Ornate or 
excessive imagery can call attention to itself as a 
figurative device and distract from the subject matter; 
moreover, it can blur distinctions while it stresses 
similarities. 
Johnson is extremely cautious in the use of 
figurative language, avoiding the practice of piling 
images on top of one another. When he does resort to 
metaphor, he is at great pains to explain even the 
simplest image, fearful that it might be misunderstood. 
For instance, when he expounds on the Scriptural 
quotation, "As you sow, so shall you reap," he observes 
that 
To sow and to reap are figurative terms. To 
sow, signifies to act; and to reap, is to 
receive the product of our actions. As no man 
can sow one sort of grain, and reap another, in 
the ordinary process of nature; as no man 
gathers grapes of thorns or figs of thistles, or 
when he scatters tares in the furrows, gathers 
14 Mitchell points out that Taylor's sermons also 
include a fine plain style (253), but this fact does not 
change the overall impression of confused but lavish 
imagery. 
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wheat into his garners; so, in the final dispen-
sations of providence, the same correspondence 
shall be found in the moral system (Sermon 10, 
115). ~ 
Johnson is pragmatic in his approach to life and his 
sermon style reflects that ruling principle. In his view, 
a sermon should be a practical discourse having an 
immediate and important application to the purposes of 
life (Life, I, 459). There are only subtle differences 
between Johnson's moral essays and his Sermons. Johnson's 
moral essays are more discursive, while his Sermons are 
more didactic. The essays, though often introduced with 
quotations, are not rigidly bound to them as are the 
Sermons. James Gray observes that "the paradox, the 
neatly turned conceit, the convoluted symbol, the far-
fetched analogy" are all "conspicuously absent" from 
Johnson's sermon style (Johnson's Sermons, 49). In a 
critical assessment even more severe than Gray's, Jean 
Hagstrum characterizes Johnson's Sermons as "colorless" 
because 11 his religion gave him no symbol, no ritual, no 
mythological machinery, no epic or tragic personages, no 
pageantry. 11 15 Johnson's Sermons, however, are not 
completely colorless. Such imagery that is found in the 
Sermons is often overlooked because it lacks detail. When 
Johnson seeks to illustrate an abstraction, he is careful 
15 Samuel Johnson's Literary Criticism, 66-68. 
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to use images that are exceptionally clear and appropri-
ate. For example, describing the universal indifference 
to the inevitability of death in Sermon ..!_Q_, he marvels: 
Nor is it true only of men, who are engaged in 
enterprise of hazard, which restrain the 
faculties to the utmost, and keep attention 
always upon the stretch. Religion is not only 
neglected by the projector and adventurer, by 
men, who suspend their happiness on the slender 
thread of artifice, or ?tand totterinsJupon the 
point of chance .... There is no interest so 
small, nor engagement so slight, but that if it 
be followed and expanded, it may be sufficient 
to keep religion out of the thoughts .... But 
let them not be deceived, they cannot suppose 
that God will accept him, who never wished to be 
accepted by him, or made his will the rule of 
action [emphasis mine] (Sermon ..!_Q_, 110-111). 
The abstract terms of artifice and chance are encased in 
two separate and parallel metaphors no less effective for 
the absence of specific visual detail. Yet, as Hagstrum 
and Gray suggest, Johnson's imagery has a tendency to sink 
into the background of his Sermons; indeed, it is 
overshadowed by the more obvious and dominant elements of 
his Sermon style--the carefully graduated sentence, 
parallelism, antithesis, and subordination achieved mainly 
through the use of noun clauses. 
Johnson's sentences exhibit a strong sense of 
artistic control; they tend to be long, logical and 
rhythmic. For example, the following passage from 
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Johnson's Sermons approaches the length of Taylor's 
sentence constructions: 
That society is necessary to the happiness of 
human nature, that the gloom of solitude, and 
the stillness of retirement, however they may 
flatter at a distance, with pleasing views of 
independence and serenity, neither extinguish 
the passions, nor enlighten the understanding, 
that discontent will intrude upon privacy, and 
temptations follow us to the desert, every one 
may be easily convinced, either by his own 
experience, or that of others (Sermon l, 3). 
If a major phrase is deleted from Johnson's sentence, the 
parallelism, antithesis, and rhythm are upset to such an 
extent that the omission is felt immediately. However, in 
the sample sentence from Taylor's Sermon .f., entire "sub-
sentences" can be removed without raising the reader's 
attention because there is no controlled rhythm to 
disturb. Johnson always seeks out logical, causal, or 
antithetical relationships through syntax. Such stylistic 
techniques help to mirror his view of the complex nature 
of man. Taylor, on the other hand, uses fifteen "and" 
clause connectives for the mere combination of ideas; he 
uses only three connectives ("yet," "but," "then") to 
impose a more sophisticated relationship on the sentence 
parts. Nevertheless, Taylor's method of composition still 
demonstrates a regularity, a grace, a sonorousness which 
is close in manner to the rhythm of the Psalms: 
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Things are so ordered by the great Lord of all 
the creatures, that whatsoever we do or suffer 
shall be called to account, and this account 
shall be exact, and the sentence shall be just, 
and the reward shall be great; all the evils of 
the world shall be amended, and the injustices 
shall be repaid, and the divine providence shall 
be vindicated, and virtue and vice shall forever 
be rewarded by their separate dwellings and 
rewards (Sermon 1, 9). 
Johnson's omission of Taylor from his catalogue of 
English sermon stylists, then, can possibly be traced to 
certain elements in Taylor's style--elaborate and complex 
imagery, and simple, casual syntax--which are directly 
contrary to Johnson's precise imagery and his controlled 
and complex syntax. 
With the major exception of Taylor and a few other 
seventeenth century divines,16 Johnson's observations on 
16 Another pre-Restoration preacher with whom Johnson 
reveals familiarity is Richard Baxter, a Puritan; however, 
he mentions Baxter's Sermons only once. In addition to 
this singular reference to Baxter's Sermons, Johnson 
refers to Baxter's spiritual autobiography, Religuiae 
Baxterianae, on two consecutive days in his journal. [See 
Diaries (March 29 and 30, 1766), 106-108]. Moreover, 
Christie's sale catalogue for Johnson's personal library 
lists Baxter's works as entries 113, 360, 510, 527, and 
597. Johnson's mention of Baxter's Sermons occurs in this 
exchange with Sir Joshua Reynolds: 
Sir Joshua once observed to him, that he had 
talked above the capacity of some people with 
whom they had been in company together. "No 
matter, Sir," (said Johnson); "they consider it 
as a compliment to be talked to, as if they were 
wiser than they are. So true is this, Sir, that 
Baxter made it a rule in every sermon that he 
preached, to say something that was above the 
capacity of his audience" (Life, IV, 185). 
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the sermon begin with the Restoration preachers. Robert 
south, Johnson says in his attempt to list the great 
sermon stylists for Boswell, is "one of the best, if you 
except peculiarities, and his violence, and sometimes 
coarseness of language" (Life, III, 248). Explaining that 
the church leader need not "speak and exhort" in his own 
person, South says "it is not the gift of every Person, 
nor of every Age; to harangue the multitude, to Voice it 
high and loud."17 "To Voice it high and loud" is, at the 
very least, an inelegant description of a method of 
preaching. South calls men's consciences "Hell and 
Damnation-proof" (15). Johnson would probably have 
This rule is highly uncharacteristic of Baxter, whose 
plain style resulted from his desire to be comprehensible 
to all members of his audience: 
That his plainness is directly attributable to 
Baxter's desire to make his meaning clear to the 
most ignorant of his auditory is beyond doubt, 
and that he was practical rather than speculat-
ive is due to the same cause (Mitchell, 270). 
Johnson's remark, "above the capacity of his audience," 
would have to stand out in bold relief from the plain 
style characteristic of Baxter in order to be effective. 
In addition to Taylor and Baxter, Christie's sale 
catalogue records that Johnson owned the works of two 
other pre-Restoration preachers: Lancelot Andrewes' 
Sermons (entry 214) and Hugh Latimer's Sermons (entry 
628). However, we have no record of Johnson himself 
making any reference to the sermons of either Lancelot 
Andrewes or Hugh Latimer. 
17 Robert South, Sermon Preached at Lambeth-Chappel 
£!:!the 28th of November (Savoy: n.p., 1666), 8. 
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regarded this as unnecessary coining, which could be 
avoided by more disciplined sentence construction. Other 
colloquialisms occur in South's description of a person 
tempted to be profane: 
tacitly to approve, and strike in with the 
scoffer, and go sharer both in the Mirth and 
Guilt of his prophane Jests (30). 
south, on occasion, violates the stylistic requirements of 
decorum and consistency of diction, but these violations 
are not frequent enough to prevent Johnson from general 
approval of his sermon style. 
Johnson expresses some reservations regarding the 
style of Archbishop John Tillotson, whose popularity 
flourished far into the eighteenth century. W. Fraser 
Mitchell offers the following assessment of the influence 
of Tillotson's homiletic style: 
The type of sermon to which he [Tillotson] set 
the seal of his approval consists in the 
statement of a general proposition arising out 
of the text, treated of under three or four main 
aspects, which lead naturally to a conclusion 
corresponding with the proposition. The thought 
of each sermon is consequently very easy to 
follow, and, as the illustrations are all 
strictly pertinent--no extraneous ornament being 
added--the syntax natural, and the diction such 
as was ordinarily employed by educated men, the 
general effect is one of the greatest possible 
lucidity and charm .... Tillotson's architec-
tonic ability in designing a sermon, the 
propriety of his examples, and the uniform 
dignity yet simplicity of his diction was 
appreciated well into the eighteenth century 
(Mitchell, 337). 
when Boswell asks Johnson for a list of his favorite 
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sermon stylists, Boswell immediately suggests Tillotson as 
the first possibility: 
Boswell: Tillotson? 
Johnson: Why, not now. I should not advise a 
preacher at this day to imitate Tillotson's 
style; though I don't know; I should be cautious 
of objecting to what has been applauded by so 
many suffrages (Life, III, 247-248). 
Johnson hesitated about recommending Tillotson's sermons 
as models for style, although he admired them for their 
emphasis on what was pragmatic in religion, for their 
carefully controlled arguments, and for their lack of 
affectation. Archbishop Tillotson's sermons are direct 
and practical; however, they are also deficient in grace-
ful stylistic embellishment. Indeed, after Tillotson, the 
plain but well-modulated style could go no farther; the 
maintenance of that approach without sinking to the level 
of the merely commonplace was exceedingly difficult. 
Nevertheless, many eighteenth-century preachers pushed the 
"plain style" of Tillotson to its extreme by removing 
almost all emotional appeal from their sermons. Perhaps, 
this was in reaction to the over-abundance of emotion in 
the preaching of the Evangelicals. It may have been in 
reaction to the Anglican emphasis on ritual as the central 
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act of worship--an emphasis which tended to relegate the 
sermon to a position of minor importance. The result was 
that many sermons which attempted to imitate Tillotson's 
style became dull and ponderous. In his own sermon 
compositions, Johnson avoided the excessive austerity of 
the imitators of Tillotson's style; he went back to 
Tillotson himself in his search for the practical and 
unadorned expression of theological truth and added to it 
his own restrained stylistic embellishments. 
Another Restoration sermonist who enjoyed widespread 
popularity in the eighteenth century was William Sherlock. 
Johnson remarked that Sherlock's "style too is very 
elegant, though he has not made it his principal study" 
(Life, III, 248). However, Sherlock's most popular work 
was a religious tract not intended for oral delivery and 
it is the one to which Johnson almost certainly refers--~ 
Practical Discourse Concerning Death. By 1743 it had gone 
into its twenty-fourth edition. Sherlock's work runs well 
over three hundred pages, whereas most printed sermons 
contemporary to his are about twenty pages long. However, 
Sherlock is consciously writing in the tradition of the 
literary sermon or religious tract; he makes this clear in 
a preface to his former congregation, the Masters of the 
Bench: 
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One reason of Publishing this Plain Discourse 
is, because I cannot now preach to you as 
formerly I have done, and have no other Way left 
of discharging my Duty to you, but by making the 
Press supply the Place of the Pulpit.18 
The Discourse is organized around the traditional outline 
form of the sermon, with one chapter devoted to each 
topic: 
I shall, 1. Consider what Death is, and what 
Wisdom that should teach us. 2. The certainty 
of our Death . . . 3. The Time of our Death; 
it must be once, but when, we know not. 4. The 
natural Fears and Terrours of Death, or our 
natural Aversions to it, and how they may be 
allayed and sweeten'd (3). 
Sherlock's outline does not promise much original thought, 
but it does show why the Discourse appeals to Johnson, who 
spends a lifetime preparing for death and attempting to 
deal with his fear of death. However, to understand 
Johnson's opinion of Sherlock's style, we must examine 
excerpts from the Discourse itself. One selection will 
show what is "very elegant" about Sherlock: 
First then, let us consider Death only as our 
leaving this World; a very delightful Place, 
you'll say, especially when our Circumstances 
are easy and prosperous: Here a Man finds 
whatever he most naturally loves, whatever he 
takes Pleasure in; the Supply of all his Wants, 
the Gratification of all his Senses, whatever an 
earthly Creature can wish for or desire (5). 
18 William Sherlock, A Practical Discourse Concerning 
Death (London: n.p., 1743), ix. 
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The style of this passage gives the general impression of 
amplification rather than multiplication; that is, it 
reworks one set of relationships rather than attempting to 
cover a great number of concepts. However, Sherlock 
lapses into casual structure and vocabulary, such as "a 
very delightful Place, you'll say." Such an easy style, 
rather than a studied one like Johnson's, suggests 
Sherlock's sensitivity to and accommodations of the oral 
dimension of the sermon genre. 
The three remaining sermonists included in Johnson's 
answer to Boswell's question are eighteenth-century 
figures. Describing Jeremiah Seed, Johnson says, "Seed 
has a very fine style, but he is not very theological" 
(Life, III, 248). Johnson's objections are probably based 
on Seed's sermons concerning the Trinity, in which he 
states that belief in the Trinity is a matter of personal 
conscience. However, many of Seed's sermons deal with 
general moral issues which do not involve controversy: 
It is a common Observation, that however forward 
Men may be to repine at the unequal Portion 
which God has allotted them of worldly Bless-
ings; yet they are generally well satisfied with 
their Share of inward Endowments: it being as 
hard to meet with a Person, who humbly thinks he 
has too little Sense and Merit, as it is to find 
one, who fancies he has too great Riches and 
Honour.19 
This opening sentence of Seed's Sermon l, on pride, 
demonstrates his mastery of general terminology and 
careful parallelism. The theme of pride is grounded in 
seed's general observations on human nature and in the 
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immediacy of the situation being addressed by the sermon. 
Another sermonist whose work Johnson describes as 
"very elegant" (Life, III, 248) is John Jortin. An 
excerpt from Sermon 1.2 1 on the fear of God, is 
representative of Jortin's style: 
If we believe God's government over his subjects 
to be such as in any other being we should call 
arbitrary, founded upon mere will and pleasure 
and over-ruling power: if we fancy that he is 
provoked at such things as would of fend no good 
man, and is to be pacified again by such homage 
and such services as no wise man would accept; 
that is, if we clothe him with our infirmities, 
and make him in some respects weaker than some 
of ourselves are, these unworthy apprehensions 
must raise in our minds an abject and servile 
dread of him, and produce a religion overrun 
with terror and superstition.20 
Although this type of statement alternates in Jortin's 
Sermons with many shorter and simpler sentences, as in the 
case of Tillotson and Taylor, the more complex and 
19 Jeremiah Seed, Eight Sermons (London: n.p., 
1757) I II, 2. 
20 John Jortin, Sermons on Different Subjects 
(London: n.p., 1826), I, 194-.-
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extended sentences are those which are more typical. 
While precise parallelism in which three or four elements 
are repeated in successive phrases does not appear in 
Jortin's Sermons, the overall effect of his style is one 
of parallelism. For example, in the selection cited 
above, three out of four of the clauses are conditional. 
The elaboration or rephrasing of one central thought is 
probably what Johnson considers "very elegant" in Jortin. 
The final critical comment in Johnson's list for 
Boswell is revealing precisely because it tells so little 
about a figure who so greatly influenced Johnson's 
religious attitudes--Samuel Clarke. Johnson probably read 
Clarke oftener than any other sermonist--at least he makes 
more frequent notations about reading him than any other 
sermonist. In his Diaries, Johnson records six occasions 
on which he reads from Clarke's sermons.21 Yet, in his 
catalogue for Boswell, he praises Clarke in the most 
qualified way: 
I should recommend Dr. Clarke's sermons, were he 
orthodox. However, it is very well known where 
he is not orthodox, which was upon the doctrine 
of the Trinity, as to which he is a condemned 
heretick; so one is aware of it (Life, III, 
248) . 
21 (March 28, 1766), 105; (May 7, 1769), 122; (April 
14, 1770), 129; (April 15, 1770), 132; (April 9, 1773), 
155; (April 14, 1781), 305. 
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Johnson was so persuaded of the practical value of 
orthodox Christian doctrine that he had a horror of 
heresy. It seemed to him that heresy would undermine the 
assurance of salvation, the promise of life after death. 
As we have seen, Johnson had a pathological fear of dying 
and the "true faith" gave him solace which enabled him to 
endure. If the "hereticks" were right, who knows what one 
might face after death? Clarke himself remained within 
the Church of England but insisted that the doctrine of 
the Trinity was an optional belief for the individual 
Christian. 
In the previous chapter, we observed that Clarke 
differs from many other natural religionists in the 
limitations of his rationalism. Once skepticism on the 
major points of doctrine has been satisfied, he advises 
that the Christian should believe, without rigorous 
examination, the minor points of doctrine: 
To sincere Believers, ... being once satisfied 
in the main and great Truths of Religion, they 
suffer not themselves to be moved, and their 
Faith in this great point shaken, by naive and 
uncertain disputes about particular Questions of 
less moment (Sermon 1, 23).22 
Indeed, Clarke recognizes the fundamentally non-rational 
nature of faith itself: 
22 Samuel Clarke, Sermons On Several Subjects 
(London: n.p., 1820). 
220 
Faith is that firm belief of things at present 
not seen: Because it is an Act, not of the 
Understanding only, but also and chiefly of the 
Will (Sermon 1, 3). 
Clarke did not consider natural religion to be an attack 
on Christianity; rather, he viewed it as preliminary to 
the truth of religious revelation: 
Natural Religion is the best Preparative for the 
reception of the Christian. The Love of Truth 
and Virtue in general, is the Dispensation of 
the Father; And the Doctrine of the Gospel in 
particular, is the Dispensation of the Son 
(Sermon 1, 9). 
Finally, the nature of the conversation in which 
Johnson gives Boswell his list of preachers must be 
remembered--Boswell begins by suggesting his own 
candidates and Johnson merely approves or disapproves. 
This format is partly responsible for Clarke's lowly 
position on the list. Moreover, Johnson does not confuse 
artistic criteria with religious considerations. The 
distinction remains quite clear--approval of Clarke's 
style but disapproval of one point in his theology. 
This survey of Johnson's opinions about particular 
sermonists reveals a significant catholicity in taste. 
Although he slights the early sermonists with the 
exception of Taylor, he appreciates the wide range of 
styles represented by many post-Restoration preachers: 
All the latter preachers have a good style. 
Indeed, nobody now talks much of style: 
everybody composes pretty well. There are no 
such unharmonious periods as there were a 
hundred years ago (Life, III, 248). 
In his own sermon compositions, Johnson avoided the 
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rhetorical excesses of Taylor and the extreme austerity of 
expression found in many of the imitations of Archbishop 
Tillotson's plain style. Moreover, while he always points 
out deviations from orthodoxy, he does not limit his 
praise to those who propound his own theological beliefs. 
Johnson recognizes that even those whose doctrine may be 
questionable, like Clarke, may nonetheless manifest 
homiletic and literary skills which must be acknowledged. 
III 
In a letter to the Reverend Charles Lawrence, a young 
clergyman apprehensive about the duty of preaching to his 
congregation, Johnson offers very practical insights on 
how to compose a good sermon. Lawrence had been adapting 
material taken from other divines for his own sermons. 
Johnson encourages him to attempt an original sermon on 
occasion and he concludes his letter by attempting to 
soothe the young man's fears with a description of the 
easy, almost mechanical, aspects of sermon composition 
based on the outline form: 
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Your present method of making your sermons 
seems very judicious. Few frequent preachers 
can be supposed to have sermons more their own 
than yours will be. Take care to register, 
somewhere or other, the authors from whom your 
several discourses are borrowed; and do not 
imagine that you shall always remember, even 
what perhaps you now think it impossible to 
forget. 
My advice, however, is, that you attempt, 
from time to time, an original sermon; and in 
the labour of composition, do not burthen your 
mind with too much at once; do not exact from 
yourself at one effort of excogitation, propri-
ety of thought and elegance of expression. 
Invent first, and then embellish. The produc-
tion of something, where nothing was before, is 
an act of greater energy than the expansion or 
decoration of the thing produced. Set down 
diligently your thoughts as they rise, in the 
first words that occur; and, when you have 
matter, you will easily give it form: nor, 
perhaps, will this method be always necessary; 
for, by habit, your thoughts and diction will 
flow together. 
The composition of sermons is not very 
difficult: the divisions not only help the 
memory of the hearer but direct the judgment of 
the writer; they supply sources of invention, 
and keep every part in its proper place (Life, 
III, 437). 
An examination of Johnson's Sermons, however, shows that 
his advice to Lawrence is deceiving in its simplicity. 
In this letter, Johnson professes his fidelity to the 
rather formal and traditional outline structure of the 
sermon. However, in his own use of the outline, Johnson 
is an innovator. His greatest deviation from the tradi-
tional sermon structure is in his position of the outline. 
He frequently delays the outline until one-fourth of the 
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sermon has been spent on a general and discursive con-
sideration of the sermon topic. Common practice is to 
begin the sermon with the outline so that the structure is 
clear from the outset. Johnson, however, frequently 
begins with a leisurely unfolding of the general topic and 
then introduces the outline. This practice de-emphasizes 
the outline and makes it less restricting; indeed, by its 
very position, it usually does not affect one-fourth of 
the sermon.23 
Although this may seem insignificant, it demonstrates 
Johnson's acute sensitivity to public taste--to his 
audience and to their pragmatic concerns. In the 
seventeenth century, congregations seemed to possess an 
insatiable appetite for preaching; they listened for hours 
to sermons placed end to end.24 such congregations did 
23 An extreme example of Johnson's delay in 
introducing the traditional homiletic outline is Sermon 
14. This sermon is ten pages in length; the outline 
occurs on the sixth page after Johnson has already made 
his strongest points. 
24 According to Mitchell, at no time in the world's 
history had preaching played so important and dispropor-
tionate a part in political and social life as it did in 
England during the seventeenth century. Never before had 
such numbers of sermons been delivered on public or 
private occasions, and never before had such quantities of 
sermons and religious treatises come from the press. For 
example, allowing for the fact that the Westminster 
Assembly was a gathering of clergymen, still there is 
something abnormal about a day spent as was Monday, 
October 16, 1643. According to the Rev. John Lightfoot, 
the occasion was a solemn fast: 
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not need much enticement to enter a sermon, so the 
preacher could plunge into the outline, confident that his 
listeners were receptive. In the eighteenth century, 
First Mr. Wilson gave a picked psalm, or 
selected verses of several psalms, agreeing to 
the time and occasion. Then Dr. Burgess prayed 
about an hour: after he had done, Mr. Whittacre 
preached upon Isa. xxxvii. 3, "This day is a day 
of trouble," etc. Then, having had another 
chosen psalm, Mr. Goodwin prayed; and after he 
had done, Mr. Palmer preached upon Psal. xxv. 
12. After whose sermon we had another psalm, 
and Doctor Stanton prayed about an hour; and 
with another psalm and a prayer of the prolocu-
tor [i.e. Dr. Twisse], and a collection for the 
maimed soldiers . . . we adjourned till tomorrow 
morning. [The Whole Works of the Rev. John 
Lightfoot, D.D., ed. Rev. John Rogers Pitman 
(London: n.d., 1825), 13 vols. Volume 13 
contains "The Journal of the Proceedings of the 
Assembly of Divines, from January 1, 1643, to 
December 31, 1644." As cited by Mitchell, 256). 
According to Mitchell, the conditions which we 
glimpse behind these facts were hardly calculated to 
produce pulpit oratory of a highly finished type. 
Political prejudice, religious enthusiasm and the neces-
sity of meeting the exigencies of the moment influenced 
what was delivered. The prevailing tone of such sermons 
is one of gloomy dogma (Mitchell, 255-257). However, 
Mitchell's assessment is not wholly true. Dreary as such 
a day may appear to the modern reader, it is important to 
recall several factors. The age was one in which drama 
and other forms of light entertainment were illegal. 
Listening to sermons was a popular form of public ac-
tivity, providing the occasion for social interaction. 
Moreover, the political and social issues of the day were 
closely intertwined with theological importance. A kind 
of theocracy was beginning to take root. 
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however, the sermon is no longer so universally 
esteemed. 25 
Johnson reveals his awareness of the decline in 
enthusiasm for the sermon through his defense of the 
subject matter frequently treated in sermons. For 
example, in ~ermon 1 1 he apparently feels susceptible to 
attack on the grounds that marriage is a frequent topic 
among sermon writers. So, he defends himself by 
asserting: 
It is, therefore, no obligation to the propriety 
of discoursing upon them [the duties of mar-
riage], that they are well known and generally 
acknowledged; for a very small part of the 
disorders of the world proceed from ignorance of 
the laws by which life ought to be regulated; 
nor do many, even of those whose hands are 
polluted with the foulest crimes, deny the 
reasonableness of virtue, or attempt to justify 
their own actions. Men are not blindly betrayed 
into corruption, but abandon themselves to their 
passions with their eyes open; and lose the 
direction of truth, because they do not attend 
to her voice, not because they do not hear, or 
do not understand it. It is, therefore, no less 
useful to rouse the thoughtless than instruct 
the ignorant; to awaken the attention than 
enlighten the understanding (Sermon 1 1 5). 
25 In The English Church in the Eighteenth Century 
(London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1878), c. J. Abbey 
and J. H. Overton note a decline in the quality and 
quantity of sermons after the Restoration (II, 37). 
However, they list Sherlock, Smalridge, Waterland, Seed, 
Ogden, Atterbury, Mudge, and Butler as outstanding sermon 
writers (II, 37). In general terms, Johnson's taste in 
sermons is within the mainstream of eighteenth-century opinion. 
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Johnson feels that he must capture the congregation's 
interest. He therefore often postpones the outline and 
begins with a defense of the topic. For example, in 
sermon 1.1, this defense of the sermon's subject-matter 
immediately precedes and introduces the formal outline: 
Since, therefore, the pursuit of perfect peace 
is the great, the necessary, the inevitable, 
business of human life; since this peace is to 
be attained by trust in God, and by that only; 
since, without this, every state is miserable, 
and the voluptuous and the busy are equally 
disappointed; what can be more useful, than 
seriously to enquire, First, what is meant by 
this trust in God, to which perfect peace is 
promised? and, Secondly, by what means this 
trust in God is to be attained? (Sermon 14, 154-
155). -
Placing the defense just before the formal outline, 
Johnson softens the blow; he emphasizes the importance of 
the subject matter before the sermon begins in earnest. 
The subject matter Johnson selects for his Sermons 
demonstrates his pragmatic attitude towards religion: 
marriage, the necessity of repentance, lying, fraud, 
charity, good government, the vanity of human life. Even 
his discussion of God's attributes leads to a practical 
application--if God is merciful, we may repent; if God is 
just, we must reform. 
Johnson's most frequent method of beginning a sermon 
is to write a paragraph on some general phase of human 
existence which the congregation has experienced and with 
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which they can empathize. For instance, Sermon 1 begins 
with a comment on man's essentially social nature: 
That society is necessary to the happiness of 
human nature, that the gloom of solitude, and 
the stillness of retirement, however they may 
flatter at a distance, with pleasing views of 
independence and serenity, neither extinguish 
the passions, nor enlighten the understanding, 
that discontent will intrude upon privacy, and 
temptations follow us to the desert, every one 
may be easily convinced, either by his own 
experience, or that of others (Sermon 1, 3). 
Clear parallels exist between this paragraph and Johnson's 
writing techniques in the Rambler essays. The most 
noticeable similarity is that of style: the extended, 
frequent sets of parallels, the careful balance, the 
preponderance of abstract nouns and noun clauses, the 
"consensus" phrase. Furthermore, in imitation of the 
Rambler style, sixteen of the sermon introductions are 
marked by a series of parallel noun clauses which lead to 
a short and rather anticlimactic verbal phrase.26 
26 For example, six of Johnson's Sermons begin with 
a noun clause introduced by that [Sermons 1, 2, 7, 12, 23 
and 24. Moreover, nine othersermons have-noun clauses-rn 
the first paragraph [Sermons l, 2 1 ~' 1Q, 11, 1!, 15, 1.1. 
and 20]. Sermon 25 begins with a series of infinitives, 
so the first word-rs to, but otherwise the formula of noun 
clause preceding and dominating the verb applies: 
To afford adequate consolations to the last 
hour, to cheer the gloomy passage through the 
valley of the shadow of death, and to ease that 
anxiety, to which beings, prescient of their own 
dissolution, and conscious of their own danger, 
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Several of the Rambler and the Sermon introductions, 
besides sharing stylistic similarities, evoke a similar 
mood of melancholy over the miseries of life.27 Moreover, 
Johnson's religious and secular writings on the vacuity of 
human life generally conclude in pragmatic exhortations to 
strive for the improvement of the situation. Although the 
Rambler essays stop short of an explicitly religious 
answer to the problem of life's emptiness, their analysis 
of the problem, as far as it goes, is similar to the 
introductions of Sermons §., .!..f, 12., .fl. 
These four sermons open on a note of melancholy with 
Johnson describing either the vanity or the misery of 
human existence. For example, Sermon 5 considers the 
literary treatment of human misery: 
There is nothing upon which more writers, in all 
ages, have laid out their abilities, than the 
miseries of life, and it affords no pleasing 
reflection to discover that a subject so little 
agreeable is not yet exhausted (Sermon§., 53). 
must be necessarily exposed, is the privilege only of 
revealed religion (Sermon 25, 261). 
W. K. Wimsatt, in The Prose Style of Samuel Johnson, 
analyzes Johnson's wide use of parallelism and balance in 
his great moral essays; he does not examine Johnson's 
Sermons. More specifically, Wimsatt notes Johnson's 
characteristic use of noun clauses to illustrate complex 
relationships through his sentence construction in the 
Rambler essays (15-23). 
27 See, for example, Ramblers 2, 6, 13, 16, 20, 31, 
53, 61, 66, 87, 96, 106, 114, 127, and-176; Sermons §_-,-12, 
15, and TI. 
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sermon 12 begins with a recognition that man will not 
admit the obvious but disagreeable truth that all human 
desires and actions are vain: 
That all human actions terminate in vanity, and 
all human hopes will end in vexation, is a 
position, from which nature withholds our 
credulity, and which our fondness for the 
present life, and worldly enjoyments, disposes 
us to doubt, however forcibly it may be urged 
upon us, by reason or experience (Sermon 12, 
127). 
In Sermon 15 Johnson dwells on the ubiquitous nature of 
man's misery. He chooses as his text Job--the prototype 
of questioning but submissive endurance to the human 
condition: 
The position, contained in this sentence, 
neither requires, nor admits proof or 
illustration; being too evident to be denied, 
and too clear to be mistaken. That life is of 
short continuance, and is disquieted by many 
molestations, every man knows, and every man 
feels; and the complaint, attributed to Job, in 
the history that is supposed to be the oldest 
book of which mankind is in possession, has been 
continued, and will be continued, through all 
human generations with endless repetitions 
(Sermon 15, 159). 
The opening paragraph of Sermon .fl is a survey of the 
various responses to the inescapable fact of human misery: 
That the life of man is unhappy, that his days 
are not only few, but evil, that he is sur-
rounded by dangers, distracted by uncertainties, 
and oppressed by calamities, requires no proof. 
• . . Accordingly we find the miseries of our 
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present state lamented by writers of every 
class, from the inspired teachers of religion, 
who admonish us of our frailty and infelicity, 
that they may incite us to labour after a better 
state, where "there is fullness of joy, and 
pleasures for evermore," to the vainest and 
loosest author, whose design is to teach 
methods, not of improving, but of wasting time, 
and whose doctrine St. Paul, speaking in a 
borrowed character, has well expressed in one 
short sentence, "Let us eat and drink, for to-
morrow we die" (Sermon £l, 237-238). 
This repeated theme of the misery of human existence is 
grounded in Johnson's general observations on human nature 
and in the immediacy of the particular situation being 
addressed by the sermon. Indeed, the examples taken from 
these four Sermons indicate Johnson's sparse usage of 
Biblical parallels for the particular contemporary 
situation he is examining. Johnson does not seem to be 
interested in relating the Biblical text closely to 
practical human experience. He manifests a distinct 
preference for describing the nature of man in 
contemporary terms, for clothing misery in contemporary 
garb, and for using Biblical parallels almost 
incidentally. Johnson's limited usage of Scripture is 
again indicative of the pragmatic religious perspective of 
a layman. Some sermon writers would stretch Scripture to 
surprising lengths to make it "fit" a particular 
situation, but Johnson was not one of them. He was never 
concerned with providing an apologia for the Bible but 
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rather with offering helpful guidance to human beings 
wrestling with th.eir daily problems. Where a Biblical 
text is useful, Johnson will take it up in his Sermons; 
however, he is at no pains to find Biblical justification 
for his presentations. Moreover, the delay of the formal 
outline in his Sermons reserves the consolations provided 
by Scriptural revelation until one-fourth of the sermon is 
completed; it allows Johnson first to test the validity of 
human experience for addressing the vacuity of existence 
and only then to bring consolation from the Divine Word to 
a problem clearly grounded in the direct experience of his 
auditors. As we observed earlier, many sermon writers 
address their own situations and problems through their 
sermons. Insofar as the experience of the sermon writer 
matches that of his audience, his sermons will be 
effective. Insofar as his experience is unique, his words 
will fail to move the congregation to reform. In his 
Sermons, Johnson is eager to reach the Taylor, Dodd, or 
Aston congregations with the practical issues they 
struggle with in their daily lives. 
Another bond between the Rambler and the Sermon 
introductions is the surprising prevalence of secular 
vocabulary. Nineteen of Johnson's Sermons open on a 
secular note; they have no religious terminology in the 
232 
first paragraph.28 Sermon.£!, for example, proposes that 
a good government must be led by individuals concerned 
with the common good. The first sentence deals with a 
generally accepted secular principle; that is, government 
has been perverted from its original aim: 
That the institutions of government owe their 
original, like other human actions, to the 
desire of happiness, is not to be denied; nor is 
it less generally allowed, that they have been 
perverted to very different ends from those 
which they were intended to promote. This is a 
truth, which it would be very superfluous to 
prove by authorities, or illustrate by example 
(Sermon.£!, 249). 
For the most part, Johnson uses religious terms when he is 
writing about a divine attribute such as mercy (Sermon £) 
or justice (Sermon l>, or when he discusses a particular 
phase of the liturgy, such as communion (Sermons 9 and 
22). For all other subjects, particularly those which 
deal with human behavior and relationships, he begins on 
the secular level and gradually moves into a religious 
context. The usual progression in his discussions of 
human vacuity is obvious--if everything in this life 
results in emptiness, man should shift his attention to 
the next life. 
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By having first disarmed his congregation with a 
secular approach, Johnson is in effect easing his auditors 
into a consideration of religious material. That Johnson 
extends the secular introduction into the majority of his 
sermons is significant because it illustrates his 
religious pragmatism in addressing the increased 
secularism around him. The use of such non-traditional 
introductions in his Sermons also reflects Johnson's 
belief in the validity of human experience to suggest some 
strategies for coping with the vacuity of human nature. 
Sometimes Johnson begins his sermons by attempting to 
give the congregation a historical perspective on the 
Scriptural text. For instance, in Sermon £, he outlines 
Solomon's credentials as a sage: 
The writings of Solomon are filled with such 
observations upon the nature and life of man 
because they were the result of long experience 
assisted with every advantage of mind and 
fortune. An experience that had made him 
acquainted with the actions, passions, virtues, 
and vices of all ranks, ages, and denominations 
of mankind, and enabled him, with the Divine 
assistance, to leave to succeeding ages, a 
collection of precepts that, if diligently 
attended to, will conduct us safe in the paths 
of life (Sermon£, 65). 
Sermon 11 is based on 1 Peter 3: 8: "Finally, be ye all 
of one mind, having compassion one of another, love as 
brethren, be pitiful, be courteous." To show the 
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importance of this list of Christian virtues, Johnson 
explains the situation in which it was given: 
The apostle, directing this epistle to the new 
converts, scattered over the provinces of Asia, 
having laid before them the great advantage of 
the religion which they had embraced, no less 
than the salvation of their souls, and the high 
price for which they were redeemed, the precious 
blood of Christ, proceeds to explain to them 
what is required by their ~ profession (Sermon 
g, 117). 
He begins Sermon 13 with an analysis of the ambiguous 
text: "Having the form of godliness, but denying the 
power thereof" (2 Tim. 3: 5): 
When St. Paul, in the precepts given to Timothy 
for his instruction how to regulate and purify 
the conversation of the first Christians, 
directed him to take care that those men should 
be avoided, as dangerous and pestilent, who, 
having the form of godliness, denied the power; 
it is reasonable to believe, that he meant, in 
his direct and irrunediate intention, to awaken 
his caution against gross hypocrites; such as 
may easily be supposed to have appeared too 
of ten in the most early seminaries of Chris-
tianity; who made an appearance of righteousness 
subservient to worldly interest; and whose 
conversion, real or pretended, gave them an 
opportunity of preying upon artless simplicity, 
by claiming that kindness which the first 
believers showed to one another; and obtaining 
benefactions which they did not want, and eating 
bread for which they did not labour (Sermon 13, 
137) . 
Johnson feels the text should be placed in its original 
context because he chooses to interpret Paul's warning as 
applying to a different type of hypocrite--more prevalent 
235 
in Johnson's day than gross pretenders to Christianity--
namely, the man who obeys the external religious forms but 
who is internally unclean. Johnson apparently feels that 
the new application is justified by the changes which 
history has worked on the size and status of the church; 
as a respecter of tradition and history, he must explain 
that his application is new. 
These few instances of Scriptural commentary, how-
ever, are contrary to Johnson's usual Sermon introduc-
tions, which, as we have seen, serve several rhetorical 
purposes: (1) they capture the auditor's attention more 
effectively through their universal concerns and general 
application than would an outline of the sermon's 
contents; (2) they ease the secular mind into a serious 
consideration of the relevance of religion's answers to 
human questions--an approach the modern theologian Paul 
Tillich describes as "the method of correlation"; (3) they 
emphasize Johnson's religious pragmatism by first 
examining human experience--thereby delaying the 
traditional appeal to religious revelation--to find 
consolations for the vacuity of life. 
Moreover, these methods of bending the traditionally 
rigid outline form of the sermon reflect Johnson's concern 
for propriety; that is, the sermon's subject matter ought 
to address the particular concerns of the audience in 
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order for the sermon to be a successful persuasive device. 
Johnson also reflects this pragmatism in his layman's 
approach to Biblical quotations. He does not choose a 
text for interesting syntactical problems or alternate 
translations, as several of the scholar-clergy had done.29 
Nor does he buttress his arguments with excessive and 
eclectic quotations, like the Latitudinarians. Moreover, 
he does not attempt to awe his congregation with his 
knowledge of esoteric vocabulary. On rare occasions 
Johnson goes into what may be called Scriptural exegesis, 
which for him consists of an attempt to resolve possible 
ambiguity in the literal meaning of the quotation. In 
Sermon 11, which considers the Scriptural text, "Finally, 
be ye all of one mind, having compassion, one of another, 
love as brethren, be pitiful, be courteous" (I Peter 3: 
8), Johnson explains: 
The word which is rendered having compassion, 
seems to include a greater latitude of signi-
fication, than the word compassion commonly 
obtains. Compassion is not used, but in the 
sense of tender regard to the unhappiness of 
another. But the term used by Saint Peter may 
29 William Laud, for instance, writes a sermon [A 
Sermon Preached before his Majestie at Wansted (London: 
n.p., 1621)] examining all possible syntactic relation-
ships in the text: "Pray ye for the peace of Jerusalem: 
May they prosper who love thee! I Peace be within thy 
ramparts, Prosperity within thy palaces!" {Psalm 121: 6-
7). Laud comments, "I have now done with Rogate pacem, 
pray for peace, but that Jerusalem is come again in my 
way. But it is a strange Jerusalem'' (23). 
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mean mutually feeling for each other, receiving 
the same impressions from the same things, and 
this sense seems to be given it by one of the 
translators [Castalia) (Sermon 1.1, 119). 
Later in the same sermon, Johnson gives two alternative 
translations, but since no choice is necessary in terms of 
his discussion, he carries the exegesis no further: 
In pursuance of his injunctions to be of one 
mind, and to sympathize one with another, he 
directs them, to love as brethren, or to be 
lovers of the brethren [Hammond] (Sermon 11, 
121-122). -
Similarly, in Sermon ~, Johnson comments on a possible 
misunderstanding of the Scriptural command--"But thou, 
when thou givest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy 
right hand doth" (Mt. 6:3): 
By this precept it is not to be understood, that 
we are forbidden to give alms in publick, or 
where we may be seen of men; for our Saviour has 
also commanded, that our "light should so shine 
before men, that they may see our good works, 
and glorify our Father which is in heaven." The 
meaning, therefore, of this text is not that we 
should forbear to give alms in the sight of men, 
but that we should not suffer the presence of 
men to act as the motive to our charity, nor 
regard their praise as any object to our wishes; 
a precept surely reasonable; for how can that 
act be virtuous, which depends not upon our own 
choice, but upon that of others, and which we--
should not have performed, if we had not 
expected that they would have applauded it? 
(Sermon 19, 210). 
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Johnson thus aptly states the practical effect of the 
Biblical text by demonstrating its insight into human 
motivation. 
Johnson usually writes from a text which is perfectly 
clear on its literal level. For him, a quotation is 
merely a springboard for a discussion of a particular 
dilemma drawn from human experience. Indeed, Johnson's 
use of Scriptural revelation in his Sermons suggests that 
it possessed a status of theory rather than of empirical 
truth--a theory, which like any other, had always to be 
put to the test of human experience. As a record of 
religious revelation, Scripture is historical; Johnson's 
Sermons suggest that revelation is not its own sufficient 
judge and that to scrutinize it with the aid of pragmatic 
human experience does not invalidate that revelation. For 
example, his Scriptural texts are those which the average 
churchgoer already knew; yet, he proposes to look at their 
concrete implications for daily life more carefully than 
his listeners would have had the inclination to do before. 
In Sermon 15, his text is "Man that is born of woman, is 
of few days, and full of trouble" (Job 14: 1). He divides 
the sermon into two parts, one a consideration of the 
shortness of life, the other, of its miseries: 
But since the mind is always of itself shrinking 
from disagreeable images, it is sometimes 
necessary to recall them; and it may contribute 
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to the repression of many unreasonable desires, 
and the prevention of many faults and follies, 
if we frequently, and attentively consider, 
First, that "man born of a woman is of few 
days. 11 And, Secondly, "that man born of a woman 
is full of trouble" (Sermon ];2, 160-161). 
In this case, Johnson grounds the Biblical quotation 
directly in the general experience of his auditors. 
In its use of quotations, Sermon 1 is unique among 
Johnson's Sermons; yet, its technique is also highly 
characteristic of Johnson's attitude towards the sermon 
form. The general topic of this sermon is the nature and 
obligations of marriage, and the Scriptural text is 
"Therefore shall a man leave his father, and his mother, 
and shall cleave unto his wife'' (Genesis 2: 24). He 
chooses one of the most familiar descriptions of marriage 
in the Bible; its literal meaning leaves little doubt or 
ambiguity. Yet, the text does not shape the sermon 
itself. To describe the nature of matrimony, Johnson 
compares it to friendship. The comparison is in the form 
of a series of adages about friendship; Johnson simply 
applies these dicta to marriage as well. 
In a sense, Johnson is following the Latitudinarian 
practice of buttressing his arguments with quotations from 
the ancients, but there is an important difference in the 
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way Johnson uses quotations.30 Although "He that hath 
friends, has no friend" has a Greek origin, and "Friend-
ship amongst equals is the most lasting" was first written 
in Latin, Johnson places the emphasis on the simple folk-
wisdom underlying the precepts: 
It has long been observed that friendship is to 
be confined to one; or that, to use the words of 
the axiom, "He that hath friends, has no 
friend" .... It is remarked, that "Friendship 
amongst equals is the most lasting" (Sermon 1, 
9-10). -
This technique is unusual for Johnson because he rarely 
uses so many quotations in a single sermon. However, he 
finds in these adages words that square with human 
experience; they have an almost axiomatic status. Johnson 
buttresses his argument, not with his usual appeal to 
authority, but with an appeal to coromon sense, which is 
perhaps the strongest support of all. 
Sometimes, he repeats the text, or parts of it, in 
order to impose unity on the sermon. For example, Sermon 
}, is based on this Biblical text: 
30 For the reader, the original quotations are 
available in footnotes; for the listener, the impression 
is created that Johnson is dealing in the same intellec-
tual currency and experience to which the congregation has 
access. Strict friendship "is to have the same desires 
and the same aversions," Johnson observes; the explanation 
is in a footnote, "An observation of Catiline in Sallust" 
(Sermon 1_, 11). 
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Thus saith the Lord, Stand ye in the ways, and 
see, and ask for the old paths, where is the 
good way, and walk therein, and ye shall find 
rest for your souls. But they said, We will not 
walk therein (Jer. 6:16) (Sermon 2, 75). 
Halfway through the sermon, when he describes modern 
intellectuals, Johnson again manifests his religious 
pragmatism in his blending of Biblical revelation with 
human experience: 
They seem, even when considered with the utmost 
candour, to have rather consulted their own 
imaginations, than to have asked for the old 
paths, where is the good way (Sermon 2, 81-82). 
The Scriptural text which introduces Sermon l is taken 
from Proverbs 28: 14--"Happy is the man that feareth 
always: but he that hardeneth his heart shall fall into 
mischief" (Sermon l 1 29). At the end of this sermon, as 
in almost half of his sermon compositions, Johnson uses a 
deliberate blending of Biblical wisdom and common sense in 
order to encourage responsible moral conduct: 
Let us all, therefore, watch our thoughts and 
actions; and that we may not, by hardness of 
heart fall into mischief, let us endeavour and 
pray, that we may be among them that feared 
always, and by that fear may be prepared for 
everlasting happiness (Sermon 1, 38). 
Johnson, then, uses Biblical quotations sparingly. 
His usual technique consists in the incorporation of the 
Scriptural text into the delayed outline of his sermon and 
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almost invariably a repetition of the same text blended 
into his hortatory conclusion. Johnson's Sermon 1 is 
atypical because he incorporates five new quotations in 
his comparison between friendship and marriage. However, 
the number of quotations involved even in Sermon 1 does 
not alter Johnson's approach. He is a layman interested 
in demonstrating the value of common human experience for 
easing the problems of life; he never uses the sermon 
genre to debate fine points of theology. His restrained 
use of Biblical quotations, then, is another facet of his 
layman's approach to religion. The ordained clergy of the 
day, both Established and Non-conformist, had a strong 
interest in debating fine points of theology from the 
pulpit and made generous use of Scripture to support their 
contentions. Johnson, however, followed neither example. 
So far we have examined several of the rhetorical 
devices in Johnson's Sermons which reflect his Rambler 
style: a general introduction to the Sermon's subject-
matter grounded in human experience; secular diction, 
parallelism, and the disciplined use of figurative 
devices; the delayed and in a sense "buried" outline; and 
the restrained use of easily comprehended Biblical 
quotations. These characteristics of Johnson's Sermons are 
variations from the formal sermon tradition; each 
variation accentuates the value Johnson places on concrete 
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experience in dealing with the vacuity of life. Johnson's 
belief that conunon sense and actual experience provide man 
with the best test for the validity of any postulate of 
religion finds expression in his Sermons no less than in 
his other writings. He does not seek to persuade his 
auditors by saying, in effect, "The Bible tells me so." 
He relies rather on the vacuity of human experience to 
produce concurrence and conunitment to the antidotes 
suggested by religion. 
Johnson's morally pragmatic attitude towards religion 
is also demonstrated by his sensitivity to the inunediate 
occasion for the Sermon. As we saw in Chapter One, 
Johnson used the particular character of the audience or 
the peculiar situation for which he was writing the sermon 
in order to suggest morally appropriate modifications of 
human behavior. Johnson never confines himself to the 
traditional homiletic practice of offering consolation 
only through generalized and abstracted appeals to 
religious revelation. For example, Sermon ll_, was 
preached on January 30, the anniversary of Charles I's 
execution. It is a pragmatic moral exemplum which 
denounces disobedience and wilful rebellion: 
Of the strife, which this day brings back to our 
remembrance, we may observe, that it had all the 
tokens of "strife" proceeding from "envy." The 
rage of the faction, which invaded the rights of 
the church and monarchy, was disproportionate to 
the provocation received. The violence with 
which hostility was prosecuted, was more than 
the cause, that was publickly avowed, could 
incite or justify (Sermon 23, 246). 
Whatever one's opinion may be of the political views in 
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the passage, Johnson is clearly shaping this sermon to the 
circumstances surrounding its delivery.31 At the same 
time, the Sermon demonstrates Johnson's preference for 
pragmatic moral principles; it is an embodiment of the 
universal moral standards of personal honesty and respect 
for others that have a relevance and truth independent of 
time. 
In Sermon 19, on charity, Johnson refers specifically 
to the occasion of the sermon, namely, the founding of an 
orphanage dependent on public donations. He relates the 
abstract concept of the religious duty of exercising 
charity toward those in need to this specific occasion, 
ref erring to "the reasonableness of laying hold on the 
present opportunity for the exercise of our charity" 
(Sermon 19, 212). The mere exhortation to practice 
charity is insufficient; it must be translated into an 
actual charitable deed. 
31 Johnson is following a tradition, which dated back 
to January 25, 1661, when Parliament ordered the thirtieth 
of January to be kept as a day of penance and humiliation; 
moreover, it ordered that a sermon be composed in praise 
of the martyred Charles I. 
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Sermon 12_, which he writes for his wife's funeral, 
includes a highly individualized list of virtues for which 
the departed should be emulated: 
Yet, let it be remembered, that her wit was 
never employed to scoff at goodness, nor her 
reason to dispute against truth. In this age of 
wild opinions, she was as free from skepticism 
as the cloistered virgin. She never wished to 
signalize herself by the singularity of paradox. 
She had a just diffidence of her own reason, and 
desired to practice rather than to dispute. Her 
practice was such as her opinions naturally 
produced .•.. That she had no failings, cannot 
be supposed: but she has now appeared before 
the Almighty Judge; and it would ill become 
beings like us, weak and sinful as herself, to 
remember those faults which, we trust, Eternal 
Purity has pardoned (Sermon 25, 269). 
A litany of virtues was a traditional homiletic device for 
personalizing the funeral sermon. Johnson is deeply 
touched by the death of his wife; yet, he is also greatly 
concerned with adapting a painful personal experience so 
that it will be spiritually enriching for the congrega-
tion. Johnson's funeral sermon is effective because it is 
personal and concrete in its treatment of mourning; 
Johnson draws from his personal experience of loss to 
suggest some general strategies for coping with the death 
of a loved one. 
Johnson's funeral sermon emphasizes the survivor's 
proper response to death. Drawing from his own experience 
the realization that sorrow is a necessary result of the 
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loss of a loved one, he attempts to sublimate the sorrow 
and to channel it into two specific religious expressions. 
The first is perpetuation of the memory of the departed 
through the emulation of her virtues: 
Let us therefore preserve her memory for no 
other end but to imitate her virtues; and let us 
add her example to the motives to piety which 
this solemnity was, secondly, instituted to 
enforce (Sermon~, 269-270). 
The second method of religious instruction is to encourage 
virtuous action based on the realization of impending 
judgment which the recent death has aroused in the living: 
Let it, therefore, be our care, when we retire 
from this solemnity, that we immediately turn 
from our wickedness, and do that which is lawful 
and right; that, whenever disease, or violence, 
shall dissolve our bodies, our souls may be 
saved alive, and received into everlasting 
habitations (Sermon 25, 271). 
The mourner can solace himself with the belief that sorrow 
in the face of death is not merely a natural emotional 
response to the experience of loss, but also an 
instruction and warning to the mourner regarding his 
personal conduct during this earthly pilgrimage. 
In Sermon 18 Johnson addresses himself to a 
particular type of fraud which he feels is a product of 
eighteenth-century circumstances and attitudes rather than 
an abuse common to all societies and ages. The particular 
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"society" referred to in the sermon probably consisted of 
those who administered the local benefit fund for the 
almshouses and charities of Ashbourne; the officers of the 
fund had invited John Taylor to preach to them:32 
For the particular application of this doctrine, 
I am sorry, that my native place should afford 
an opportunity. But since this society has 
called me to stand here before them, I hope no 
man will be offended, that I do my duty with 
fidelity and freedom. Truth requires, that I 
warn you against a species of fraud, sometimes 
found amongst you, and that of a very shameful 
and oppressive kind (Sermon ]J!, 199). 
He refers to the particular offense of depriving a 
contributor from the benefits of a common fund when he is 
in need. It is another example of Johnson using a 
particular experience as a means of religious instruction 
and warning; once again, he fits the sermon to the 
occasion, or in this case, to the culture. 
Johnson's real masterpiece of adapting the sermon to 
a unique situation is The Convict's Address to His Unhappy 
Brethren. This sermon (Sermon £!!) was written for the 
Reverend William Dodd and preached by him to his fellow 
prisoners shortly before his execution. Johnson actually 
takes advantage of the circumstances surrounding the 
32 See, Jean H. Hagstrum and James Gray, eds., Samuel 
Johnson, Sermons, 199, note 3. 
sermon and capitalizes on the convict-mentality of the 
congregation. 
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He begins with a fast-moving account of an incipient 
prison break by Paul and Silas. The prisoners are lured 
into the sermon by the excitement of the story and the 
relevance of the occasion to their own situation. Johnson 
here engages in a rare bit of theatricality; he exploits 
the drama of the situation which is known by all--the 
plight of the prisoners and the preacher's imminent fate. 
Both the occupants of pulpit and pew respond from their 
need to the jailer's question to Paul and Silas: "What 
must I do to be saved?" Johnson makes the sermon 
pertinent by answering the question in terms of the 
prisoners' situation. He stresses the urgency of the 
convicts' state and eliminates unnecessary theological 
hair-splitting: "Of the efficacy of a death-bed 
repentance many have disputed; but we have no leisure for 
controversy" (Sermon 28, 308). A few pages later he 
states, "But there is no time for disquisition; we must 
try to find the shortest way to peace" (Sermon 28, 309). 
Johnson's style also reflects the urgency of the situation 
for the prisoners--the sentences are shorter and simpler 
than those in all of his other sermons. Therefore, 
Johnson once again takes artistic advantage of the 
peculiar nature of the congregation and grounds his appeal 
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for obedience and repentance in the practical experience 
of the prisoners. 
A test for the consolations offered by religious 
revelation against the reality of practical experience in 
Johnson's Sermons is noticeable in terms of another of the 
"standards" for a good sermon for which he praised Blair. 
Blair directed his sermons to man's reason; he exercised 
restraint and discipline in appealing to the emotions. 
Johnson's incipient emotional involvement in his Sermons 
is evident in his departures from his usual style of 
careful balance and parallelism. This is not to suggest 
that every "typical" sentence Johnson writes is packed 
with parallelism and balance--many are not. Nor am I 
suggesting that all sentences in the Sermons which are not 
based on parallelism and balance betray an emotional 
involvement. However, these limited "departures" demon-
strate Johnson's belief that restraint in emotional appeal 
contributes towards producing the desired didactic end of 
the sermon. 
For example, his disciplined use of repetition 
heightens the sense of his personal involvement in what he 
is expressing. In Sermon 15, the meditation on Job leads 
him to observe: 
Many things which are not pleasant may be 
salutary; and among them is the just estimate of 
human life, which may be made by all with 
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advantage, though by few, very few, with delight 
(Sermon 15, 160). 
"Very few" is an apparent spontaneous intrusion--though, 
of course, it was planned--and interrupts the parallelism 
of "by all with advantage" I "by few ... with delight." 
In Sermon ~, commenting on intellectual pride, he states: 
But were our knowledge far greater than it is, 
let us yet remember that goodness, not 
knowledge, is the happiness of man! The day 
will come, it will come quickly, when it shall 
profit us more to have subdued proud thought, 
than to have numbered the host of heaven (Sermon 
~' 71-72). 
The clause "it will come quickly" is an unusual note in 
the Johnsonian cadence. Again, it gives the impression of 
an intrusion; it could easily have been incorporated to 
read, "The day will quickly come," which would place the 
emphasis on the parallelism at the end of the sentence. 
Moreover, it is a repetition of "will come" and Johnson 
seldom uses repetition when he can substitute parallelism. 
Similar repetition occurs in Sermon 13: 
To give the heart to God, and to give the whole 
heart, is very difficult; the last, the great 
effort of long labour, fervent prayer, and 
diligent meditation (Sermon 13, 143). 
"To give the whole heart" adds only one new word to the 
previous phrase. It is a re-thinking of the first phrase, 
in a sense a correction of it, whereas Johnson's 
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corrections are usually worked out before the final 
written expression of the thought. The second half of the 
sentence is in Johnson's usual style, with no repetition 
and three parallel terms of two elements each. All these 
minor breaks from Johnson's accustomed style suggest his 
sensitivity to and accommodations of the oral dimension of 
the sermon genre. 
The most dramatic departure in Johnson's Sermons from 
his usual emphasis on the role of human experience as a 
valid judge of the consolations suggested by religious 
revelation can be seen in all their conclusions. The 
Sermon conclusions consistently reflect the status of 
unassailable truth that revelation possessed for the 
religiously orthodox. Indeed, Paul Alkon, in Samuel 
Johnson and Moral Discipline, observes that "as they are 
more directly didactic and religious, [Johnson's Sermons] 
are artistically less effective than the rest of his work'' 
(191). Alkon's critical observation is more relevant to 
the conclusions of Johnson's Sermons than to other 
sections of the works. The conclusions rely heavily on 
the traditional and highly formalized patterns of diction 
which characterized the homiletic element of the sermon 
tradition--the diction is highly liturgical and often 
paraphrases Biblical forms of address. As a practical 
churchman, Johnson really has no choice. He uses his 
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Sermons' conclusions to summarize, to impose a logical 
structure, to reinforce the outline, to remind the reader 
of the Scriptural text, and to end things with a liturgi-
cal flourish. 
An important rhetorical quality distinguishes the 
conclusions of Johnson's Sermons from the endings of his 
moral essays--restrained emotional involvement with the 
subject matter. Johnson uses the formalized exhortation 
"Let us" rather than the intimate 11 I" or "you". For 
example, in Sermon 19 he begins his final sentence with 
the first person, but ends with a generalized Biblical 
quotation: 
Let us endeavour to reclaim vice, and to improve 
innocence to holiness; and remember that the day 
is not far distant, in which our saviour has 
promised to consider our gifts to these little 
ones as given to himself; and that "they who 
have turned many to righteousness shall shine 
forth as the sun for ever and ever" (Sermon 19, 
213). -
In such passages Johnson seems to be overlooking the 
thoughtful general principles rooted in human experience, 
which are embodied in his beginning paragraphs, for the 
sake of repeating the Scriptural text. 
On some occasions, Johnson concludes his Sermons with 
a liturgical formula: 
An uniform perseverance in these holy practices, 
will produce a steady confidence in the Divine 
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favour, and that confidence will complete his 
happiness. To which that we may all attain, God 
of his infinite mercy grant, for the merits of 
Jesus Christ, our Saviour; to whom, with the 
Father and the Holy Ghost, be ascribed, as is 
most due, all honour, adoration, and praise, now 
and ever! Amen. (Sermon z, 84). 
After examining Johnson's imaginative adaptation of so 
many elements from the English sermon tradition, this 
unoriginal use of formula in several of his Sermon 
conclusions is striking.33 When writing for the ''pulpit 
of orthodoxy," Johnson always concludes his Sermons by 
bowing to the conventions of tradition--to the absolute 
finality of the criteria of religion for addressing the 
vacuity of human existence. 
Johnson's Sermons demonstrate that he refuses to 
accept Scripture blindly, nor does he expect his auditors 
to do so; however, when he tests revelation against life, 
he finds the two in agreement. Our examination of 
Johnson's Sermons has revealed some important deviations 
from those characteristics which he found so praiseworthy 
in the sermons of Blair and other representatives of the 
English sermon tradition--variations which point to his 
pragmatism and to his layman's approach to religion. 
These modifications of the tradition include a general 
33 Additional examples of Johnson's use of liturgical 
formula to conclude his Sermons can be found in Sermon 6, 
73; Sermon 9, 105; Sermon 25, 271; Sermon 27, 299; sermon 
28, 313. - -- --
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introduction to the Sermons' subject-matter grounded in 
human experience; secular diction, parallelism, and the 
disciplined use of figurative devices; the delayed and in 
a sense "buried" outline; and the restrained use of easily 
comprehended Biblical quotations. These techniques 
accentuate the role of experience as a reliable test for 
any proposed consolation for the vacuity of life; indeed, 
even Scriptural revelation is not exempt from that 
critical scrutiny. While Johnson's Sermons formally 
acknowledge that Scriptural revelation provides man with 
such consolations, he always bases his argument on the 
firm foundation of human experience. Johnson's strongest 
impulse was always to be honest with himself and with his 
audience; he rejected what he considered to be 
oversimplification. Johnson's Sermons testify to the 
serious perspective which a layman, engaged in the 
concrete struggles of daily life, can bring to bear on 
religion. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
Johnson described himself in his Rambler essays as "a 
writer whose chief end is the regulation of common life" 
(Rambler 11. 1 57) and who has undertaken "the arduous 
province of preserving the balance of the mental constitu-
tion" (Rambler 47, 253). In doing so, he wanted to 
clarify some fundamental principles of human nature. 
Johnson preferred neither the penchant of some ration-
alists for deduction from ~ priori configurations nor the 
obsession of some pedants with adventitious particulars. 
He had instead an affinity for inductive generalization 
based upon observation and reason; with this orientation, 
he analyzed the conduct of mankind to discover, by drawing 
inferences from life as it is lived, the basic and 
unchanging operational principles of human beings. 
Throughout his Sermons, Johnson demonstrated his under-
standing that the pragmatic bases for action together with 
realistic possibilities of accomplishment needed first to 
be understood before a sermonist could effectively 
motivate men to virtuous action and an improved life. 
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Within the vast array of human trials presented in 
the Sermons, Johnson found confirmation for his basic view 
that the human tragedy lay in the insufficiency of things 
which are limited and ephemeral to a hunger that is 
limitless and infinite. In classical Christian theology, 
this insatiable hunger for wealth, power, fame, or sexual 
gratification within the nature of man is called 
concupiscence. This orthodox theme of the contradiction 
between human desire and human fulfillment, of 
concupiscence, gives a basic coherence to the seemingly 
unrelated subjects treated in the Sermons. Moreover, the 
Sermons demonstrate that Johnson's understanding of human 
nature anticipated many of the discoveries of modern 
psychology, especially in the areas of repression, 
projection, fantasy, delusion, and motivation. As we have 
seen, Walter Jackson Bate argued convincingly that Johnson 
anticipated Freud's theory of repression--the process by 
which man attempts to escape from his anxieties and fears 
by pushing them into the recesses of his unconscious mind 
(Achievement, 93-94). The forces that Freud described 
were mainly sexual, whereas those that concerned Johnson 
were broader. Today, we could call Johnson's focus 
"existential" because it centers on the problems man 
encounters as he tries to grasp the meaning of life. By 
recognizing the existence of such fears in the human 
257 
psyche and by analyzing how such forces shaped human 
character and destiny, Johnson demonstrated "the pain of 
being a man" in a compassionate effort to bring ultimate 
help and comfort, rather than to reflect bitterly and 
cynically on life. 
Indeed, Johnson's Sermons answer the question of how 
man is to be "consoled for the misery of life" in a 
conventionally religious manner--faith in the possibility 
of eternal salvation. The Sermons, however, always frame 
this conventional religious answer within a pragmatic and 
secular understanding of the nature of man. Through 
rational control and common sense, through mature and 
realistic perceptions about the self and abou~ relation-
ships to others, by extending the benefit of one's 
experience to others according to the rule of social 
benevolence, Johnson tells the auditors of his Sermons how 
they may pragmatically alleviate the miseries and problems 
of this life without simply appealing to salvation in the 
next life. 
Johnson's Sermons reflect the insistent concerns of 
many eighteenth century divines with ethical conduct based 
on rewards and punishments, with the free agency of man, 
and with demonstrating that the revelation of Scripture 
and the demands of human reason were compatible. However, 
the variations in Johnson's Sermons from many of the 
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"standards" for an effective sermon which he singled out 
for praise in other sermonists--limiting the subject 
matter, sensitivity to the audience, disciplined and 
restrained use of emotional appeal, gesture and 
intonation; the stylistic characteristics of parallelism, 
controlled use of repetition and figurative devices, 
sensitivity to a choice of diction which stresses 
universal concepts over particular ones, and attentiveness 
to formal structuring techniques within the sermon 
tradition--suggest his predilection to test the truth of 
religious revelation against the reality of experience and 
common sense. 
We have demonstrated that Johnson's deviations from 
traditional English sermon style included a secular 
introduction to the Sermons' subject-matter grounded in 
human experience; secular diction, parallelism, and the 
disciplined use of figurative devices; the delayed and in 
a sense "buried" outline; and the restrained use of 
Biblical quotations. These techniques accentuate 
Johnson's belief that human experience in itself is a 
reliable test for the consolations proposed by religion 
for life's vacuity; indeed, not even Scriptural revelation 
ought to be exempt from the critical scrutiny of pragmatic 
experience. Even when self-consciously assuming the voice 
of "sermon orthodoxy," Johnson could not completely 
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anesthetize his propensity towards skepticism. His 
Sermons testify to the extreme depth and profundity of a 
faith examined and forged from his understanding of the 
nature of man. 
Furthermore, in some significant ways, Johnson's 
observations on the nature of man place him outside the 
prevailing Christian moral philosophies of the eighteenth 
century. Johnson depicts the mind not as a hierarchy of 
conflicting faculties but as an integrated complex; rather 
than advising the sublimation of the imagination and 
desire, he advocates their integration with reason. 
Moreover, the answer to ethical and psychological problems 
is given in the Sermons both in the traditional religious 
terms of Christian purpose and in secular, "psychologi-
cal," terms of a realistic perception about the self and 
one's relationships to others. 
Specifically, Johnson calls for the pragmatic 
exercise of charity to alleviate, at least partially, the 
experience of vacuity in this life. Throughout his 
Sermons, Johnson admonishes his auditors to be prepared to 
aid others; and if they cannot help their fellow men in a 
material way, they can at least extend to them their 
sympathy and try to console them in their moment of 
suffering: 
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The power of godliness, as it is exerted in the 
love of our neighbor, appears in the exact and 
punctual discharge of all the relative and 
social duties. He, whom this power actuates and 
directs, will regulate his conduct, so as 
neither to do injury, nor willingly to give 
offence. He will neither be a tyrannical 
governour, nor a seditious subject; neither a 
cruel parent, nor a disobedient son; neither an 
oppressive master, nor an eye-servant. But he 
will not stop at negative goodness, nor rest in 
the mere forbearance of evil; he will search out 
occasions of beneficence, and extend his care to 
those who have no other claim to his attention 
than the great community of relation to the 
universal Father of mankind . • . . One instance 
of the power of godliness is readiness to help 
the weak, and comfort the fallen, to look with 
compassion upon the frail, to rekindle those 
whose ardour is cooling, and to recall those 
who, by inadvertency, or under the influence of 
strong temptation, have wandered from the right 
way; and to favour all them who mean well, and 
wish to be better, though their meaning and 
their wishes have not yet fully reformed their 
lives (Sermon ]d, 145-147). 
One of the major themes in the Sermons which we have 
examined is that of earthly life as a testing period for 
men. Johnson believed in a system of rewards and 
punishments after death which would be meted out in 
accordance with the way a man has spent his life. Thus, 
in the exercise of charity, men make themselves eligible 
for everlasting rewards. 
However, as an observer of mankind, Johnson knew that 
men are seldom motivated to goodness by the distant 
prospect of bliss, though that bliss is final and 
permanent. Men do good principally in order to relieve an 
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immediate ill and in the Sermons we see charity working in 
just such a way. Man gives his gift in order to escape 
the pain of vacuity and he helps another so that he might 
think well of himself. Johnson's ~ermons demonstrate his 
transformation of the conventional ascetic ideal of 
Christianity into the pragmatic and secular concern with 
self-interest as the real motivator in human nature for 
right conduct. The Sermons do not rule out love of virtue 
for its own sake as a desirable goal, but they make it 
clear that they are not addressed primarily to those who 
already love virtue for its own sake. They are designed 
instead for those who are struggling to progress in the 
practice of virtue and need to have their self-interest 
enlisted on the side of virtue. The Sermons remind us 
that Johnson considered enlightened self-interest a very 
different matter from selfishness and a perfectly 
legitimate foundation for moral action. 
Johnson's concept of what defines evil also reflects 
the complex interrelationship between the religious and 
the secular aspects of his definition of--and exhortations 
to--right conduct. The Sermons demonstrate an understand-
ing of immorality as a process rather than as a static 
concept. If evil is seen as something inherent in a 
person or institution, then it would be within the 
province of the sermon writer to attack those elements. 
However, Johnson does not focus on a static concept of 
evil; this would create a tone and attitude that could 
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produce resentment and so would be counter-productive to 
the moral purpose of the Sermons. Johnson focuses instead 
on the processes by which evil may be produced; he depicts 
the consequences of these processes more by the amount and 
kind of harm done to other people and less by the failure 
to adhere to God's commandments: 
they, who have looked with indifference upon the 
calamities of others, who have scoffed at the 
mourner, and insulted the captive; who have 
diverted the uneasiness of sympathy by vicious 
enjoyments, and suffered others to languish in 
pain or poverty, for want of that relief, which 
would cost only a momentary pleasure, shall be 
condemned to an everlasting society, with those 
beings, whose depravity incites them to rejoice 
at the destruction of mankind. And those who 
have, in obedience to the institutions and in 
conformity to the example of their Saviour, 
endeavoured to alleviate calamities and to 
remove distress; those by whose bounty the gloom 
of prisons has been cheered, and by whose 
tenderness, the languor of sickness has been 
solaced; those by whom oppressive power has been 
disarmed, and helpless innocence been defended, 
shall be exalted to perpetual and unchangeable 
felicity, and stand for ever in the presence of 
God, employed in the contemplation and praise of 
infinite benevolence (Sermon l:]_, 292). 
While Johnson describes solace for evil in the convention-
al terms of hope for happiness in an afterlife, he also 
emphasizes the pragmatic dimensions of virtuous conduct 
and the solace religion offers for the vacuous experiences 
of this life. 
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Johnson is in the forefront of those self-conscious 
thinkers who reacted to Cartesian dualism by emphasizing 
the processes of the mind. He does not think in terms of 
the static concepts of mind against body, or in 
hierarchies of order, but is aware of man's struggle to 
integrate the passions, desires, imagination, and reason. 
We noted earlier William Temple's rejection of the 
"Cartesian faux-pas." Johnson also refused to accept this 
artificial separation of man from his world, of the human 
mind from external matter. With his typical common sense, 
Johnson simply bypassed Descartes and observed that man's 
mind, when healthy, engages the external world in a 
vibrant relationship. Furthermore, Johnson does not 
attack man for his failure to attain the Christian ideal. 
Man is attacked for affectations of importance, for 
unrealistic perceptions, for vanity, for compulsiveness. 
Johnson observes man as a fragmented being because man's 
focus is often limited solely to earthly goals and to this 
world as a place of flux and instability. Religion 
provides man with the means of overcoming the chaos of 
this life in two concrete ways: (1) it suggests those 
pragmatic behaviors which ameliorate the experience of 
life's vacuity, and (2) it urges man to attend to the 
transcendent goal of salvation. 
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Johnson makes clear in his Sermons that the only 
rational way to endure the radical misery of life is by 
placing trust in the truth of revelation: 
We know, therefore, that those whom he shall 
protect cannot be in danger; that neither the 
malice of wicked men, nor of wicked angels, can 
really injure them, but that persecution and 
danger shall only harass them for a time, and 
death set them free from disappointment and from 
pain. He therefore that trusts in God will no 
longer be distracted in his search after happi-
ness, for he will find it in a firm belief, that 
whatever evils are suffered to befall him will 
finally contribute to his felicity; and that by 
"staying his mind upon the Lord, he will be kept 
in peace" (Sermon l.!, 15 5) . 
His response is the traditional, familiar, and convention-
al Christian reply to the problem of life's vacuity. 
Johnson believed in it; yet, he also knew how inadequate 
it was. He knew that it could not solve the misery of 
life; it could only offer consolation--only assuage 
temporarily the anguish of existence. This realization 
deeply disturbed Johnson because of what it meant about 
the nature of life itself as well as the notion of a 
divinely ordered universe. Nevertheless, his response to 
these fears was to seek consolation in the authority of 
the established system of religion. Yet, Johnson's 
Sermons reveal his struggle to assert an unqualified and 
unquestioned acceptance of that authority; the locus of 
this tension suggests his almost "existential" 
understanding of the inter-relationship of religion and 
the nature of man. 
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In presenting religion as a necessary adjunct to 
man's psychological faculties, Johnson is not arguing for 
an escapist, subjective substitute for facing the problems 
of life; rather he sees religion--the Christian faith 
personally applied--as a pragmatic, resolute, rational, 
and objective way of mastering oneself. The ''stability of 
truth" and the "choice of eternity" he believes to be 
solutions to miseries created by all human choices made 
without direction or sound basis. 
Johnson, believing that "the business of life is to 
go forwards" (Idler lJ:.., 225), is not engaged in breast 
beating or in gestures of despair; he demonstrates in his 
Sermons that most of the difficulties and unhappiness of 
life are both personal and spiritual, and that through a 
right understanding of one's needs and through actions of 
responsible choice, many of these difficulties can be 
ameliorated. In opposition to the Stoics, he teaches that 
man's humanity cannot be escaped--desire and imagination 
must and will continue to exist and influence us; and in 
opposition to the Determinists, he argues that these 
faculties are subject to control and direction, and that 
man can choose his goals, his objects of desire and 
pursuit, and his hopes. 
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In his Sermons, Johnson's presentation of the 
dissatisfaction involved in the attainment of worldly 
goals is not intended to promote either despair or stoic 
resignation. Its true design is, in addition to teaching 
a truth about human nature, to promote reflection on the 
validity of religion's ability to alleviate the vacuity of 
life. The presentation of earthly distress and 
frustration is vivid and extensive in the Sermons; it 
functions as a comment on what Johnson believed to be the 
stubbornness of man's heart--his unwillingness to change 
his life or give up his illusions. "Since life itself is 
uncertain, nothing which has life for its basis, can boast 
of much stability" (Rambler 184, 204); therefore, in his 
Sermons, Johnson promotes a doctrine of stability which 
was objectivity based upon experience, reason, and common 
sense, informing and empowering Christian religion. With 
his intense interest in practicality and action, he sees 
this stability as applicable to and effective in our 
current lives--giving direction to our pursuits, hope of 
reward for our endeavors, and power or stimulation for our 
actions for good. 
Johnson uses the Sermons, then, to make a strong case 
for the pragmatic applications of religion. Indeed, the 
religion he advocates throughout the Sermons works most 
effectively in the layman's world filled with vacuous 
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secular preoccupations. That man increases his chances 
for reward after this life by living according to the 
precepts of religion is a bonus. The Sermons are not just 
a guide to Heaven, but a portrait of the limitations of 
man's nature; Johnson counsels us to adopt the counsels of 
religion in order to alleviate the vacuity of life as best 
we can. 
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